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A Letter from the Editor

Historia,

the peer-reviewed student history journal of

Eastern Illinois University and the Epsilon Mu Chapter of Phi Alpha
Theta, began publication in 1992 and continues to provide a strong
tradition of exemplary academic excellence. This collection of essays
represents the continued achievements of undergraduate and graduate
students. Ranging across several disciplines, it is my belief that historical
scholarship inspires great interest and solid research within a range of
academic disciplines. This scholarship has left an indelible mark in the
historical profession as well, which continues to expand its boundaries
through the integration of interdisciplinary approaches. In this spirit, all of
our authors are to be congratulated on making our selection process a
difficult and thought-provoking task.
This year’s volume contains articles of a vast temporal and
chronological scope. From the jungles of Mesoamerica, to the shores of
Algiers, to the crowded pubs of Ireland, we find a number of interesting
analyses of sporting events and nationalist movements alike. From
turbulent Latin American rebellions, Christian missionaries in Korea, and
slanderous political cartoons in the Chicago Times, we can appreciate the
breadth and depth of this journal’s impressive range. We have also
included four book reviews that cover each author’s primary field of
research. We hope that the presence of reviews will establish a tradition
and that will be followed in future volumes of Historia.
ii

I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Joshua Birk, who will
be leaving Eastern for Smith College in the fall. His time, effort, and
patience as our adviser not only helped make this journal a reality, but has
left his mark in a short time as an exemplary teacher and colleague to our
department. I would like to thank the patience and participation of the
editorial board, which was at times, a difficult task to select nine articles.
Finally, I would like to thank the faculty of the history department, whose
leadership and guidance continue to promote the best scholarly work
possible. I hope this year’s journal continues what has become a solid
tradition for the history department and the university.
Chad R. Cussen, Editor
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Oppression in the Defense of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Freedom
of the Press during the Civil War
Brandon Johnson
Brandon Johnson is an undergraduate student in Business from New Lenox, IL. He wrote this paper
for Dr. Leslie R. Hyder in EIU 4158, Freedom of Expression: Dissent, Hate, and Heresy, during the
spring 2009.

The founding fathers of the United States of America knew that the value of
free press brought to a democratic society was both immeasurable and
undeniable. Without a means to disseminate relevant political and social
information to the voting public, the power of elected officials would likely
run unchecked and threaten to destroy the historic work of the
Constitutional Convention. For that very reason, freedom of the press was
fused into the bedrock supporting the nation by enshrining it in the first
amendment in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.
Despite its prominent position in the country’s founding, many
groups throughout United States’ history have challenged freedom of the
press. In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that
America is run by a government “of the people, by the people, for the
people.” True to Lincoln’s statement, the citizens of America during the
1860s had an enormous impact on the interpretation of civil liberties as laid
out in the Bill of Rights. The following paper explores some of the
prevailing public attitudes, professional beliefs, and governmental actions
affecting freedom of the press under the Lincoln Administration during the
Civil War. During this time period, public citizens and newspaper
professionals had at least as much to do with shaping the freedom of the
press as government officials.
Although the Constitution has always guaranteed certain rights to
all citizens, the interpretation and limit of those rights has evolved within
American society over more than two hundred years. Close scrutiny into
the evolution of our civil rights is an excellent way to fully appreciate their
application to modern society, which in turn fosters understanding of the
potential impact of governmental and societal restrictions of these rights.
1

The free speech limitations imposed by Abraham Lincoln, news editors, and
public citizens in the name of preserving the Union illustrate the difficulty
of protecting civil rights in a complicated landscape like the one created by
the Civil War.
There is no doubt that the 1860’s press played a vital role in both
the social and political landscape of the nation. The number of newspapers
in circulation grew rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century until
“there were almost 2,500 on the eve of the Civil War.”1 Newspapers during
this time were often associated with a particular political party, and
generally put forth no claim of impartiality. Despite the unabashed political
motivation that existed amongst most editors during the 1860s, “the ability
of a newspaper to expose hypocrisy or express an opposing view was as
vital as it is today.”2 The abundance of print-worthy news created by the
outbreak of war in 1861 fueled the first industry-wide use of the telegraph;
used extensively by field reporters to send accounts of battles and other
news back to their home offices in large cities like New York and Chicago.
Telegraph rates were high, but so was the potential for profit by being on
the leading edge of a story.
This unprecedented use of communications technology to speed
the rate at which stories went to press resulted in some serious and valid
concerns for the military. If news stories could be reported from the
battlefront, transmitted to the printer in a matter hours, to be printed the
next day, then any mention of troop movements or other vital strategic
information in the articles could provide crucial information to the enemy.
It became common practice to require military officials to approve outgoing
telegraph messages before transmission. Such military officials had broad
legal authorities due to the implementation of martial law by Lincoln
during the war.

1
Brayton Harris, Special!: Correspondents and Newspapers of the American Civil War (New
York: Potomac Books, 1999), 9.
2
Jeffrey Manber, Lincoln’s Wrath: Fierce Mobs, Brilliant Scoundrels and a President’s
Mission to Destroy the Press (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2005), 8.
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There are some historians who portray President Lincoln as a
villain, claiming that he actively manipulated the press throughout his
political career. In their book, Lincoln’s Wrath, Jeffrey Manber and Neil
Dahlstrom comment on some of the acts of vandalism targeted against
printing presses during the Civil War and conclude that it is “not as
outrageous as it may initially seem to believe that the destruction of
dissenting voices was in accordance with the wishes of the president.”3
While Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War were extraordinary, not all
historians view him so negatively. In fact, according to an article written
by Stephen Towne in a journal titled Civil War History, “most historians…
have argued that in the North under Lincoln’s leadership, no concerted,
official policy of governmental interference with the press existed.”4 Those
who defend Lincoln’s actions point to his unenviable task of conducting a
war based upon civil liberties for slaves while combating sedition and
insurrection by secessionist citizens of the Union.
Even critics of Lincoln like Manber and Dahlstrom have cited the
fact that Lincoln and many of his cabinet appointees owed much of their
political success to positive, long-standing relationships with newspaper
editors. Lincoln, like many of his political contemporaries, realized that
newspaper editors were the gatekeepers in any effort to relay political ideas
to the public. The President himself had been quoted saying “no man be he
citizen or president of the United States, can successfully carry on a
controversy with a great newspaper, and escape destruction, unless he owns
a newspaper equally great, with a circulation in the same neighborhood.”5
Lincoln had a profound respect for the ability of the press to rally the public
to a cause.

3

Manber, 7.
Stephen E. Towne, “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the
Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863.” Civil War History 52, no. 1 (Mar.
2006): 4.
5
Manber, 8.
4
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The question then becomes whether Lincoln’s respect for an
association with the press motivated him to support or hinder it during his
time in office. The truth of the matter remains open for debate among
historians. Even so, it is clear that Lincoln possessed an iron-willed
determination to both win the war and reunite the country. To this end, he
took unprecedented measures to stamp out dissidence and protect the
Union during the Civil War.
An unparalleled level of animosity among American citizens
shaped the political landscape during the Civil War. The nation had
literally been torn in half along political lines between the anti-slavery
Union to the North and the pro-slavery Confederacy to the South. The
separation was not a clean break, however, as there were many citizens of
the Union who sympathized with the cause of the South. Further, there
was a prominent anti-war movement in the North that supported the
creation of a sovereign Confederacy if it would bring peace.
As the head of the Union, President Lincoln acted as a lightning
rod for political dissidents in the press who wished to attack the leadership
of the North. Lincoln “was mercilessly lampooned, viciously libeled, and
relentlessly satirized in his own time.”6 Newspapers throughout the
country attacked the president both for political reasons and out of malice.
Press criticism rarely intimidated Lincoln during this troubling time.
Lincoln took no notice of the personal attacks on his character during his
time in office. There were, however, several events and circumstances
during the war that did motivate him to lash out against the press.
Due to the nature of the Civil War, enemies of the Union were
sprinkled throughout the North. There was no easy way to track down
these southern sympathizers and deport them. Thus, sedition was one of
President Lincoln’s primary concerns throughout the conflict. “Lincoln had

6
Harold Holzer, “Lincoln Takes the Heat,” Civil War Times Illustrated 39, no. 7 (Feb. 2001):
44.
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little tolerance for anything that smacked of dissidence.”7 One common
form of sedition during the war was to attempt to persuade soldiers to
desert their posts. Desertion was a serious crime during the war that was
dealt with quite harshly by the government. Lincoln, therefore, did not
hesitate to strike out against individuals who interfered with military
discipline; claiming that he found it “incongruous that he ‘must shoot a
simpleminded soldier boy, who deserts, while he must not touch a hair of
the wily agitator who induces him to desert. I think…to silence the
agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but…a great mercy.’”8
Maintaining the integrity and reliability of the military remained a focus of
Lincoln’s policies throughout the war.
In September of 1862, Lincoln issued an executive order
suspending the writ of habeas corpus for “not only rebels and insurgents
but also abettors who were ‘discouraging volunteer enlistments’ or
‘resisting militia drafts.’”9 In addition to the suspension of habeas corpus
rights, Lincoln declared that people arrested for these seditious acts were
“subject to ‘martial law’ and… ‘liable to trial and punishment by Courts
Martial or Military Commission.’”10 The legal implications for members of
the press were enormous. Military officials could now decide to imprison
members of the press through accusations of sedition with no habeas corpus
protection. Given the level of distaste that many generals had for the
coverage that they received from the press, it is not surprising that the fear
of imprisonment led to a certain level of self-censorship by some reporters.
The press had routinely clashed with military commanders since
the onset of the war. One well documented example involved General
Halleck in mid-1862. While many Union officers were respectful of and
even friendly with members of the press, there were some who chafed under

7

Wyatt Kingseed, “The Fire in the Rear,” American History 42, no. 3 (Aug. 2007): 48.
Ibid., 50.
Sean Mattie, “Prerogative and the Rule of Law in John Locke and the Lincoln Presidency,”
Review of Politics 67, no. 1 (2005): 98.
10
Ibid.
8
9
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the glare of constant public attention that embedded reporters inevitably
brought to the battlefield. Halleck “was becoming increasingly impatient
with the reporters who hung around headquarters,” and goes on to say that
Lincoln “was also under considerable pressure from several of his division
commanders and certain staff officers who resented the needling criticisms
of the reporters.”11 In May of 1862, Halleck issued Field Order No. 54,
which called “for the expulsion of all ‘unauthorized hangers on’ from his
army.”12 When questioned about the definition of the phrase “unauthorized
hangers on,” by his subordinate commanders, Halleck made it clear that he
considered newspaper reporters to be unauthorized. Most field reporters
were expelled from the ranks of Halleck’s forces and denied first-hand
access necessary to report on battles and troop morale. Although there
were several examples of broad-based military suppression of the media,
many actions were aimed at smaller groups or individuals.
When targeting reporters or newspapers proved ineffective at
squelching damaging coverage, members of the military were quick to
arrest and prosecute private citizens suspected of providing information to
the press. As in most American wars, there arose a vocal anti-war political
movement, the Peace Democrats, during the Civil War. Peace Democrats,
referred to as “Copperheads” by Republican newspapers, “wanted to end the
war, even if it meant continued slavery. They held little sympathy for
blacks and believed that Lincoln had consistently acted unconstitutionally
in conducting the war.”13 Ohio Congressman Clement Vallandigham, a
very vocal critic of Lincoln and his policies, lead Copperhead movement. In
fact, “in December 1862, he had boldly introduced a congressional
resolution calling for Lincoln’s imprisonment.”14
Although such a
resolution had little chance of being taken seriously in the House of

11

J.C. Andrews, The North Reports The Civil War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1955), 183.
12
Ibid., 184.
13
Kingseed, 47.
14
Ibid., 48.
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Representatives, Vallandigham had a large public following and strong
associations with several newspaper editors, including the editors of the
Columbus Crisis and Chicago Times.
Vallandigham, through both newspapers and public speeches,
vehemently criticized both the Lincoln administration and the war. As he
traveled across the North, “he articulately and energetically pushed the
envelope in speech after speech, encouraging soldiers to desert and inciting
weary crowds, all the while knowing he enraged official Washington.”15
The huge influence of this congressman meant that any attempted
prosecution under sedition laws risked turning him into a martyr, which
caused Lincoln to remain cautious in the hope that success on the battlefield
would turn the tides of public opinion away from Vallandigham. The
unofficial policy of Lincoln was to avoid drawing attention to the outspoken
critic.
Unfortunately for the president, General Ambrose Burnside had
no such reservations. In April 1863, Burnside “threw down the gauntlet
and issued Order No. 38, threatening death or banishment to anyone
committing treason… A military tribunal would try perpetrators.”16
Vallandigham, who by this time was running for governor in Ohio, saw an
opportunity to get some much needed publicity. A few days after Order
No. 38 was issued, Vallandigham gave a speech “at Mount Vernon, Ohio,
aware that undercover officers stood ready to record his every word.”17
Vallandigham proceeded to declare his disdain for President Lincoln,
General Burnside, and Order No. 38 in very plain and inflammatory
language.
Four days later Vallandigham was arrested in the middle of the
night by military authorities. The congressman was escorted to Cincinnati,
where a military court convicted him of inciting the public in an attempt to

15

Ibid.
Ibid., 49.
17
Ibid.
16
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undermine the government. Since Lincoln had suspended the writ of
habeas corpus, the gubernatorial hopeful had little recourse when “Burnside
ordered Vallandingham imprisoned for the duration of the war.”18
Unfortunately for Lincoln, the result of the military trial played into the
plans of his congressional nemesis.
Though imprisoned, “Vallandigham watched a firestorm of protest
rise throughout the North in an 1860s media frenzy. Free speech and the
right to a fair, civilian trial were the crucial issues.”19 In imprisoning the
influential congressman, Burnside had unwittingly created the political
martyr that Lincoln had hoped to avoid. Protests after the arrest of
Vallandingham were widespread and sometimes violent. Mob actions
included the destruction of the offices of a Republican newspaper, the
Dayton Journal. Although Lincoln believed that military justice had
fittingly punished the actions of Vallandingham, he knew swift action was
needed to staunch the political bleeding. Lincoln had Vallandingham
banished to the Confederate States, where he would be unable to rabble
rouse the northern population. Through this creative response, Lincoln
diffused the situation and eliminated a dangerous political rival.
Angry mobs frequently destroyed newspaper offices and printing
presses during the Civil War. As with the occurrence at the offices of the
Dayton Journal, attacks were often politically motivated and targeted
newspapers that were perceived as intolerably critical of the war. In
August of 1861, mobs descended upon and destroyed the offices of “the
Bangor (Maine) Democrat, August 11; the Easton (Pennsylvania) Sentinal
August 19; the West Chester (Pennsylvania) Jeffersonian, August 20; the
Cumberland (Virginia) Alleghanian, August 23” and several other
newspapers for printing material considered to be in opposition of the
Union cause.20 Although most efforts to suppress newspapers during the

18

Ibid.
Ibid., 50.
20
Brayton Harris, Special! : Correspondents and Newspapers of the American Civil War (New
York: Potomac Books, 1999), 98.
19
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Civil War involved government sanctions, the public had a hand in
“censoring” newspapers as well. If enough people believed that a specific
newspaper was lending an inappropriate level of support to the enemy, then
protests were likely.
Not all public action against newspapers culminated in the
destruction of property. Angry groups of citizens often sent stronglyworded messages to the editor, “encouraging” the self-censorship of
potentially offensive articles. But there was seldom any hesitation to
employ more “aggressive” means of persuasion. In Massachusetts a mob
targeted the editor of the Haverhill Essex County Democrat. The unfortunate
victim “was ‘forcibly taken from his house by an excited mob, and refusing
information, was covered with a coat of tar and feathers, and ridden on a
rail through the town.’”21 After enduring this painful demonstration of
civic displeasure, the editor apologized for the material that he had printed
and swore to never again print articles advocating secession. Other editors
throughout the Union, in the face of similar reprisals, either abandoned
their presses or agreed to “swear allegiance to the U.S. Government.”22
Although mob violence occasionally targeted editors who
supported Union forces, a far more pervasive source of suppression was
self-imposed. Even as secessionist publications criticized and condemned
every move the North made during the war, anti-secessionist editors often
spoke out regarding the importance of censoring material considered
“damaging” to the Union cause. On June 12, 1863, Joseph Medill, editor of
the Chicago Tribune, wrote:
It is licensee they want, not liberty! License to stab the bosom of
the Republic – our beautiful mother! And drag her corpse to be
trampled upon by the blaspheming South – to the end that they
may set up in her stead the loathsome harlot of the Confederacy. If

21
22

Ibid., 100.
Ibid.
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ruffians like these are not to be arrested and punished with severe
penalties, there is no reason in our fighting the rebels at
Vicksburg.23
Editors supporting the Northern cause frequently spoke out in
against any newspaper deemed to have printed unpatriotic material.
Medill’s statements “typify what most of the editors wrote.”24 In addition
to the censorship imposed by the public at large, the editorial profession
itself suppressed the publication of anything considered too provocatively
critical of government policy.
The freedoms of speech and the press, enshrined in our
Constitution, act as the cornerstones of our liberty. Throughout our
country’s history, public and governmental interpretations of these rights
have continued to shape and evolve. It is illuminating to look beneath the
surface narrative of a famous historical event like the American Civil War
and discover that the war itself was not the only conflict raging at the time.
The actions of key players on the battlefield like Generals Halleck and
Burnside, along with political leaders in Washington like President Lincoln
and Congressman Vallandingham, helped to shape attitudes and set
precedents that affect both our perception and the government’s
enforcement of our constitutional rights.
Historians have tended to be pragmatic in their assessment of the
appropriateness and scope of media suppression by the government during
the Civil War. Menahem Blondheim write:
The record does show dozens of wartime incidents that could be
considered substantive infringement of press freedom, even by
nineteenth-century standards. However, when weighing the

23

Hazel Dicken-Garcia and Giovanna Dell'Orto, Hated Ideas and the American Civil War
Press (New York: Marquette Books, 2007), 159.
24
Ibid.
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number of the violations and the limited and temporary nature of
most of them against the long duration of the war, the huge
number of Northern newspapers, and the enormous volume of
public information, not the mention the vehemence of opposition
speech, the significance of those isolated, unsystematic
infringements would appear minimal.25
In contrast to previous conflicts in the history of the United States,
in which the government took an active role in suppressing the media, the
opposition press was given an enormous amount of latitude during the Civil
War. President Lincoln focused his media suppression efforts toward
specific publications actively damaging the war effort, rather than against
the industry as a whole. Even then, governmental actions were often
temporary and rarely heavy-handed.
Public sentiment during the 1860s tended to mirror the actions of
the government. Union judges generally agreed that rulings imposing
shut-downs of secessionist newspapers were rarely necessary. Public
protests and mob actions would often shut these presses down faster than
official sanctions. The patriotic attitudes of most Union editors often
resulted in a cautious approach toward the publication of information that
might hinder the North’s war effort. These factors rendered broad-based
government suppression of the media largely unnecessary.
The United States has come a long way since the onset of the Civil
War. Landmark Supreme Court cases, public protests, and the proliferation
of advocacy groups have advanced the causes of free speech and free press
greatly over that last 150 years. However, thoughtful inspection of the nottoo-distant past provides valuable insight into the evolution of these rights
since the Civil War era.

25

Menahem Blondheim, “Public Sentiment Is Everything: The Union’s Public Communications
Strategy and the Bogus Proclamation of 1864,” The Journal of American History 89, no. 3
(2002): 871.
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A Democratic Impulse?: Political Institutions in Early New England
Towns
Jason Miller
Jason Miller of Tolono, Illinois wrote this essay for Dr. Foy’s Seminar in Early American History in
Fall 2008. He completed his Bachelor of Arts in history at the University of Illinois in December of
2007 where he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi. Currently, he is buried in research for his thesis project,
a social history of political violence and the Copperhead movement in Illinois during the Civil War.

Thirty-nine years after its initial publication, Kenneth Lockridge’s A New
England Town remains a staple in graduate level courses covering the
colonial period. Exploring Dedham, Massachusetts from its inception in
the first half of the seventeenth-century to the midpoint of the eighteenthcentury, Lockridge has posited that during the first one hundred years of its
existence great changes within Dedham’s political community had taken
place. In his depiction, the townsmen metamorphose from an almost
slothful political entity during the seventeenth-century to dyed in the wool
democrats in the eighteenth-century. For Lockridge, this change occurred
because of the shifting socioeconomic, geographic, and political facets of a
growing society in which a populace that once occupied a small, close-knit
community became an enlarging and continually expanding community
with disparate interests.
At its inception, Dedham’s political culture centered upon the allpowerful town meeting and its townsmen. These townsmen, largely
occupied by their agricultural pursuits, did not want to spend time at the
town meeting, the political body that decided every issue by a majority
vote. Encumbered by a myriad of issues demanding the townsmen’s
attention and vote, they created the position of selectmen to administer the
town’s will on a day-to-day basis. From this point forward, an elite cadre of
comparatively wealthy selectmen elected by the townsmen ruled Dedham.
These selectmen exercised all the power that the community of townsmen
could exercise at their meetings, but on a day-to-day basis. The townsmen,
as Lockridge accounts, could have exercised greater control over the
selectmen, but because of the deferential nature of Puritan society’s belief in
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the “natural inequality of men,”1 allowed them to operate largely
unimpeded. This deference to authority and political harmony died with
the founding generation. With their deaths and subsequent issues of a
growing population, shrinking land availability near town, and a myriad of
conflicts based on sectionalism within the township, Dedham’s residents
increasingly turned upon one another. The result was political infighting
leading to attempts at secession and equally vigorous attempts to maintain
the town proper. This, for Lockridge, was evidence to the rise of an “active
democratic behavior” within early eighteenth-century New England.2
It is an impossibility to explore the primary sources from which
Lockridge drew his conclusions. A New England Town is a social history
based upon town records that still affords an opportunity for
reinterpretation, though a guarded one. Contingent on Lockridge’s faithful
representation of sources, it is possible to draw alternative conclusions from
his evidence and propose a new model that not only explains the early
political stability of New England towns, but also the fractious nature of
politics during the eighteenth century. Imposing the model of Communal
Authoritarianism, in which a community that is active in policing itself to
ensure communal adherence to and progress towards commonly held
values, beliefs, and ambitions, upon seventeenth-century, Dedham reveals
that the townsmen are not as deferential as they appear. Creating the
position of, and investing their power in, the selectmen, New England
townsmen exercised ultimate control and oversight. They actively policed
the selectmen’s actions and their repercussions, creating the peaceful
political existence that Lockridge mistakenly attributed to political
deference. At the inception of the eighteenth-century, population pressures
began stressing their political system because of the relative ease at which
they could be corrupted.

1

This view held that the more prosperous members of society were blessed by God and should
serve as an example to be followed by those who were not. Kenneth Lockridge, A New England
Town (New York: Norton, 1970), 10.
2
Lockridge, 138.
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Dedham During the Seventeenth-Century
The Puritan settlers of New England sought to establish a stable
society within the howling wilderness of the North American continent.
Through the creation of covenants, town meetings, and selectmen, their
investment paid immediate dividends. In comparison with early Virginian
settlers, inhabitants of the early Puritan settlements enjoyed remarkable
stable social and political lives. Lockridge has proposed the model of
“Conservative Corporate Voluntarism” as an explanation of how this
stability was achieved at the local level. Key to this local stability was the
wise and judicious use of power by the towns’ selectmen operating within
the construct of a covenant and a largely passive populace. The selectmen
routinely settled disputes in such a manner both beneficial to the
individuals involved and the community. The routine manner in which
they settled disputes is irrefutable. However, the downplaying of the town
meeting and of the agency of individual townsmen within Dedham’s
political culture overshadows a more promising way of understanding just
how and why towns such as Dedham achieved social and political stability.
It is difficult to fathom that a community so devoted and fervent in their
desire for stability, and a peaceful Christian existence, would be so passive.
The proposal here is to adopt a different model that reinvests the power
into the people in a way that fits the evidence Lockridge presented.
This proposed model is what can be termed Communal
Authoritarianism. Communal Authoritarianism can be defined as a
community that is active in policing itself to ensure communal adherence to
and progress towards commonly held values, beliefs, and ambitions. An
easy way of envisioning this model is through a set of isosceles triangles in
a position so that they form a figure similar to an X. The populace with its
beliefs and values would be positioned at the base of one triangle and the
selectmen at the junction between the two triangles. The investment of the
populace’s power is represented by a vertical line from the midpoint of the
base of the triangle rising towards the juncture between the triangles.
Once that power reaches the juncture (the selectmen) the power is then
redistributed on the other side. If the two triangles match in size the
community’s needs and aspirations have been met. If, however, the other
triangle’s base is too large or too small, their needs and wants have not
14

been met, resulting in a refusal to reinvest their power into the group,
making individual or whole sale changes where necessary.
This model is predicated on a commonly held mindset among the
community. Though there existed some stratification in the distribution of
wealth, the community was based upon commonly held values and external
pressures which bound them together. New England towns of this period
were based on “covenants or mini-constitutions that directed who was
allowed to live there and how they were supposed to conduct themselves.”3
In early Dedham, every male resident bound himself to a covenant that
promised to “receive only such unto us as may be probably of one heart
with us.”4 Through the exclusion of those who were “contrary minded,”
Dedham’s villagers ensured a common ideological bond among its
members. During a dispute the covenant required villagers to turn towards
their neighbors for a resolution.5 Villagers needed assurance that the
neighbors shared a common mindset. The social contract was not the only
factor contributing to group cohesion. The passage of the litmus test
determining their moral fitness to join the community, the common
experience of an Atlantic crossing, residence in an isolated town near
wilderness, close proximity to Amerindians believed to be devil worshipers,
and the shared experience of oppression in England collectively acted as a
trial by fire in which the residents of Dedham drew their motivation and
strength to remain in and at peace with the group. Dedham‘s first
generation was devoted to their community and its utopian vision is evident
in “the overwhelming majority of the settlers came to Dedham to stay.
They neither ranged restlessly west nor sought wealth in the developing
metropolis of Boston.”6 Willingness to stay in one area was not a passive
acceptance of their lot, but a coherent and intensive attempt to create that
“city upon a hill.”
The town of Dedham was settled in 1635. In March of that year
the General Court of the colony gave the assembly of townsmen in Dedham
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and elsewhere authorization “to make bylaws not repugnant to the laws of
the colony and to ‘choose their own particular officers.’”7 Though
Lockridge states that it was “shortly” after this that Dedham elected a
board of selectmen, this ignores four years of rule by the town meeting.
Over those four years they had not been able to expediently use those
meetings to resolve their problems. It was not until May 1639 that the
townsmen established the board of selectmen. This is what they meant by
the “long experience that the general meeting of so many men in one
[assembly to consider] […] the common affairs thereof has wasted much
time to no small damage.”8 The men of Dedham had not been passive in
the administration of their local government, or the course by which they
sought to achieve their utopian vision. If they had been passive, then there
would never have been the need for the selectmen. Furthermore, the fact
that the executive powers were not wholly surrendered to these selectmen
and that the town meeting acted as an oversight is indicative that the
townsmen had a stake in Dedham’s future and felt the need to ensure that
their vision was fulfilled.
The selectmen were under the watchful eye of the populace. As
noted by Lockridge, many of the selectmen began their political careers in
lower positions of government such as a fenceviewer or hogreeve. Only
after each had “submitted himself to the town’s watchful eye” could he have
gained or lost the “necessary respect” to become a selectman.9 Once in this
position, a selectman would find himself in day-to-day contact with his
fellow citizens. In these daily encounters he would have to assign guilt or
innocence to a party, negotiate the location of public roads, or a whole
assortment of other issues. In fact, “It was a rare townsman who did not
find himself either wanting or having to attend the selectmen at several of
their meetings each year, and it was a rare selectman who did not find
himself judging most [of] his fellow townsmen in the course of a year.”10 It
is in these disputes, such as John Gay’s request for town land to build a
barn or the punishment of men who took wood from public lands, that
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illustrate the political agency of the community through the actions of the
selectmen. The selectmen had to be fair in their response to these requests
and illegal activities. They could neither deny out of hand a request or
overreact in cases in which punishment was necessary, and expect to
maintain the peace. The selectmen shared a common ideology and goal
with the people they served and therefore sought to act fairly within the
perceived parameters of that goal. If they did not, they were deemed
unrepresentative of the communal ideology and removed from their
position as the bureaucrats for the aggregate dictator that was the Dedham
population.
It comes as no surprise that the wealthier members of this society
dominated the position of selectmen. While they may have been wise and
judicious in their use of power, this can just as easily be attributed to the
process described above as it can to Lockridge’s unspoken acceptance of the
Great Person Theory. The Great Person Theory is based on the belief that
exceptional leaders possess extraordinary qualities and skills.11 Recall that
the town was based on an exclusionary principle, only those who passed a
rigorous personal examination were allowed to stay and there were many
similar experiences which created a common mindset. This is not to say
that the inhabitants of the town were exactly alike and did not have
differences of opinion, they all shared a common history and ideological
background that informed the way they related to the community and
treated their neighbors. That the wealthy were in the position of leadership
more often can more likely be ascribed to the Situational Approach to
Leadership from Social Psychology. This theory holds that external,
situational factors can and do influence who will become the leader of a
group.12 The townsmen did not simply elect the wealthy because of
divinely ordained reasons—that they were blessed, therefore, possessed
superior morals—nor does it mean that the voters necessarily “liked to elect
the most substantial of the mature townsmen,”13 rather, because of their
isolation, labor intensive occupation, and a whole host of other factors, the
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wealthier members of the community were the logical choice for leadership.
Their slightly higher appointment rate allowed the less wealthy to focus
upon everyday tasks with some assurance their desires and views were
being upheld consistently throughout the community.
Despite the power the selectmen held in Puritan society, they
were still accountable to the town meeting. Though the General Court of
the colony regulated who could and could not vote, a clear majority of the
male taxpayers in the town were eligible to vote in these meetings
throughout this period.14 As Lockridge argues, these men were just as
powerful as the selectmen and more influential in the sense that they also
functioned as an oversight committee. Every so often the town “would
reaffirm the broad mandate of power given to the board” of selectmen and
through this reaffirmation “confirm the ultimate power of the meeting.”15
They also had the power to vote a selectman, the whole board of selectmen,
or the very position in and of itself out of political existence. Outside of an
incident in 1660 when the whole town voted to “withdraw the power of the
selectmen,” Lockridge portrays this meeting as passive, content with
leaving the running of the town to the selectmen.16 One possible
explanation for this supposed passivity can be found in the day-to-day
interactions in which deals between the town, represented through the
selectmen, and individual residents resolved personal disputes amicably for
the needs of the town and the individuals involved. Personal quarrels,
because of these interactions, were funneled away from the town meeting
and did not become political disputes. Another explanation for Lockridge’s
conclusion can be found in a close perusal of his math in relation to the
1666 tax list and the number of terms served by men of different rank.
Assuming that wealthy selectmen could be considered “wealthy” during all
their terms, for the 25 years between 1639 and 1666 the wealthy served a
total of 14 years for an average of 3.5 terms for man. The middling and the
poor served for a total of eleven years with an average of terms served for
the middling sort around 5.8 terms.17 Of course, averages in government

14

Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 46.
16
Ibid., 48.
17
These statistics are derived from information presented by Lockridge on pages 42-44.
15

18

representation are by no means definitive. This pattern suggests a higher
turnover rate than Lockridge asserts, with the board of selectmen being
anchored by those few individuals who were steadfast and appealing to the
community’s wants and desires. If this would hold up to higher historical
scrutiny, the town meeting would have to be reclassified as an active and
vengeful polity asserting its vision of society.
Dedham and other New England Towns in the Eighteenth-Century
By the last decades of the seventeenth-century, the utopian
ambitions of New England towns were beginning to wear away. Victims of
population growth and its subsequent dispersal, the deaths of their
founders, and the Great Awakening of the early half of the next century
eroded the towns’ singular communal ambition and created factions vying
for political power. For Lockridge, these factions were the humble
beginnings of “an active democratic behavior” where residents would come
to “accept the vocal and sometimes violent conflicts that give rise to that
kind of democracy.”18 Yet, as with the early exploration of Lockridge’s
seventeenth-century Dedham, there is an alternative explanation for their
behavior based on the central thesis posed earlier—Communal
Authoritarianism. Though the utopian ambition of this model imposed by
their founders was lost, its political institutions of the town meeting and
selectmen as well as the political relationship between the two survived
well into the eighteenth-century. Factions existed within Dedham and
other towns such as Concord, but they were not operating under some
before-its-time democratic impulse. Rather, they were operating within the
political framework and constraints of Communal Authoritarianism.
As they had during the seventeenth-century, eighteenth-century
New England townsmen centered their social and political lives on their
town. Most, if not all, towns still politically communicated with the outside
world solely through their delegate to the General Court. This delegate
was expected to follow his own discretion in representing a town’s interests
unless instructed otherwise by the town meeting.19 With limited political
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contact the townsmen still held the ultimate power within their isolated
community. If they did not make people sign the covenant, they still
actively “warned out” those who were undesirable. Conversely, if a
newcomer to town was deemed to be a hardworking, productive individual
they would be allowed to stay, provided they could afford to setup shop or
buy land. In effect, while no longer necessarily tied to one another by
affections of love in the sight of God or a common migration experience,
many communities still exercised their right to exclusive residency. This
was important because, the town’s political power still lay with the
enfranchised townsmen who either by their own rule or through their
appointed bureaucrats—the selectmen—“claimed authority over anything
that happened within […] [the town’s] borders” from moral
transgressions of members of the town to the building of roads, levying of
taxes, and religious and property disputes.20
With the growth in population, the resolutions to disputes that
were acceptable to both the town and the individual that had characterized
these communities in the seventeenth-century became nigh impossible in
the eighteenth-century. At their inception, towns such as Dedham,
Andover, and Concord had formed a central village around the
meetinghouse. From this village, farmers would journey to work their
fields that lay just beyond the limits of the village. As the community
granted subsequent land holdings to its men, the distance a farmer had to
travel to his lands grew. In the early days, problems such as these were
esolved by land swaps negotiated between the town’s selectmen and the
individual farmer. As more and more land came to be distributed,
landholding townsmen found themselves increasingly hemmed into the
village and isolated from their landholdings. Many of these men, or their
sons who were coming of age and stood to inherit land from their fathers,
took it upon themselves, for the sake of convenience, to leave the village
and plant their roots closer to their landholdings. As more and more men
began to settle these regions, the seeds of discord were being sewn one
settler at a time.21
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Eventually, these seeds would sprout and blossom into highly
divisive political issues. As Robert Gross notes, “With town government
affecting so much of daily life, no New England community could escape
political conflict. A road urgently needed by a man at the outskirts was
often a wasteful expense to an inhabitant near the center, while one
churchgoer’s learned preacher was another’s prideful sinner on the way to
hell.” Problems such as these, and larger issues such as secession tied
directly to them, were rampant throughout eighteenth-century New
England towns.22 During the early period of these town’s existence, when
the founders as well as their ideologies were still alive, most townsmen
continued to live in or in close enough proximity to the village that
everyone was likely to see the need for a road or to support a single
preacher. During the eighteenth-century in towns such as Dedham and
Concord, the population of townsmen and thereby the controlling power
remained concentrated in the original village. The townsmen were largely
able to elect men with whom they had daily contact and shared their local
concerns. However, the numbers of those living in the periphery continued
to grow. These “outlivers” began to “wonder whether their interests were
fully considered” when these selectmen met or when the town meeting
gathered and repeatedly denied their petitions over a myriad of issues
deemed by the village dwelling townsmen as against the interests of the
town. 23 In Dedham and Concord, these residents of the periphery who were
outnumbered and seemingly politically disfranchised and neglected sought
to gain control of their political lives. They did so by appropriating and
abusing the political system under which their ideologically united
ancestors had lived.
To demonstrate this trend , it is paramount to explore specific
examples within New England society. As early as 1704, signs of the larger
conflict between the village and periphery were surfacing in Dedham. After
building a coalition of townsmen in the outlying areas and townsmen living
in the village, and after three highly contentious votes over the month of
March, the board of selectmen that had been dominated by men from the

22
23

Gross, 11.
Lockridge. 103-107.

21

village was replaced by a board in which men from the periphery dominated
by a four to one margin. These new selectmen from the periphery kept
their political intentions quiet during the election. Once they assumed their
positions and they attempted to win political concessions for the outlying
section of town they were soundly defeated by the townsmen on repeated
occasions. Some amount of political trickery must have occurred because
why would a majority of townsmen vote in a slew of candidates over the
objections of the incumbent board if they knew they were going to oppose
their policies in the first place? They must have been tricked. Once they
realized this deception the townsmen sprung into action and checked their
selectmen’s power. Over the next couple of years the peripheral influence
“gradually lost control of the board of selectmen” and the village was once
again in control. 24
Twenty-three years later an alliance of men of the outlying areas
around Dedham again sought to “control the mechanisms of town
government and this time [meant] to force the town to grant independence
to several of the outlying sections.”25 Men of the outlying areas had
realized the basic weakness of the founders’ political system. The position
of selectmen had arisen in the early years of colonial settlement when it
became clear that townsmen could not effectively administrate their own
town or deal with day-to-day issues in an efficient manner. The selectmen
were invested with the town meeting’s powers to resolve these disputes.
The community at this time was a relatively small group of people where
everyone was attending the same social functions and, likely, expressing the
same general desires for the betterment of the town. In this small
community, the selectmen and their actions were on display for everyone to
see and were responsible to the town meeting. Only those townsmen that
attended the town meeting could vote or exercise the townsmen’s oversight
of the selectmen. If the townsmen were the aggregate dictators and the
selectmen their bureaucrats, the peripheral men realized that they could
seize control of the town meeting by stuffing it with men sympathetic to
their cause thereby forcing the town into acquiescing to their demands and
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into electing a sympathetic board of selectmen. In 1727, this tactic
succeeded in winning a board of selectmen full of peripherally inclined men.
With that accomplished these men then moved the meeting towards
recognizing the petitions of independence for the outlying areas of town.
Men from the village, realizing the tactic that had brought this about and
appropriating it for their own means, exited the meeting and quickly
rounded up “lazy yeomen” who had not attended the meeting “to restore
their majority” and defeat the petitions. 26 Though the board of selectmen
lay in league with the peripheral area, the awakened body of townsmen
from the village successfully thwarted petitions for independence during
subsequent meetings. In March of 1728, when the election of selectmen
was once again up for consideration by the townsmen, the faction in
support of secession rushed through a resolution that “amounted to a
declaration that, contrary to province law, a man with any taxable property
at all could vote in the meeting.”27 Being that the men in the outlying areas
were far less likely to meet the provincial requirements for the vote, this
resolution was designed to enfranchise men from the peripheral regions and
ensure the reelection of selectmen sympathetic to secession. These men
were duly elected, but the moderator, apparently sensing what had
happened, “expressed his doubts or even tried to adjourn the meeting” and a
confrontation ensued that resulted in a brawl.28 The next day the town
meeting reassembled and finished electing selectmen sympathetic to
secession, but defeated the resolutions that would have allowed secession to
come to fruition. In the next year, the town reestablished its control of the
selectmen and the fractious debate seemed to be on a course of continual
discord.29 The General Court, however, stepped in. By 1748, after twenty
plus years of continued political discord, the General Court did not
recognize the independence of any outlying areas but instead created four
precincts within the town of Dedham. With the status of precinct, each
area could elect and support its own minister. In the end, the political
discord within this community was apparently ended by the assignment of a
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selectmen’s post to each of the precincts and special interest groups. As
Lockridge notes, “Neither side’s definition of community had won and
neither would ever win. The battle had ended in a cease-fire, an armistice, a
truce.”30
Particularly with the secession of outlying areas, such occurrences
were not limited to Dedham. Similar events with similar outcomes
occurred throughout New England up to the American Revolution. In the
case of Concord, the debates revolved around religious strife caused by the
reverberations of the Great Awakening, the building of roads, the
positioning of the school house, and secession of outlying areas. Here, as in
Dedham, the delegation of “controversial issues to selectmen proved to be
no solution to strife. Indeed, the policymaking failures of the town meeting
simply intensified an ongoing struggle among sections to dominate the
selectmen.” And, like Dedham, “the outcome of annual elections turned
principally on which quarter of town could jam more inhabitants into the
town hall.”31 Both like and unlike Dedham, who eventually succumbed to
political compromise imposed from the General Court, Concord townsmen
cut the number of selectmen down to three—one for each faction of the
debates. The townsmen, however, continued to debate the issues in the
town meeting.32 Though Lockridge’s account ends in the 1740s and never
states whether townsmen still contested political power in the town
meeting, it can be assumed that like the case of Concord, they still met and
debated the issues of their day.
In all of the cases discussed above, factions within the town sought
to gain a political advantage by taking control of a political system that had
been formed under the auspices of a unifying ideology in small communities
with watchful neighbors. Communal Authoritarianism did not exist in the
eighteenth-century. The communal ideology and ambition had gone.
However, the political structure, born in the exigencies of the town’s
infancy, where the townsmen invested their power into the selectmen but
exercised political oversight of their actions persisted. Understanding that
the town meeting represented an empty political shell devoid of any
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unifying ideology outside of section, townsmen actively sought to use the
meeting itself, where only votes counted, to gain the advantage for one side
or the other. To do so, factions within New England towns used the
political existence of their ancestor’s model to impose their will upon
everyone else by stuffing the town meeting with sympathetic townsmen. It
was a non-democratic, non-republican political maneuver made by factions
that understood the political system under which they were operating.
This resulted in a deadlocked political system that could not resolve itself.
A majority of townsmen could deny the independence of a secessionist
section while the selectmen could be of that secessionist mindset. This
polarization is evidence of the continued political structures that had
resided in these towns during the seventeenth-century in which townsmen
did not defer to selectmen’s judgment lightly, but actively monitored their
every move in day-to-day interactions and at the town meeting in a very
small community. What had changed in the eighteenth-century, however,
was that there were geographically defined self interests that pulled the
bonds of unity apart.
Toward A New Narrative
Communal Authoritarianism within early New England ultimately
relied upon consent from the populace of any given town. The communal
spirit of early Dedham was held together by shared experiences and the
belief and hope that it was possible to create a more perfect society based
upon pure devotion to God and group piety. Dedham was exclusive in that
no one could become a member unless they passed a rigorous test of their
character. If they were deemed to be “one heart with us” they were
admitted. Through the selection process, the town created a group
cohesive in their outlook on the proper role of society and individuals
within that society in achieving their ultimate utopian community. Though
they attempted to administer their own affairs as a group, it became difficult
because of unknown doctrinal arguments or personal property disputes. In
order to facilitate the implementation of their master plan for their town,
they invested all the power of the general town meeting into a group of
selectmen to administer day-to-day and very specific problems. The effect
of this concentration of power was returned to the populace on a day-to-day
basis. The townsmen expressed whether they felt that these selectmen
25

ruled justly or unjustly, or in accordance with their general desire for a
utopian community, at the next town meeting. If their truly was an
absence of political discord it does not necessarily mean that the townsmen
were passive. It could also mean that the selectmen were fulfilling their
obligations to the community amicably. After all, they were Puritans who
lived in fear of a vengeful God. When there was discord, and the selectmen
removed, it can safely be assumed that the selectmen had not fulfilled their
obligations or had exercised some perceived abuse of power. Otherwise,
year after year the townsmen reinvested their power into the seven
selectmen to administer in day-to-day affairs. The townsmen’s needs and
wants were regularly reconciled with the greater utopian vision of the
community. Thus, their needs and wants, such as land and the issue of the
placement of public roads did not assume the size of a large, destructive
political fight. Through the years in which the founders lived, this model of
Communal Authoritarianism worked like a well-oiled political and social
machine, keeping the peace until the next generation rose to power.
With changing attitudes towards religion, land pressures, and
other socioeconomic pressures the utopian ambition was lost in the
eighteenth-century. What was not lost, however, was the political
structure laid out by their forefathers. As the expansion of the town
roceeded, interests between geographically defined sections with disparate,
antagonistic interests arose. Each side, knowing the nature of the political
structure bequeathed to them, sought to exploit it for their factional gain.
Perceptive that only those who were in attendance at the town hall would
be considered the electorate, the factions sought to pack the meetings with
as many sympathetic townsmen as possible. The result was political
deadlock and far short of democracy.
The date in which Communal Authoritarianism ceased to operate
remains slightly ambiguous.
In towns like Concord, that largely
maintained their political autonomy and integrity from outside influence,
the taxation from Britain following the Seven Years War and, more
importantly, the revocation of their right to assemble in town meetings
without permission from British officials stirred them from their selfcontained political shell and hastened the creation of a polity that was
increasingly aware that their livelihood, both politically and economically,
was tied to the outside world. During the economic crisis that accompanied
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the War for Independence, they would become fully aware how much their
livelihood depended upon the outside world. With the British defeat, the
political system in which Communal Authoritarianism had existed within
was gone. The townsmen, now largely aware and concerned with their
new connections to the outside world, and with the knowledge from
Communal Authoritarianism of just what mob rule by people with unlike
interests could do to their lives, were among the first to step towards a
modern form of democracy. Thus, just as Communal Authoritarianism had
been born in extreme political circumstances, it died in extreme political
circumstances.
Despite any reservations, the birth of a republic in the 1780s does
not necessarily mean that all of the inhabitants of that new republic had
been undergoing an evolution preparing them for this new political
existence. The people of New England towns, like most people, had clung
to their past more readily than they had embraced an unknown future. In
the end, this interpretation is hampered by the fact that it has relied largely
on Lockridge’s evidence. Not only is it hampered by his evidence, but it is
also hampered by the way in which Lockridge represents his evidence. One
can glean an alternative explanation from his work suggests that the
experience of Dedham and other New England towns is not an open and
shut case for “Conservative Corporate Voluntarism” or some before its time
democratic impulse. Instead, it is a topic that is in need for new
investigations by a new generation of historians.
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At the turn of the-eighteenth century, the English public was confronted
with numerous and conflicting interpretations of Africans, slavery, and the
slave trade. On the one hand, there were texts that glorified the institution
of slavery. Gabriel de Brémond’s The Happy Slave, which was translated
and published in London in 1686, tells of a Roman, Count Alexander, who
is captured off the coast of Tunis by “barbarians,” but is soon enlightened to
the positive aspects of slavery, such as, being “lodged in a handsome
apartment, where the Baffa’s Chyrurgions searched his Wounds: And…he
soon found himself better.”1 On the other hand, Bartolomé de las Casas’
Popery truly display'd in its bloody colours (written in 1552, but was still being
published in London in 1689), displays slavery in the most negative light.
De las Casas chastises the Spaniards’ “bloody slaughter and destruction of
men,” condemning how they “violently forced away Women and Children
to make them slaves, and ill-treated them, consuming and wasting their
food.”2 Moreover, Thomas Southerne’s adaptation of Aphra Behn’s
Oroonoko in 1699 displays slavery in a contradictory light. Southerne
condemns Oroonoko’s capture as a “tragedy,” but like Behn’s version,
Oroonoko’s royalty complicates the matter, eventually causing the author
to show sympathy for the enslaved African prince.
After 1688, the public sphere expanded to enormous proportions
and the English could read about the slave trade through the works of

1

Gabriel de Bremond, The Happy Slave: a Novel in Three Parts Compleat /Translated from the
French by a Person of Quality (London: Gilbert Cownly, 1686), 9.
2
Bartolome de las Casas, Popery truly display'd in its bloody colours, or, A faithful narrative of
the horrid and unexampled massacres, butcheries, and all manner of cruelties, that hell and
malice could invent, committed by the popish Spanish party on the inhabitants of West-India
(London: R. Hewson, 1689), 5. While the reproduction of Casas’ work mainly portrays English
attitudes toward the Spanish, it represents one facet of the English Weltanschauung which
abhorred slavery and the slave-Trade.

28

popular scholarship and Royal African Company publications. The works
of the Company contained surprisingly detailed accounts of the trade that
focused on business, economics, and numbers. And yet, the validity of the
information attained by the leaders and stockholders of the Royal African
Company, and the rest of England, proved questionable. This information
often excluded Critical details about African society and the human aspect
of the slave trade. Popular writers and scholars, who created a speculative
view of the slave trade, filled this void in the Company’s accounts of the
slave trade. Moreover, the sources available to the English failed to hold
the standards of validity needed to build a complete understanding of race
and slavery. Royal African Company (RAC) publications left out the human
aspect while popular scholars and authors artificially created a human
aspect. This process would have disastrous effects for the collective
English Weltanschauung (German word, literally translated as “worldview”). Similarly, the conflated the meanings of words like “slave” and
“negro” in RAC correspondence and pamphlets created a society that would
eventually treat all “negroes” as “slaves,” and help delay British abolition.
In order to determine the changes that the English Weltanschauung
underwent during this period, this essay seeks to investigate the factors
contributing to decisions made by the leaders and stockholders of the Royal
African Company) and how these decisions may have shaped Englishmen’s
conceptions of Africans and slaves.3 Three separate steps are required,
namely, ascertaining who the leaders and stockholders of the RAC were
and how they got their information, determining how information was
conveyed to the wider society, both through the Company and through
popular literature, and analyzing the use of the words “slave,” “negro,” and
“native,” and the contexts in which they were used in correspondence and
pamphlets. English society at the turn of the eighteenth-century had not
yet fully assumed that all Blacks were inherently slaves; it was well on its
way.
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The need for discussing the English slave trade from such a
vantage point emerges from the well-established, but still lacking,
historiography of the slave trade. Historians from Philip Curtin, K.G.
Davies, Elizabeth Donnan, and Eric Williams to the more recent works of
William A. Pettigrew, Susan Amussen, Kenneth Morgan, David Eltis and
David Richardson have adequately mapped most areas of the trade.4 Each
of these works touches on important aspects of the trans-Atlantic slave
trade, but leaves some questions unanswered. Pettigrew’s works focus on
the political and legal aspects of the changes that occurred in 1688 as they
relate to the slave trade, leaving questions about the social environment of
England and the West Indies. “The Costs of Coercion,”, brings economic
factors into the discussion, but likewise leaves social effects of the slave
trade unexamined. Davies’ The Royal African Company, on the other hand,
touches upon the issues of communication and efficiency within the
Company, but creates effects on the greater society out of the discussion.
Finally, Amussen makes powerful connections about the effects of the trade
as they relate to the structure of work, gender, and law, but ignores a
discussion of the larger society as a whole. With this in mind, the current
scholarship fails to make fundamental connections between the slave trade
and its influence on the collective English Weltanschauung.
The Organization of the Royal African Company
The RAC’s organization remained much like that of other jointstock companies of the eighteenth-century. Its chief officers included a
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Governor, Sub-Governor, Deputy Governor and twenty-four elected
Assistants. The charter required Assistants to hold at least ₤400 of stock.
Moreover, they were elected by shareholders who received one vote for
every ₤100 of stock. The Assistants met twice a week to guide the day-today business of the Company and twice a year—once to elect a Governor,
Sub-Governor, and Deputy Governor and once to announce a statement of
the Company’s stock.5 Assistants initially allowed served for only three
consecutive years, but after 1691 this rule was dropped. At the same time,
the Company decided to raise the minimum stock holdings for Assistants
from ₤400 to ₤1,000, with no more than ₤250 being previously-owned
stock. Sub and Deputy Governors were limited to one consecutive twoyear term; however, influential people often rotated between the positions
of Assistant, Sub-Governor, and Deputy Governor, creating a stable group
of decision-makers.6 Whereas the entire Court of Assistants met about
once a week, the Company established a number of Sub-Committees to
assist in the duties of running the Company. Davies notes that Assistants
served on one or more sub-committees.7 The Company pushed the entire
burden of executive decision-making to the Assistants and their subcommittees.8 What emerges from Davies’ description is an extremely large
company ran by twenty-four of its most wealthy investors, who met
multiple times a week, and were responsible for nearly every decision the
Company made. Because these twenty-four Assistants met so often, they
were London-bound and found little time to travel to the places where the
Company purchased slaves. Assistants rarely acquired knowledge of the
slave trade from firsthand experience.
In addition, those who ran the RAC had several common
characteristics. First, most of the influential members of the Company
obtained multiple investment interests. Most of the officials of the RAC
established interests in the British East India Company. For example, Sir
John Banks, a wealthy merchant, financier, and director of the Royal
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African Company, likewise served as a director of the East India Company
and was involved with the Levant Company.9 Similarly, George Berkeley,
an influential politician and founding member of the RAC, was a member of
the East India Company in 1680 and a governor of the Levant Company in
1681.10 Sir Josiah Child represented a “passive investor” whose central
interest remained with the East India Company, despite being an early
Assistant of the RAC.11 Jeffrey Jeffreys, Assistant of the RAC in the 1680s,
participated in the tobacco trade, established business relations with the
East India Company in the 1690s, and became a licensed Separate Trader,
someone who traded separately from the Company, in the early 1700s.12 Sir
John Moore participated in both the Royal African and East India
Companies around the time of the revolution, being an Assistant for the
former and the second largest shareholder in the latter.13 Sir Dudley North
served as Assistant, Sub and Deputy Governor of the Royal African
Company, Governor of the Russia Company, and involved in the Levant
Company.14 In short, many of the Assistants of the RAC struggled with the
demands of multiple different companies.
Similarly, those who ran the RAC tended to be wealthy individuals
with deep-rooted political interests. For example, D.W. Hayton’s The
House of Commons, 1690-1715 lists twenty-five individuals who were both
Members of Parliament and holders of significant offices within the RAC.
Many of these, such as Sir Thomas Cooke, Sir Francis and Sir Samuel
Dashwood, Nathaniel and Frederick Herne, John and Jeffrey Jeffreys, and
Sir William Pritchard, also held significant interests in the East India
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Company.15 Additionally, Davies notes that in the first two decades of its
existence, the Company listed nearly fifteen peers or associates of the
Company.16 Once again, many of the most influential members of the RAC
displayed significant interests elsewhere.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the most influential members of
the Company were passive investors who had little real world experience in
Africa, the West Indies, or anywhere else in the Atlantic world. For
example, Sir Dudley North, at the time of his investments with the Royal
African Company, was a passive investor.17 Likewise, Sir Josiah Child,
founding member and Assistant of the RAC, was a passive investor who
believed that trade should be controlled from a central location, London.18
Only a select few, such as Sir William Hedges, Charles Hayes, and Sir
Dudley North had any significant experience away from England. Sir
William Hedges owned one of the first shares of the Company and was a
multiple-term Assistant in the 1690s. He was heavily interested in the East
India Company and traveled to the Bay of Bengal, where he acquired
knowledge about Islamic languages and customs.19 Sir Dudley North was
sent abroad to Russia, Smyrna, Italy, and Constantinople, which certainly
made him a more informed controller of his interests in the Russian and
Levant Companies, but probably added little benefit for his interests in the
Royal African Company.20 Charles Hayes, a widely known mathematician
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and geographer, traveled to Africa before his days as Sub and Deputy
Governors of the Royal African Company.21 In short, it appears that some
portion of the most influential members of the Company possessed little
experience in the Atlantic world.22
The Transfer of Information Concerning the Slave Trade
With some of its major investors being passive, holding
investments in multiple companies, and having political obligations, RAC
investors relied heavily on outside forces to bring them information about
what was happening in the Atlantic World. With reliance this in mind,
information was acquired through three avenues. First, the members
gained information through the frequent meetings of the Royal African
Company. While they took copious notes of these meetings, these
documents represent the transfer of information within the Company and
tell us little about the proliferation of information to the greater society.
Next, Englishmen gained information through published works of the
Company and through records of the Privy Council and House of
Commons. This avenue is, in some sense, more important because it
remained accessible to the wider society; the pamphlet wars between the
Company and the separate traders were directed towards wider groups of
Englishmen as the ability for commoners to influence government
expanded. Finally, they received information from popular literature. This
avenue also affected the rest of society.
Popular literature and scholarship helped frame the most basic
assumptions about slavery and the slave trade for all Englishmen. Aphra
Behn’s Oroonoko, published in 1688 lies at the heart of these assumptions.
Behn noted the tale of the African prince who is forced from his homeland
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into slavery in Surinam, where he reunites with his love, Imoinda, and
battles the assumptions of slavery, arguing that he cannot possibly be a
slave because of his royalty. The idea that Oroonoko, a slave, should be
glorified rather than chastised, presents an interesting idea for this time.
The author claims that, “The whole proportion and air of [Oroonoko’s]
face was so noble…that, bating [except for] his colour, there cou’d be
nothing in nature more beautiful.”23 Moreover, John Trefry, manager of
Lord Willoughby’s estate, upon hearing Oroonoko claim to be, “above the
rank of common slaves,” exclaims, “[Oroonoko] was yet something greater
than he confess’d.”24 This idea—that there are distinctions between various
types of slaves—is contrasted by the idea that Africans represnted an
inferior race. For example, the owner of the plantation holds Oroonoko as
a slave, after which he is attacked by Whites. Similarly, the leaders
eventually decide to hang Oroonoko as a warning to the other slaves.
Thomas Southerne’s adaptation of Oroonoko, which premiered in November,
1695, projected the dual views of slavery. Additionally, one of Southerne’s
modifications involved Oroonoko’s suicide rather than enduring the
struggle, indicating that he may have tried to represents Africans as
cowards.
Oroonoko fits into the larger group of Atlantic Creoles, who were
able to capitalize on their ability to speak African and European languages
to, in some cases, gain small measures of freedom. Atlantic Creoles were
often African traders or their sons, who held high positions in African
society.25 In 1767, European slave traders captured members of one ruling
family in Old Calabar, which facilitated a seven year journey wrought with
disappointment and disaster. As a result, the two young African Creoles
attempted to return home. Cases like this were complemented by Africans
being sent to England to receive an education and Atlantic Creoles securing
freedom and property in America. These situations, which occurred with
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some frequency in the early days of the slave trade, became less common as
time wore on. By the 1730s and 1740s, Atlantic Creoles in America began
to lose their socioeconomic standing at the hands of increasingly strict legal
codes. 26 These codes, which shrank the ranks of the Atlantic Creole,
reflected the English Weltanschauung, which increasingly focused on
reducing the African to sub-human levels.
Compared to Oroonoko, Gabriel de Brémond’s The Happy Slave,
translated from French in 1686, presents a decidedly more pleasant view of
slavery. The novel tells of a young Roman, Count Alexander, captured
near Tunis. While in captivity, Alexander realizes the lighter side of
slavery. In fact, the author declares that Alexander, “having happily fallen
into the hands of so good and generous a patron, began to recover.”27
Brémond’s work emphasizes the “benevolent master” concept, which may
have impacted how Englishmen chose to see themselves in relation to
African slaves. The essence of Brémond’s stance on slavery is evident from
the very beginning, when he exclaims, “Africk…where the people were no
less cruel than the lions and tigers that fill the desarts of the countrey: But
since the discovery of Love there, it hath appear’d, that as love grows in all
Countreys, so barbary itself hath nothing of barbarous but the name.”28 In
short, the translation and publication of Brémond presents Englishmen
with an overwhelmingly positive view of slavery and the slave trade in
which the slave trade appears as a civilizing process.
On the other hand, publication of the works of Bartholomew de las
Casas at this time emphasized slavery as a barbarous institution. De las
Casas presents a systematic description of the various cruelties committed
in the new world in Popery Truly Display’d in its Bloody Colours. In this
work, slaves and natives are shown as, “being oppressed by such evil
usage,” and “afflicted with such great torments and violent
entertainments”29 by their Spanish masters. De las Casas argues that the
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slave trade not only abuses the slaves, but Native Americans as well.
Again, the publication of de las Casas’ work also reflects English
competition with Spain; however, the anti-slavery message of Popery Truly
Display’d in its Bloody Colours, distributed at a time when the English were
so engulfed in their own slave trade, further illustrates the diversity
regarding English attitudes toward the slave trade. Moreover, when
combined with Oroonoko and The Happy Slave, three distinctly separate
views of the slave trade emerge in English popular literature.
Like popular literature, popular scholarship, most importantly the
voluminous works of Nathaniel Crouch, help convey information about the
slave trade to the English. Crouch was a bookseller and writer who
published a number of pocket-sized, informational books written under the
pseudonym of Robert Burton (often abbreviated R.B.). Between 1666 and
1725, Crouch published some seventy-five books, which were written in
simple English and sold for one shilling. Although he published many
novels that dealt with religion, he is best known for his historical works,
which he himself wrote. After his death in 1725, Crouch’s works continued
to sell well for the remainder of the century.30 In English Acquisitions in
Guinea and East-India, Crouch displays an overview of the customs,
religions, wildlife, trade patterns, and marriages of the natives near each
English fort or settlement in Africa. Nowhere does Crouch explain how he
received such information, and it is unlikely that he observed these things
himself, especially considering the number and frequency of his
publications. In addition, Crouch conveys some degree of disdain for the
natives, questioning the viability of their religion, calling them treacherous,
and describing their feeding habits like those of swine.31 Crouch declares
that the people of Guinea “are handsome and well proportioned, having
nothing disagreeable in their Countenances, but the blackness of their
Complexion.”32 In describing the natives around James Fort, Crouch claims
that they “are Envious, curiously Neat, Thieves.”33 Unreliable information
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conveyed in popular literature, such as Crouch’s works, shaped
Englishmen’s conceptions of the slave trade.
Equally important were the pamphlets and publications of the
RAC and the separate traders, which had considerable implications for the
transfer of information on the slave trade and the shaping of slavery in the
minds of many Englishmen. During the pamphlet wars between free
traders and monopolists in the 1690s, which continued in the public sphere
until the 1720s, a number of publications attempted to convince
Englishmen to support either side. Reflections of the East India Company and
the Royal African Company, authored by Roger Coke in 1696, chastises the
Company for being a monopoly and yet allowing foreign protestants to
trade within its limits.34 Similarly, Considerations Concerning the African
Companies Petitions (1698) and Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of
Commons by the Planters (1698) argue against the Company’s monopoly for
imposing on Englishmen’s liberty and failing to provide enough slaves to
the West Indian plantations.35 Reasons Humbly Offer'd to the Honourable the
Commons of England, written sometime in the 1690s, argued that Jamaica
needed more “negroes” to work the plantations.36 In Considerations Relating
to the African Bill (1698), separate traders argue that a continuation of the
monopoly would further endanger relationships with Africans and other
Europeans, which would be detrimental to the trade.37
Like the separate traders, the Royal African Company chose
pamphlets as the main medium of transferring information to the general
public. True Account of the Forts and Castles Belonging to the Royal African
Company (1698) presents valuable information concerning the status of the
Company’s installments in Africa. The pamphlet provides the public with
concrete numbers of men and guns, as well as comments on the state of
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each of the Company’s forts. This pamphlet concludes that the forts and
castles were “sufficiently provided with small arms, powder, and other
necessaries of war…built of Stone and Lime,” and that an adjoining factory
was, “covered with lead, and in very good repair.” 38 Additionally, the
pamphlet claims that the data was “taken from Sundry Persons,” which
implies that the Company had multiple sources to acquire information.39 In
short, this pamphlet shows that the English public was being given fairly
detailed accounts of the slave trade.
Further accounts of the forts, relationships with Africans, and the
ability of the separate traders to supply slaves to West Indian plantations
are found in Some Observations on Extracts Taken out of the Report from the
Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, authored by the Royal
African Company in 1708. This document contains information from the
Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations and includes the number
of slaves brought to the West Indies by the separate traders and a list of the
RAC’s forts in Africa. Additionally, the document argues that the forts and
castles are the best foundation for continued friendship, justice, humanity,
and honesty in English relationships with Africans.40
Moreover, The case of the Royal African Company (1709) provides
readers with a complete summary of the free trade debate as it applied to
the RAC through 1709. The Case provides details of the RAC’s trade with
Africa, but leaves out human or social aspects. For example, The Case
describes the forts and settlements in Africa as a place to, “stipulate the
price of the merchandize with the natives,” rather than hold prisoner
hundreds of slaves until the next slave ship appeared.41 Furthermore, The
Anatomy of the African Company’s Scheme for Carrying on that Trade in a JointStock Exclusive (1710) provides a balance of the Company’s books along
with a claim that the benefits of the African trade are due solely to the
efforts of the RAC, the overall goal being to get their subscribers to loan
the Company ten percent of their payment. Additionally, the Anatomy
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provides the number of forts (“14”) and the amount of land they take up
(“100 miles space on the Gold Coast”), but fails to describe any nonbusiness related aspect of the trade.42 In other words, the content of such
pamphlets tended to focus on the business aspect, rather than the human, or
emotional aspects of the slave trade. These gaps would be filled by popular
literature and speculation.
In addition to the publications of the separate traders and the
Royal African Company, political writers such as Daniel Defoe and Charles
Davenant frequently issued pamphlets articulating a particular stance on
the slave trade. In Reflections upon the Constitution and Management of the
Trade to Africa (1709), Davenant sets forth the position of the RAC by
examining memoirs, declarations, accounts, and other official papers. Like
most other pro-Royal African Company texts, Reflections claims that the
Company was extremely successful before 1698 (before the separate traders
were allowed to trade with the payment of a 10% duty). Similarly, it uses
numbers from the Navy Office of Barbados to disprove many of the separate
traders’ claims. Likewise, the article provides information about Africa and
the Company’s holdings in Africa.43 Moreover, A Clear Demonstration, from
Points of Fact, that the Recovery, Preservation and Improvement of Britain's
Share of the Trade to Africa, is Wholly Owing to the Industry, Care and
Application of the Royal African Company (1709), as the title might suggest,
claims that the benefits of the slave trade are due to the efforts of the RAC
and that a monopoly is better suited to fit the needs of England and its
subjects than free trade. Once again, Davenant uses RAC records to both
prove his assumptions and discredit the separate traders.44 These works
provide critical insight into the information that was conveyed between the
RAC and ordinary Englishmen because they were designed solely for the
purpose of galvanizing the support of the people in England. They show
that Englishmen had a wealth of detailed information about the business
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aspect of the slave trade at their disposal, however, pamphlets often left out
information about the social aspects of the slave trade.
Information was transferred between the RAC and its smaller
shareholders through a series of meetings that occurred in the first years of
the new century. Ultimately, these meetings were the result of the everworsening fortunes of the Company at the hands of the separate traders.
As the separate traders began to infringe upon the RAC’s market, especially
after 1698, the Company found its finances increasingly in danger. In order
to keep afloat, the Company repeatedly asked its shareholders for loans in
the first years of the new century. In March 1701, the Company sent out a
request of ₤4 per share from its shareholders. Similarly, in 1702 the request
increased to ₤6 per share, in 1704, ₤7 per share, and in 1706, another ₤4 per
share.45 Similarly, in September, 1706, the Company sent out a public
request for an increase in subscription.46 These public requests show that
the Royal African Company’s smaller shareholders were frequently called
upon by the RAC during the “pamphlet wars” with the separate traders.
Additionally, they suggest that smaller shareholders were given frequent
meetings where information concerning the Company was passed along.
The information being passed along related solely to business and
economics.
K.G. Davies’ Royal African Company provides a few hints about the
Company’s official correspondence. Sir Dalby Thomas, Agent-General of
the RAC from 1703-1711 and Assistant for four years prior to that47,
corresponded frequently with the RAC. For example, Sir Thomas
corresponded with the RAC concerning prices of gold, deaths, “coast
charges,” relations with the French, Portuguese, and Dutch, and tax
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systems with the natives.48 The RAC corresponded frequently with its
other agents. Like the correspondence with Sir Thomas, correspondence
with other agents spanned any number of topics. Those topics included
shipping, sloop trade, and, as most often was the case, the productivity of a
particular area.49
From these observations, we can construct a number of assertions
concerning the operation of the Royal African Company at the turn of the
Eighteenth Century. First, by wealthy, prominent investors who often held
multiple business and political interests controlled the RAC. There were
minimum amounts of shares that a person needed to hold in order to be
elected to an official position within the Company.50 Many of the investors
were passive; they had not been actively involved in the trading of slaves,
opting instead to remain in London.51 Moreover, the frequency of the
Company’s meetings ensured that its leaders had little time to travel the
world or become active in the trade.52 Observations on a Guinea Voyage,
written nearly a century later by James Field Stanfield, asserts that a true
understanding of the Slave Trade could not be achieved without a personal
experience on a slave ship, thus inferring that many RAC decision-makers
of had little understanding of the human aspect of the trade.53
Much of the information that was circulating within the Royal
African Company and in the wider society left out a crucial humanitarian
perspective that represented the foundation of future abolitionist writings.
Popular literature and scholarship, in an attempt to fill the void left by
pamphlets and official papers, often portrayed Blacks and the slave trade in
less than accurate ways. For example, The Happy Slave suggests that the
slave trade could be a civilizing process aided by benevolent slave masters.
Similarly, both Behn’s Oroonoko and Southerne’s adaptation question the
sub-human nature of royal Africans, while at the same time reaffirm the
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sub-human nature of non-royal blacks. Moreover, writers of popular
history, such as Nathaniel Crouch, surely did not possess an unbiased,
objective and factual basis for their assertions. Crouch, for example,
published nearly seventy-five books in just over half a century, a fact that
calls into question where he obtained information on such a short notice.
Moreover, pamphlets that circulated at the turn of the century solely
addressed the economic and business aspects of the slave trade, leaving out
critical issues such as the living conditions on board slave ships, an issue
that would make Thomas Clarkson famous in the last two decades of the
eighteenth century.
Implications for the Collective English Weltanschauung
With this in mind, the complex, yet haphazard, transfers of
information concerning Africa, Africans, slaves and the slave trade during
this time affected English society in a very profound way. This change can
be seen by a consideration of the various meanings of the three most
common words used to describe Africans: “native,” “slave,” and “negro.”
Two of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions of the word “negro,”
states that “a person of black African origin or descent” and “a slave (or
enfranchised slave) of black African origin or descent.”54 The use of the
word “negro,” as either the former or latter meaning, provides a clue into
the degree in which English society equated the words “negro” and “slave”
during this period. Moreover, the convergence of the two words shows one
effect of the lack of cultural and societal information concerning the slave
trade, despite the relatively detailed economic accounts of the trade.
In some cases, the English used the word “negro” to describe
Africans before their enslavement in the West Indies, either in Africa or in
the process of being sold into slavery (the middle passage).
In
Considerations Concerning the African Companies Petitions (1698), the author
claims that “no good negroes” reside in the most remote areas of Africa.55
Similarly, Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of Commons by the
Planters (1698) refers to a lack of “negroes” supplied to the West Indies.56
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Reasons Humbly Offer'd to the Honourable the Commons of England (16901699), too, claims that Jamaica needs more “negroes,” thus using the word
to describe pre-West Indian Africans. Finally, on December 26, 1695, the
Calendar of State Papers notes that, “the factors of the Royal African
Company picked out the best negroes.”57 In 1698, the Privy Council gave
the RAC the authority to export beans as a means to feed “negroes” on
board their ships. In 1693, they requested that the Company send more
“negroes” and goods in order to help furnish the West Indian plantations.58
In each of these cases, the documents used the word “negro” to describe
Africans in the process of being sold into slavery.
On the other hand, the English sometimes referred to Blacks in
Africa as “natives.” Considerations Relating to the African Bill (1698) refers
provides one such instance. Similarly, in Some Observations on Extracts
Taken out of the Report from the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations
(1708), the Royal African Company discusses friendly relationships with
“natives” through permanent forts and settlements.59 One year later, the
Company explained how separate traders gave the “natives” more leverage
in their relationship with Europeans.60 In a letter to the Royal African
Company from Captain Bernard Ladman in 1701, Ladman refers to “blacks
being afraid to come aboard English ships,” that were docked off the coast
of Africa.61 In this case, “blacks” instead of “negroes” was used to refer to
Africans who the British traded with. Interestingly, Ladman later refers to
his coming away from the site with “24 Negroes,” thus referring to Blacks
on board trans-Atlantic ships as “negroes.” In each of these cases, the word
“native” is used when referring to African trading partners of the English.
In other words, the British still expressed some distinctions between
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African trading partners, captured Africans, and slaves; however, they
considered the majority of Africans “negroes,” rather than “natives.”
On the contrary, some writings blurred the line between “negroes”
and “slaves,” in which case a document might use the word “slave” to
describe an African in Africa or the word “negro” to describe a slave in the
West Indies. Some of these, however, provide a clear distinction between
the words “negro” and “slave.” On June 10, 1693, for example, the Calendar
notes a slave uprising in the West Indies and refers to the aftermath in
which soldiers, “fell upon all the negroes, free as well as slaves.”62 In this
instance, although the author refers to slaves as “negroes,” he notes that the
existence of a difference between free and enslaved Negroes. Moreover, on
September 14, 1693, a Committee discussed rewarding “freedmen and
slaves who behave well against the enemy.”63 Once again, the document
notes a clear difference between emancipated Negroes and enslaved
Negroes.
Moreover, using the word “negro” to mean the word “slave”
represents one effect of the comparative lack of cultural and societal
information about Africans. The Calendar of State Papers notes one
instance in which a ship, “shipped 700 slaves at Guinea,” and a
disagreement between the Company’s agents and a planter over how much
the planter owed the agent for “negroes.”64 In a letter from Sir Dalby
Thomas to the Royal African Company in 1704, Thomas referred to
purchasing of both “slaves” and “negroes.”65 A treaty between the Royal
African and French Senegal Companies claims that both companies would
assist each other, “against the Negros,” using the term in a very general
manner. Moreover, the “Project of the Assiento for Negroes Made between
England and Spain, 1707” provides a great example of the development of
the words by the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century. To
begin, the document is described as a “Contract for Blacks or Negroes,”
thus leaving ambiguity in the meaning of both terms. Next, it attaches the
two words, declaring that it is an “Agreement to import Negro slaves,”
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showing some convergence in the meanings of both words.66 A Report on
the Trade to Africa in 1709 presents a similar pattern. At one point, the
document comments, “the Charges of their working Negroes, employed in
carrying the Goods of the Company and other Matters relating to their
Trade, and in looking after their Slaves.”67 In this example, the document
used both “negro” and “slave” in the same sentence to mean the same thing.
The Calendar of State Papers presents the words “negro” and
“slave” as having similar meanings. In the minutes for November 14, 1693,
it refers to the “negro trade,” when referring to the slave trade. Moreover,
the same entry uses the word “slaves” when talking about blacks in the
West Indies. On November 9th, they once again referred to the transAtlantic slave trade as the “negro trade.” In all, the writings of the
Calendar of State Papers, letters between factors and the Company, and
pamphlets portray Africans as slaves, whether they use the word “negro” or
“slave;” they represent a converging of the words “negro” and “slave” and
are emblematic of a lack of cultural information concerning Africans.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the convergence of the words “negro” and “slave”
coupled with pamphlets and literary works which viewed the slave trade
from an exclusively economic standpoint suggest that the English
Weltanschauung underwent a significant change at the turn of the eighteenth
century; however, any study concerning the British slave trade would be
incomplete without a connection to British abolition. Put another way, the
developments occurring in the British Weltanschauung in the decades
enveloping the year 1700—in which the concept of race was being solidified
so that Africans were viewed primarily as slaves—may have clouded the
vision of Englishmen, helping delay a widespread moral inquiry until the
end of the eighteenth century.
One way historians have explained this “delayed abolition” holds
that the profits of the slave trade during previous years overshadowed the
moral questions that surrounded it, an assertion that historian Eric
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Williams championed.68 In other words: willful ignorance. While the
correspondence concerning the slave trade available in Donnan’s Documents
Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America falls short of explicitly
stating willful ignorance, such sentiments can be inferred from their
writings. In “The Slave Trade at Calabar, 1700-1705,” the author describes
the “brutish creatures” that occupy the slave ships, as “cruel and bloody in
their temper, always quarrelling, biting and fighting, and
sometimes…murdering one another.” Moreover, the author declares that
slave captains “need pray for quick passage,” in order to avoid losing too
many slaves, and thus, “turn’d to a very bad market.”69 In this case, the
author hints that the health and well-being of slaves should be considered
only in relation to the economic health and well-being of the captain and
merchant. Numerous petitions to the House of Commons cite professions
in England, Gun-makers, Cutlers, Powder-makers, Dyers, Packers, Setters,
Drawers, Shipwrights, and Sail-makers, just to name a few, whose
livelihoods have been “supported by Sale of their Goods, usually exported
by the Royal African Company.”70 In this case, Gun-makers, Cutlers,
Powder-makers, etc. failed to question the morality of the slave trade
because of its economic benefits.
Philip Gould hints at another possible aspect of delayed abolition
in Barbaric Traffic; the enlightenment. Those few criticisms of the slave
trade that did exist in the early eighteenth century focused on the literal
inconsistency of the trade with biblical law. In the latter part of the
century, this idea “gives away to the contemporary standards of enlightened
civilization.”71 In other words, the ideas of an enlightened civilization
implied just commerce, which was used instead of biblical law to combat the
slave trade.
When integrating the content revealed in this study, it becomes
apparent that another explanation is possible. In other words, the changes
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occurring in the collective English Weltanschauung at the turn of the
eighteenth-century clouded the English mindset, which may have delayed
an inquiry into the slave trade. As we have seen, many accounts of the
slave trade tended to emphasize the economic aspect of the trade. The
origins of this can be found in RAC correspondence with Sir Dalby
Thomas, which reveals discussions that focused almost entirely on
international competition and prices of gold and slaves.72 Sir Thomas’
Weltanschauung, therefore, clearly viewed the slave trade through an
economic lens. Moreover, those who read pamphlets based on information
conveyed by Sir Thomas and his counterparts would have experienced the
slave trade through an economic lens. To add, pamphlets reflected
correspondence in that they began to confuse the meanings of the words
“negro” and “slave.” When this happened on a grand scale, as it did during
the pamphlet wars of the 1690s-1720s, the collective English
Weltanschauung underwent a critical change. The end result was a
generation of Englishmen who’s first experience with the slave trade was
through a businessman’s rather than a humanitarian’s perspective; Africans
were slaves first and humans second, rather than the reverse.
Consequently, when the British slave trade expanded exponentially in the
first decades of the eighteenth century, the English were well prepared to
accept the institution, instead of question it. That would be left for the
women and men of a later generation.
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The Vietnam War has certainly produced burgeoning scholars and
literature. In the decade or so after the Vietnam War ended, most scholars
wrote critically of the United States’ intervention in Indochina. Heated
debates began to take place within books, article, and conferences. Given
the lavish attention, three scholarly views have arisen and become
increasingly heated. Orthodox scholars follow the traditional doctrine that
America’s involvement in the war was unwinnable and unjust, while the
revisionists believe that the war was a noble cause and Vietnam, below the
17th parallel, was a viable and stable country, but policies and military
tactics were improperly executed. The heated debates have focused on two
central issues—Ngo Dinh Diem and his reign over South Vietnam and poor
leadership by American presidents and top officials. Orthodox scholars
argue that Diem as a corrupt tyrannical puppet, while revisionists believe
Diem was an independent leader who knew what was necessary to allow his
young country to survive. According to the orthodox scholars, American
presidents John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson and other
top officials did their best to control the situation in Vietnam, though the
war was doomed from the beginning. Revisionists do not believe the war
was lost on the battlefield but was lost due to poor decisions and lack of
attention to the war. Recently, another group of scholars have weighed in
on this subject. These scholars, post-revisionists, do not even admit
defeat—arguing that the United States won the war by late 1970. The goal
of this paper is to give insight on orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist
views.
Ngo Dinh Diem
In Philip Catton’s book, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s
War in Vietnam, he does not attempt to whitewash any of Diem’s faults but
does portray Diem as a modern nationalist, determined to follow his own
49

agenda. Diem’s desire to build his own South Vietnamese state led to a
coup, which the Kennedy administration supported. Catton explains that in
an attempt to find a reliable president in South Vietnam, the United States
assumed the position of kingmaker. Diem and his key advisers’ feared that
the perception of their dependence on the United States tainted their
credentials as nationalists, playing into the hands of the regime’s enemies.
Catton points out that Diem feared the Americans nearly as much as they
did the Communist insurgents. Implementing his own vision of a sovereign
national entity, Diem assembled the South Vietnamese peasantry for
support while reducing the regime’s reliance on the United States. Catton
goes on to argue that the strategic hamlet program was intended not only
to defeat the National Liberation Front (NLF) but also to further free the
South Vietnamese from the overbearing American control. In addition,
Catton explains that Kennedy, Johnson, and top American officials did not
fully understand Diem’s intentions or the social and cultural situations in
South Vietnam. Diem understood the necessity of American assistance, but
he knew the intrusive American support would make him a puppet of
Washington. Catton finally suggests that the overthrow of Diem prompted
the Americanization of the war in Vietnam.1
Keith Taylor, a leading revisionist, sparked the reevaluation of the
Vietnam War in an article entitled “How I began to Teach About the
Vietnam War.” Taylor aims to debunk three axioms regarding the war.
The first is the idea that there was not a legitimate noncommunist
government in Saigon. The second misconception he addresses is the belief
that the United States had no legitimate reason to be involved in Vietnam,
while the third focuses on the assumption that the United States could not
have won the war under any circumstance. Taylor explains that Diem was
actually a competent leader—not an American lackey. Made into a
scapegoat for American frustrations and misguided American advisors,
Keith portrays Diem as understanding what was necessary for South
Vietnam’s survival, but the U.S. sponsored assassination cut his leadership
short.2
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While Keith Taylor sparked the reevaluation of the Vietnam War,
Mark Moyar continued to push this debate further. Moyar’s book, Triumph
Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, explains how the United States’
government failed South Vietnam morally and politically by allowing
Diem’s assassination. His death put an end to his successful prosecution of
the war against the Viet Cong, which obviated the controversial incursion
of American troops from 1965 to 1973. Generally, Moyar says, historians
view Diem as an authoritarian Asian dictator who became an oppressor as
he solidified his family’s stronghold over South Vietnam’s government, thus
becoming a less effective leader. Moyar, however, fiercely disagrees with
these statements. He acknowledges the authoritarian nature of Diem’s
leadership, but argues for its necessity. South Vietnam was fighting for
survival and needed a dictator-like leader; Diem governed in an
authoritarian manner because of the unsuitability of Western-style
democracy for a country dominated by a totalitarian culture. According to
Moyar, in 1962 and 1963, the South Vietnamese army became increasingly
skillful in intelligence gathering and in fighting under Diem’s leadership.
Consequently, until he was assassinated in the November 1963 coup, Diem
successfully prosecuted the war to the verge of victory over the Viet Cong.
Moyar’s last chapter, “Betrayal: August 1963,” states that after the
assassination, everything fell apart in Vietnam. Diem’s death was a tragedy
for South Vietnam as well as for American policy.3
On the opposite side of the spectrum lies the orthodox scholar
Robert Buzzanco and his article, “How I Learned to Quit Worrying and
Love Vietnam and Iraq.” Buzzanco argues that Diem engaged in an
assortment of corrupt activities that included placing his family into high
political positions, dealing in the black market, and firing roughly 6,000
army officers and replacing them with more loyal but less qualified soldiers.
He imprisoned over 40,000 political prisoners and executed more than
12,000, and took control of 650,000 hectares of land, which denied peasants
of their livelihoods. Buzzanco also writes that if the South Vietnamese
wanted Americans in their country, why were there several coups d’état to
oust the Americans? To counter this fabricated belief, Buzzanco suggests
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that in fact, the South Vietnamese did not want American support, and that
the United States’ sole motivation was imperialism. In support of
Buzzanco’s arguments is David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest.
Halberstam and Buzzanco’s perceptions about Diem are closely related.
Both historians believe the Diem regime lacked legitimacy and stunk of
corruption.4
Historian Edward Miller’s, War Stories: The Taylor-Buzzanco
Debate and How We Think About the Vietnam War, is an article trying to
separate historians Keith Taylor and Robert Buzzanco’s ideas about Diem’s
legitimacy. Miller disagrees with Buzzanco’s critical depiction of Diem as a
spineless American puppet with no agenda other than appeasing American
leaders. According to Miller, Buzzanco believes that Diem was “handpicked” by American leaders in order to Americanize South Vietnam. In
addition, Miller argues that Diem actively pushed for a modernized nation
in South Vietnam. Diem’s determination to follow this vision made him
much more autonomous than Buzzanco recognizes. According to Miller,
Buzzanco quotes Wesley Fishel, an American advisor to the South
Vietnamese leader, saying that the government was “shaky as all hell.”5
Buzzanco believes that Diem’s only agenda was to increase his family’s
power, however, Miller contends that no credible evidence exists that
implicates Diem as a “hand-picked” or excessively corrupt leader.6
Miller moves on to explain that Diem showed his independence by
redistributing land. Diem, lacking interest in American land reform,
pushed for his own ideas of land distribution. Instead of America’s proposal
of dispensing landlord’s property, Diem wanted to redistribute people by
transporting thousands of peasants to Land Development Centers in lightly
populated areas in South Vietnam. Miller acknowledges and supports
Philip Catton’s study of the Strategic Hamlet Program, Diem’s last
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modernization project. Miller notes that Diem was trying to modernize
South Vietnam and had no dependency upon the United States.7
While Miller tries to separate Taylor and Buzzanco, though siding
with Taylor, Gabriel Kolko’s orthodox view portrays Diem as a corrupt and
tyrannical leader. Kolko explains that by the early 1960s the United States
could not overlook the increasing threat that Diem’s blatant corruption and
oppression posed. Kolko writes that the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk,
addressed the dilemma the week after Kennedy took office, saying that the
United States was “caught between pressing Diem to do things he did not
wish to do and the need to convey to him American support.”8 By 1961
Diem fully appreciated and relied on the Kennedy administration’s reliance
on his regime. Moreover, Diem ignored America’s modest proposals, Kolko
says, “at best [only] agreeing to study them.”9
Well on his way toward self-destruction, Diem began arresting
thousands of civilian non-NLF critics, political threats, and military
officers—enemies that, according to Kolko, only existed in his head. Diem’s
oppression did not stop there. On May 8, 1963, Diem ordered the killing of
nine Buddhist protesters at an anti-Diem demonstration in Hue. While the
orthodox view of Kolko condemns Diem for his murder and oppression of
Buddhists, Mark Moyar disagrees. Moyar writes that reporters developed
friendships with Buddhist leaders—Buddhists gave reporters tips, carried
protest signs in English, and made the young men feel significant. The
correspondents, in return, favored stories about the Buddhist protesters.
Moyar also contends that Diem gave Buddhists permission to carry out
many activities that the French and Ho Chi Minh had prohibited, but
animosity still loomed. Moyar goes on to explain that the Vietnamese
Communists had a history of posing as monks and infiltrating Buddhists
organizations, since a Vietnamese man only had to shave his head and wear
a monk’s robe to be considered a monk. However, Kolko argues that only a
few Communist documents have been captured revealing Communist
participation in the Buddhist demonstrations.10
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Controversy looming around Diem still remains. Orthodox
scholars adhere to the traditional views of Diem, while revisionists are
trying to investigate and reevaluate Diem’s role during the Vietnam War.
Both sides of this debate have credibility, however, the public and most
historians would agree that the corrupt nature of Diem’s authoritarian
regime only hindered America’s progress in Vietnam.
Poor Leadership
In the 1990s, historians began to reevaluate John F. Kennedy’s
role in Vietnam, leading to their argument that the young president, had he
not been assassinated, would not have escalated the conflict into a major
war. Kennedy supporters like Arthur Schlesinger, Howard Jones, Fred
Logevall, David Kaiser, Lawrence Freedman, and others have also made
this claim. Furthermore, the 1991 Oliver Stone film, JFK, portrays
Kennedy as a dove in regards to Vietnam, and alludes to the idea that
Lyndon Johnson was responsible for the escalation of the conflict. More
recently, the revival of the war has gone further with Philip Catton, Keith
Taylor, Mark Moyar, Ed Miller, and others claiming that America’s top
officials, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and the Joints Chiefs of Staff lost
the war due to poor decisions, lack of attention, and separate agendas.
Buzzanco, agreeing with the revisionists, states, “I believe that
Kennedy made bad decisions about Vietnam because he was not paying
sufficient attention and Johnson did so because it was not his priority.”11
Buzzanco explains that the sheer mass of documents, interviews, and oral
histories pertaining to the war provide sufficient evidence that Kennedy and
Johnson regarded the Vietnam War as a solemn and significant matter.
However, Buzzanco also argues that the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries
contain millions of pages of reports and analyses from an array of agencies,
military branches, and diplomatic officials, all of which avidly demonstrate
the dedication of both administrations to substantial levels of attention to
the war. In addition, Buzzanco questions Taylor’s notion of Johnson’s
limited war, asking, “Should he have sent 500,000 men to Vietnam then?”
He argues that the American public and congress would not have supported
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such a sizeable commitment, while other orthodox scholars would agree
that both Kennedy and Johnson were incorrect in their policy-making,12
Harry Summers, a revisionist, published On Strategy: A Critical
Analysis of the Vietnam War to defend and find a more plausible
interpretation of the Vietnam War. Summers contends with the notion that
Vietnam was lost as a result of the poor training of American troops rather
than strategy. He supports his ideas by arguing that, at the time of the Tet
Offensive, the Viet Cong possessed twenty-percent of their original power.
He claims that the Tet Offensive and the 1972 invasion were both horrible
failures for the North Vietnam forces. Also, Summers argues that it was
not until the United States pulled out of Vietnam in 1972 that North
Vietnam succeeded in victory. Bad tactical and logistical planning did not
lead to the fall of South Vietnam, but rather the inadequate leadership of
top American officials. The United States had done everything it set out to
do, according to Summers. Providing supplies, munitions, and shelter for
more than a million personnel several thousand miles from home, the
United States’ military also fought and won almost every engagement with
the enemy. However, the United States’ presidents and top officials
provided only a vague and generic expectation of victory. Summers and
other conservative historians, such as Lewis Sorley, Michael Lind, Edward
Miller, Keith Taylor, and Mark Moyar, contend that the United States
actually won the war militarily, but because of poor decisions and pathetic
politicians, the war was lost.13
Revisionists believe that the Kennedy administration quickly
began plunging deeper into the morass of the Vietnam War, while George
C. Herring, an orthodox scholar, characterizes Kennedy as a cautious,
hesitant, and improvisational leader.
Kennedy postponed a firm
commitment for nearly a year, and he only acted because of the pressures of
a collapsing Diem regime.
Wary of international and domestic
consequences but unwilling to introduce a full-scale war, Kennedy chose a
careful course, thus expanding the United States’ role in Vietnam.
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Kennedy’s unprepared and dangerous policies encouraged Diem to continue
on his corruptive path. The reluctant president rejected Walt Whitman
Rostow’s proposal to put pressure on the Soviet Union to stop sending
troops and supplies to North Vietnam, therefore entrapping the United
States in a “long drawn out indecisive involvement.”14 Herring points out
that Kennedy became frustrated with the unmanageability of the War and
never devoted his full attention to Vietnam or the potential consequences of
his actions. The President and his advisors’ preoccupation with day-to-day
events led to shortsightedness that encumbered the formulation of a longterm solution in Vietnam. Kennedy believed that the United States knew
what was best for Vietnam, and this arrogant mentality pushed the United
States farther into war.15 To reinforce Herring’s ideas, historians James S.
Olson and Randy Robert provide further descriptions in Where the Domino
Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-1995. All three historians believe the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations were ill-prepared, hesitant, and
unable to comprehend the conflicts of the Vietnam War. Consequently,
Kennedy and Johnson were willing to use heavy firepower to overwhelm
and insert American policies.16
Herring explores President Lyndon Johnson’s deteriorating
situation in South Vietnam, mimicking Larry Berman’s book, Lyndon
Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. Between 1963 and 1965,
Johnson transformed a limited war into an open-ended commitment within
Vietnam, Herring explains. Frightened that a large-scale involvement
might endanger his chances for re-election, Johnson expanded American
advisors and assistances until 1965 when it appeared that South Vietnam
might collapse. Over the next six months Johnson ordered a ground and
air offensive against North Vietnam—pushing the United States into a
major war in Indochina. After America began attacking the North
Vietnamese, Johnson publicly committed the United States to defending
South Vietnam from the defiant North Vietnamese. Moreover, operation
Rolling Thunder, implemented by Johnson, grew from an infrequent effort
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into a determined program. Herring explains that questions of Johnson’s
comprehension of foreign policy circulated from the moment he took office.
Consequently, Johnson regarded the Vietnam conflict as part of Kennedy’s
program he was sworn to defend.17
Agreeing with Herring’s view is Fredrik Logevall’s book, Choosing
War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.
Logevall proves that Johnson had a variety of options that could slow or
stop the escalation of the war, but the president and his advisers chose to
increase the number of American troops in Vietnam, pushing America
further into a war with appalling consequences. In addition, Logevall
argues that both Kennedy and Johnson had stepped away from
opportunities for disengaging from the involvement in Vietnam for
domestic and political reasons, for example the 1964 election. Johnson’s
actions after Kennedy’s assassination prove his desire to escalate the war
secretly. Meanwhile, world leaders dissociated themselves from American
involvement, and privately counseled Johnson to “cut and run.” Unwilling
to admit defeat, Johnson lost numerous opportunities for détentes and
improved relations with China and the Soviet Union. Logevall also gives
convincing evidence proving that individuals like Secretary of Defense
Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and General William
Westmoreland haughtily chose to pursue a war that many around them
inquired and discouraged. Nevertheless, Johnson’s own agenda and the bad
counsel of his military advisors followed a disastrous path of further
escalation, condemning about 59,000 American soldiers to premature
death.18
The policies of American presidents and top ranking officials
sucked America into an unwinnable war, H.R. McMaster argues in his
revisionist based book, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert
McNamara, the Joints Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.
McMaster analyzes the decisions and viewpoints of the Johnson
administration through 1966 by which time American troops were heavily
engaged in Vietnam. McMaster explains that Johnson and McNamara
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excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff from all major decisions on the war. Both
Johnson and McNamara believed that analysis and statistics could resolve
any situation in Vietnam. Unfortunately, the two men got approximately
59,000 soldiers killed in a war they all knew proved unwinnable, according
to McMaster. Johnson and McNamara created a barrier which shielded
them from professional counsel. As political bullies and manipulators of
intelligence, Johnson and McNamara were solely responsible for bad advice
from their advisors.19
Johnson was determined to commit to a limited war without the
approval of Congress and hid the war’s escalation from the American
people. McMaster believes Johnson based all of his decisions on his
domestic program—the Great Society. He goes on to argue that in late
January 1965, Johnson authorized American destroyers to patrol the Gulf
of Tonkin, in hopes of provoking a North Vietnamese attack. In February
of that same year, Johnson introduced American ground troops into
Vietnam, an irreversible commitment to the war. McMaster made an
alarming assertion explaining how the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the
president’s policies as essentially flawed, but nevertheless acted to support
and reinforce it—contributing to Johnson’s and General Westmoreland’s
disastrous strategy of attrition in South Vietnam.20
McMaster challenges McNamara’s critics saying that McNamara
never had a good relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of their
inability to respond fast enough, while their ignorant administration
exacerbated the Johnson administration’s opinion of them. According to
McMaster, McNamara lost patience with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
impassiveness. The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that McNamara's
strategies would be inadequate to turn the tide against the North
Vietnamese. After Johnson’s approval of McNamara’s plan to escalated
pressure on the North Vietnamese, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s desire to
further their own agendas hindered their cooperative ability to provide
military advice. By the summer of 1964, according to McMaster, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had been reduced to serving “more as technicians for
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planners in the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] than as strategic
thinkers and advisers in their own right.”21 He concludes that the war in
Vietnam was lost in Washington, D.C., long before Americans realized the
country was at war and assumed the sole responsibility for the fighting in
1965. Logevall and McMaster’s beliefs mirror the evidence presented in
other recent books such as Kaiser’s American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and
the Origin of the Vietnam War. 22
Pressed by many advisors to pursue an aggressive course in
Vietnam, the Kennedy administration followed suit. Kasier, a recent
revisionist, believes that Robert McNamara misled Kennedy as to the status
of ongoing efforts. As a result, Kennedy died believing the circumstances in
Vietnam were much more manageable than what it really was. With
Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the conflict began to move much more
quickly toward a full blown war. Johnson wanted to be a great domestic
president, however, he was less experienced in foreign policy, thus pushing
the United States further into a quagmire. Unlike Logevall, Kaiser believes
Kennedy’s confidence and skepticism led him to resist suggestions for
major involvement. According to Kasier, Kennedy was reluctant to commit
American ground forces in Vietnam, while Johnson was determined to
confront North Vietnam with ground forces and bombing campaigns.
Johnson lacked Kennedy’s sophisticated foreign policy, Kaiser says, and did
not understand or value the extraordinarily negative effects that war would
have on “our” relationship with the rest of the world. Kasier’s book is a
worthy companion piece to David Halberstam’s book, The Best and the
Brightest. Halberstam argues that it was a number of specific individuals
with their own private agendas and belief systems that led to the deepening
investment in the Vietnam War. Halberstam, like Kasier, notes that
Kennedy purposefully denied repeated attempts by his senior advisors and
the military to drastically widen actions in Vietnam. According to Kaiser,
while Kennedy did allow escalation by sending military advisors, he
repeatedly and quite specifically denied, both verbally and by way of
documented meetings with advisors, authorization to escalate by
introducing direct combat involvement. Still, this is not to suggest that
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Kaiser either agrees with Halberstam’s thesis or to argue that he has
nothing new or worthwhile to reveal—similarities do run through both
books. Kaiser argues that the Vietnam War was neither necessary nor
winnable, but the greatest American policy failure in foreign relations.
In contrast to Kasier, Michael Lind’s revisionist book, The
Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military
Conflict, describes the United States’ involvement as a proper response to
communist aggression and a need to assert America’s strength. Lind also
debunks the liberal mythology that the United States missed opportunities
to befriend the North Vietnamese Communists. He asserts that there was
no opportunity for a Coalition Government in South Vietnam; and the
South Vietnam’s government was at least as legitimate as the North’s and
undoubtedly preferable.23
In accords with Kasier and Halberstam, Lawrence Freedman’s
Kennedy’s War: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam and Howard Jones’s Death of a
Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam
War argues that Kennedy would never have turned Vietnam into an
American war, with a huge deployment of American forces, the way
Lyndon Johnson did in 1965. Both Freedman and Jones argue that
Kennedy did increase the number of advisers, who sometimes assisted the
South Vietnamese in battle, but never favored deploying significant ground
forces. Also, Kennedy had a plan to eventually withdraw all American
troops when the South Vietnamese army became more capable of
controlling their government.24
Daniel Ellsberg covers much of the same material that appears in
David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest, but, begins his examination
of the war with President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara
claiming unprovoked enemy aggression and threats to American interests
instigated the war. Within twenty hours of starting his new job at the

23

David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origin of the Vietnam War
(Cambridge Belknap Press, 2000); Michael Lind, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of
America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1999); and David
Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest.
24
Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s War: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York: Oxford
Press, 2000); and Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and
JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

60

Pentagon, and referring to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Ellsberg writes that
he already knew that each one of the assurances given by the President and
Defense Secretary was false. Ellsberg explains that the intelligence did not
fail in Vietnam since Presidents do get good advice from top officials, but
that the position of the President combined with executive secrecy as an
enabling condition permitted irrational and ineffective policies. Even before
the Gulf of Tonkin, the Johnson Administration was determined to start a
war with North Vietnam, unbeknownst to the American people or
Congress. With the full knowledge of the President and Secretary of
Defense McNamara, massive covert operations were carried out. Again,
lies covered any of this up. As a result, no one could be honest. Johnson
would never entertain any negative reports, nor would McNamara and the
military.25
Moyar depicts Johnson as a figure trapped by circumstance,
quoting Johnson as saying, “It’s like being in an airplane and I have to
choose between crashing the plane or jumping out. I do not have a
parachute.”26 Moyar argues against the orthodox school’s view of
American involvement in the war as “wrongheaded and unjust.”27 The
main villains are former Vietnam War correspondents David Halberstam
and anyone else who had anything negative to say about the South
Vietnamese premier Ngo Dinh Diem and positive things to say about
Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh. Moyar declares that after
Diem’s assassination, Johnson had at his disposal numerous aggressive
policy options that could have allowed South Vietnam to continue the war
without a massive American troop involvement, but he ruled out these
options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence.
Therefore, Johnson had to fight a defensive war within South Vietnam’s
borders in order to avoid the dreadful international consequences of
abandoning the feeble country. Johnson had always wanted to avoid
American ground troop intervention, but most of his advisers doubted that
ground force involvement would produce an easy victory, believing instead
that it would result in a long and agonizing political struggle against an
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enemy who might never give up. Furthermore, in June 1965, Moyar states
that Johnson and his military advisers concluded that only the use of
American ground forces in major combat could stop the Communist
conventional forces from finishing off the South Vietnamese Army and
government.28
As Johnson contemplated whether to send American troops into
battle, overwhelming evidence supported the conclusion that South
Vietnam’s defeat would lead to either a Communist takeover or the
switching of allegiance to China. Information that became available
subsequently has reinforced this conclusion. The Johnson administration
could have negotiated an American withdrawal from Vietnam that would
have preserved a non-Communist South Vietnam for years to come, but
evidence from the Communist side reveals North Vietnam’s complete
refusal to negotiate such an agreement. While this may have failed, top
American officials did miss some strategic opportunities of a different sort,
opportunities that would have allowed them to fight from a much more
favorable strategic position. Following Diem’s ouster, the United States’
military leaders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff constantly supported an
invasion of North Vietnam, however, Johnson and his civilian advisers
rejected this advice. Also, Moyar notes that Johnson’s failure to attack
North Vietnam worked to the enemy’s advantage by assisting an enormous
Chinese troop deployment into North Vietnam.29
Another missed opportunity was the destruction of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. Johnson ignored many recommendations from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to put American ground forces into Laos in order to carry out the
destruction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Viet Cong insurgency could not
have brought the Saigon government close to collapse without the support
of North Vietnamese men and equipment funneled into South Vietnam via
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Orthodox historians, like Halberstam, have argued
that an American ground troop presence in Laos would not have stopped
most of the infiltration, but new evidence proves that the United States
missed some important opportunities to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail.30
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Unlike all of the above authors, Lewis Sorley, a post-revisionist,
does not even admit defeat. In his book, A Better War: The Unexamined
Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, he argues that
General Creighton W. Abrams had succeeded in effectively winning the
war by 1971, however, this victory was giving away by Richard Nixon and
Henry Kissinger at the bargaining table in Paris in 1972-1973. Sorley
claims that General C. Westmoreland focused on “search and destroy”
missions that neglected the pacification program, but after General Abrams
took over, it was “a better war.” Also, Westmoreland failed to provide the
effective training crucial to the South Vietnamese army’s ability to take the
lead in the war effort. The result was an escalation of the war with heavy
casualties and a rising protest in the United States.31
It is often said that time is the greatest healer of pain. However,
even today, the Vietnam War continues to be a difficult and sore subject.
As stated earlier, orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist scholars offer
three differing views regarding this challenging period of American history.
The general public and orthodox scholars seem to dispute the revisionist
and post-revisionist views, partly because they are less published and carry
fewer supporters in the academic world. However, the public and historians
are still learning new information about the war with each passing day, and
this new information will continue to give fresh insight and produce more
revisionist and post-revisionist historians. The contentious debate over the
Vietnam War is far from over. While the Vietnam War debate continues to
loom around these three academic views, new attention has been brought to
the Vietnamese side of the story. Literature regarding the war has been
dominated by American scholars searching through American produced
documents. As historian Huynh Kim Khanh argues, Vietnam is regarded as
“a battlefield or a piece of real estate to be fought over” and its people “as
passive bystanders in a historical process engineered elsewhere.”32 New
declassified information will continue to raise questions among historians,
which will push this debate far into the future.
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When the Spanish first sailed to Latin America they found several large,
well organized civilizations occupying the land. In the late 1500s several
Spanish accounts describe a game played by the native peoples of
Mesoamerica. Their interest in the game arose from a bouncing hard ball.
Franciscan monk, Fray Toribio de Benavente, stated that “the balls of this
land are very heavy, and the Indians run and jump so much that it is as if
the balls have quicksilver within.”1 Pedro Martir de Angleria Spanish royal
historian from 1520-1526, wrote that “I don’t understand how when the
balls hit the ground they are sent into the air with such incredible bounce.”2
The Mesoamericans played the game on a ballcourt designed to
correlate with their religious and astronomic beliefs. Even the most
insignificant items, such as the equipment worn by the players, had specific
meaning. These games were more than just a sport. The ballgame could
replace full-scale war, determining the winner of a conflict, based solely on
the outcome of the game. The games signified important forms of both
entertainment and ritual, in which lives and honor were gambled along
with money and material goods. The losers of the game were expected to
die with honor; and crying and begging for their lives was unthinkable.
The idea of the losers’ honor, how they portrayed themselves as they died,
remained of great import in the minds of the Mesoamerican people. The
ballgames incorporated religious beliefs about immortals, creation, and
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various myths, to formulate the rules and traditions of the game. These
games proved an important part of Mesoamerican culture.3
Types of Ballcourts
Masonry courts were only built in the largest cities and the main
trading centers. The upper class built ballcourts near ceremonial locations
or markets. Various types of courts were found in large and smaller cities
throughout Mesoamerica. Ballcourts were often “I” shaped, with two tall
structures forming the top and bottom lines of a letter “I.” However, there
were simple linear courts, which did not have the “I” shaped structures.4
The Ballgame
Scoring depended on the game. There were several rings which,
like basketball, could give the team points when participants threw the ball
through them. In some places, corncobs were used to keep track of points;
whoever had the most at the end won.5 However, if participants threw the
ball through a ring mounted on the wall of the court, immediate victory
would result.
Both young and adult men played the game, and, on the ballcourt,
class divisions disappeared.6 When on the field the men were equal. The
teams would consist of “teams of two, three, and occasionally as many as
nine to eleven players.”7 Usually, they played in two teams of two.8
Various rules governed the ways in which the players could touch the ball.
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Players could use only the buttocks, hips and knees to hit the ball. The
restricted means of striking the ball lent the game the name hip ball.
Many Mesoamerican myths talk about dividing the body into
upper and lower parts. The ball could only be hit where these two parts
connected. At this connection, players often wore a yoke, which separated
these two parts, and was believed to put a player in and out of the
Underworld at the same time. The courts themselves were usually divided
into two or four parts, representing the two or four divisions of the body,
constellations, or the four parts of earth. Furthermore, this separation was
represented in the courts between the north nations, the sun, and the
southern nations, the moon.
One group of people went a step further and incorporated this
division to the initiation of boys. The Apinaye of South America held the
games for boys undergoing their initiation into adulthood.9
Equipment of Ancient Ballgames
According to tradition, when the Hero Twins fought the gods, in
the Underworld, they only used what items they had from the living world.
Depending on the variation of each region’s myths, these items became the
role for the equipment used in the Mesoamerican ballcourts. The sort of
clothing and equipment used, even the ball, varied by region. Most of these
items no longer exist and their exact use and significance is not clear. Yet,
there are some clues in the form of figurines, found in excavations, and
depicted in written documents. Some figurines have protective gear on,
such as “a yoke at waist, a wrap on the left hand, and a pad on the left knee
onto which they would fall when striking the ball.”10 In their original form,
these pads were probably made of reed, wood, or cloth.11 Some types of
pads may have been for certain ceremonies or as markers of victorious
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ballplayers. Although restricted to use their hands, they did have hand
protectors. It is not certain why they needed hand protectors, except to
protect the bones in the hand. Usually only three fingers would fit in the
handle. In addition, there are some headstones, which could have been
awarded to the winning side.12
Roles of the Ballgames in Mesoamerican life
The Mesoamerican ballgames were used for many purposes, from
simple games in the dirt to complex ceremonial rituals in large cities.
Evidence shows that there was a great amount of food involved in the
games. Moreover, archaeologists uncovered many utensils, such as empty
plates and bowls, which probably contained food in them, now long since
decomposed. Scholars believed that Mesoamericans used food dedication
rituals of the ballcourts.13 Numerous artifacts indicate that Mesoamericans
also used ballcourts for sacrificial burials. In the supernatural courts, items
like precious jewels would take on symbolic meanings. For example, a
greenstone and a Spondylus shell could be the universe. In the Tikal’s
Triple ballcourt, there is evidence that “two females were placed within the
benches of the two central structures in the seated positions, facing each
other across the ballcourt alley.”14 Such sacrifices honored the dead, for it
was believed that the life of the people killed gave life to the newly
dedicated building, which in turn meant that it was also giving life to the
whole community.
The ballgame created extensive connections for communication
and trade. Villages competed against each other, which involving men and
women. These competitions were not just in the ballcourts. There were
contests of many kinds between the people within their village. Feasting,
dancing, singing, and mock warfare ensued:
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When the two groups came together, they began to
dance. The dancing was continued for three hours. The
songs this first night gave their reasons for being joyful.
The second night, the songs told of the valor and agility
of their ball players. The following day, the women
occupied themselves in preparing a feast for the day of the
contest. If the challenging village won, the visitors were
given a great feast, but, if it lost, the visitors were given
nothing, the losers consoling themselves by eating the
feast alone.15
The games were a social event. People mingled and enjoyed
themselves, often casting bets in attempts to gain wealth.16 For most
Mesoamericans, the games served as a form of entertainment. For elites,
the ballgames presented an opportunity to increase personal power and
prestige, or to negotiate with other leaders. Depending on the amount of
wealth, and the rank of a particular person in society, elites might wager
vast amounts of wealth.17 “Spectators wagered their finely woven mantles,
with losers fleeing the courts leaving a trail of garments behind them.”18
Ballcourts also served as a fertility ritual. Because of such
extensive feasting, historians believe these events were set around harvest
time, when food supplies would have been most abundant. With these
harvest feasts, negotiations about village relationships could take place.
Ballgames were a way for two rivaling villages to compete and
fight without having to engage in traditional warfare. The outcome on the
field represented the outcome of the battle; some would lose wagers and
honor, while the losing team would lose their lives. In addition, the
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ballcourts were used as a “public reenactment of warfare.”19 In this case,
prisoners from a defeated enemy were forced to play ballplayers from the
city of the victors. Thus, the ballgame signified ways to portray the victory
of a battle.
The ballgames were seen as a replication of the movements of the
planet Venus, the moon, and the sun. Ballcourts were pathways to the
underworld. One story, Popol Vuh, written by a Mayan noble in Central
America, narrates the tale of two sets of twin brothers and underworld
gods. The brothers go to the underworld and the first set of them are killed
and given to the gods, but the second set of brothers defeat the underworld
gods several times. The brothers travel to heaven and now represent the
planet Venus and the Sun.20 Walter Krickeberg developed one idea
centered on the story of Popol Vuh. He states that the games represented “a
symbolic reenactment of the struggle between day and night, between light
and darkness. It therefore symbolized the daily and seasonal journey of the
sun and other celestial bodies, and their cyclical descent through the
Underworld, and ascent into the sky.”21
Origin of the Ballgames
Each village contained its own legend about the foundation of the
ballcourts; therefore, each ballcourt represented the village’s identity. Two
examples follow:
After the Mexica had reached Coatepec and established
their villages and the temple of their patron god,
Huitzilopochtli, they were instructed by that god to build
a ballcourt.
In these migration legends, the
transformation of the wild, uninhabitable spaces into
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controlled, social places was partly accomplished through
the imposition on the landscape of public, ritual
architecture.22
Another legend stated the following:
In another Central Mexican account, the native
chronicler, Ixtlilxochitl, cited in Leyenaar, tells us that
Topiltzin, the ruler of Tula, proposed to his three rivals
that the four of them rule his realm together and
presented them with a model of a ballcourt made of four
kinds of precious stone. In this case, the ballcourt
symbolically represented Topiltzin’s domain and all of its
wealth and resources.23
Winners and Losers
While in society the players were separated by rank, blood, and
class; in the ballcourts they were divided into winners and losers. The
winners would finish the day in victory, living on to play another game,
while becoming champions for their village. The winners were also given
the honor of being able to drink Chicha, a fermented drink typically made of
maize.24 On the other hand, Mesoamericans often sacrificed the losers to
their gods, generally by decapitating them. In the Great Ballcourts of
Chichen Itza, serpents or squashed plants depicted the neck of a person,
once the decapitation finished.25
Sacrifice and the “Rolling Heads” Myths
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Researchers believe the rubber ball was created in the tropical
lowlands, where rubber sources grew naturally and existed high supply.26
In places where no rubber balls existed, documents show that human heads
were used instead. One Seneca myth describes this:
A cannibal killed a woman and ate all but her head,
breasts, and the boy twins she was pregnant with, which
he placed in a hollow tree. The boys survived on the milk
in the breasts and were later discovered by their father,
who made them ball clubs and a ball to play with. The
mother’s skull was still alive, and in fear of it the boys and
their father fled. The father, helped by his invisible
brother, was chased by his wife’s flying skull until it was
finally killed. After the skull was dead, it was used as a
ball in a game.27
Sacrifice played an important role for the ballgames. There are
many accounts from art pieces, artifacts, and bones to confirm this practice.
However, Mesoamericans used various means of execution, the primacy of
decapitation in the act of ritual sacrifice remains uncertain.. In Popol Vuh,
many references to decapitation exist, though not for sacrificial reasons.
For example, one person did not die when losing his head and the other was
already dead.28 The actual deaths were by other means. One set of twins
were killed before the ballgame, but the method was unknown. In another
story, from the same sacred source of the Mayas, another twin’s head was
cut off, but his twin brother gave him a pumpkin as a replacement. This
second set of twins won the game, but allowed themselves to be put into a
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stone oven and burned to death, by their enemies. They were revived and
killed again; this time with their limbs were scattered and their hearts and
head removed. Removing the heart represented the most important act of
sacrifice in several Mesoamerican regions.
Many mythical stories
portrayed the head living without the rest of the body.29
There is evidence to suggest that some nations used human heads
instead of a rubber ball. Many paintings and stories offer examples of heads
used for balls and games in which the balls have faces. Since the purpose of
the game was to keep the ball moving, the bouncing behavior of rubber
made it a perfect material for ball construction. Several myths depict heads
that could move on their own. In this respect, decapitation would “bring
about not a lifeless head, but a head that, once freed from the body, could
jump, roll, and fly.”30 Thus the term, rolling heads, or rolling skulls, are found
in many stories throughout the New World. The Apinaye, in South
America, only played ballgames for a boy’s initiation. To coincide with the
rolling heads legend, they used rubber balls based on a myth:
A man who attacked people at night with his sharpened
leg-bone was beaten to death by villagers, who cut off his
head. His head jumped away, and returned in the daytime
to attack the people, but they tricked it into falling into a
hole and covered it with dirt. Later, youths going
through their initiation came across the spot and noticed a
rubber tree growing out of the head’s grave. Using the
sap from the tree they made the first rubber balls for the
rubber-ball game.31
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There are also stories where rubber balls represented the moon,
constellations, or the Sun. In addition, some believe that the loss of a game
was a symbolic severing from society. Therefore, decapitation and
dismembering of body parts portrayed this disconnection. Not only does
the person lose life but also the connection to the body, which in turn
represents the larger disjunction of culture, and a link to the constellations.
These ideas can be used to describe aspects of the harvest and fertility.
Both social interaction and agricultural fertility remained two of the central
roles of the games. The myths associated with decapitation and these two
themes correlate together.32
End of the Ballgames
People played ballgames all over Mesoamerica. Although each
area had slight variations to the game, the overall definition of what a
ballgame was and how it was to be played remained fairly similar.
Ballgames had such an impact on the lives of the Mesoamerican world, and
were so popular, that the gulf coast nations sent a tribute of 16,000 rubber
balls a year to an inland king.33 The ballgames were tightly interwoven
into the everyday life of society. The ballgames incorporated the culture of
Mesoamerican societies, which now aids archaeologists with learning about
forms of Mesoamerican entertainment. The ballgames displayed the power,
prestige, honor, and beliefs of these people. The games proved how
complex these societies, later called savage and uncivilized by foreign
invaders, really were at the height of their rule. These games are no longer
played. Ultimately, the Mesoamerican civilization would fall to disease and
Spanish conquerors.
When the Spanish came, with their Christian beliefs, any practice
that worshiped any creator but the Christian god was prohibited, which, of
course, meant that the act of sacrifice was not tolerated. The game which
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had been played for 3,000 years ended not long after the Spanish
invasions.34 By 1589, all the ballgames had ended, although a few
Spaniards wrote accounts of a few games, and some artifacts have been
preserved. These are mere glimpses at the earliest form of organized sport
in Mesoamerica.35
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The power struggle simmering between the Catholic Church and the
Mexican national government erupted with Catholic bishops and priests
suspending religious worship in protest of the anticlerical policies of the
Calles administration on July 31, 1926.1 President Plutarco Elias Calles
called for “submission to the law,” known as Calles Law, that implemented
anticlerical conditions set forth in the Constitution of 1917.2 Laws that
controlled property rights in Article 27 of the Constitution forbade Church
ownership of property and limited foreign ownership. All land served the
public interest by the protection of communal rights of indigenous groups
and redistribution of land under control of a strong national government.3
Under Calles’ Law, the government nationalized all church buildings,
outlawed religious houses, banned public religious functions, and required
priests to register in order to avoid severe fines or imprisonment.4
Examination of the Cristero Rebellion as simply a conflict between
church and state misses the many faces, or nuances, that surrounded the
uprising. In the work of historians from Jean Meyer, in the 1970s, to
Ramon Jrade in the 1980s, and more recently the works of Jennie Purnell
and Adrian Bantjes, reveals a multilayered portrait of the rebellion. The
secular nature and the anticlerical position of the Calles administration are
clear. What proves more complex, however, is how the conflict is defined.
Was the rebellion a “holy war” with religious motivations? Was the
conflict based in an economic struggle between a variety of peasant groups
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and the policies of a strong national government? Was the rebellion the
culmination of long-standing grievances between the Church and the state?
Or, as Purnell suggests, was the rebellion the articulation of factional
conflicts between various communities that included economic, political,
regional, and community concerns?5
This paper examines the complexities of the Cristero Rebellion,
exploring the motivations of the many factions that emerged on both sides
of the conflict and the many faces of the participants. The rebellion cannot
be characterized as purely a battle between two dominating forces. Like
much of Mexican history, the story of the rebellion is one of continuing
struggle for political, economic, and regional autonomy among a variety of
groups. Indeed, the portrait of the Cristero Rebellion has many facets, each
with its own interests, ideologies, hopes, and dreams.
The Face of the State
In 1925, Tobasco cacique Tomas Garrido Canabal criticized
Catholic clerics and stated that “’the cassocked vultures have seized their
prey, digging their talons into the heart of the Indian, who is less prepared
than any other race to resist the seduction of the whole ritual farse.’”6
President Plutarco Elias Calles, like Canabal, believed that the power of the
Church obstructed modernization and that he must eliminate the power of
the Church and its domination of the peasantry.7 Calles wanted absolute
control and was suspicious of the politicization of the Church after the
creation of a fairly successful Catholic Party in 1912. Although the party
had dissolved, Calles sought to rid Mexico of the potential for Church
control.
The origins of the ideology of de-fanaticization were found in
radical liberalism of the nineteenth-century scientific positivism, Marxism,
and Protestantism. Mexican revolutionaries understood the revolution as
more than an economic struggle, but also one of spirituality. They
considered religion, like many of their Russian counterparts, a “drug” and
the “Catholic ritual […] a seductive trick designed to exploit ignorant
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peasants ‘hallucinated by floats, adorned with clouds, little angels, chalices
and all the artiface the clergy uses to cheat them out of their last penny.’”8
They clerics accused of sustaining the “backwards” nature of rural
peasantry and presenting an obstacle to the formation of a modern state.
However, the development of a secular state was not the only
motivation for Calles’ actions toward the Church. Following the February
1926 proclamation of the “primate of Mexico” in which he “repeated a 1917
declaration that the Church did not recognize the constitution,” Calles
proceeded to fully implement all the provisions of the Constitution
regarding the Church.9 He called for “submission to the law” that would be
required anywhere and explained that this did not indicate the
‘decatholicisation’ of Mexico.10 The Church antagonized Calles who
already sought its end, or at least minimizing its strong presence in
Mexico.
The State sought to end what they believed to be the hegemony of
the Church over the Mexican people, in particular, indigenous and rural
populations. In order to modernize, the secular state must rid Mexico of
fanaticism and mysticism that kept the people ‘backwards’ and without a
national identity. The Mexican government wanted absolute control over
the social, cultural, economic, and political lives of the people, and the
Church was considered a significant obstacle.
The Face of the Church
The Catholic Church, although present in the daily life of many
Mexicans and a fixture in many rural communities, was noticeably absent
from the rebellion. The majority of priests, according to Jean Meyer, were
quite hostile to the cristeros. Meyer found that in January 1927, out of 3,600
priests, only five were participated in the rebellion. One hundred priests
were “actively hostile,” sixty-five were neutral but provided support to the
cristeros, forty were “actively favorable,” and 3,600 priests left their
parishes.11
The Vatican had forbade bishops and priests aiding the
insurgents and demanded that they follow the law of the land. Many feared
persecution as priests had been attacked and murdered and so fled to the
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cities or went into hiding in the hinterlands of Mexico under the protection
of their parishes.12
Mexican clerics suspended of worship on 31 July, 1926, in order to
encourage private worship. This was “an attempt to put the sacraments
and the clergy beyond the reach of civil law.”13 However, the “majority of
clergy withdrew from rural areas and sought refuge in the big towns under
the control of the Government.”14 Not only did the majority of priests
withdraw from their parishes, they encouraged nonviolence, patience, and
humility. According to Aurelio Acevedo, one of the cristero rebels, “the very
Fathers forbade us to fight for Christ, for the religion our fathers taught us
and then reaffirmed for us in baptism, confirmation and our first
communion.”15 Many priests offered sermons opposing the cristeros, calling
them ‘cattle-thieves’ and discouraging parishioners from participation in
rebel activities.16
A few priests, such as Fr. Adolfo Arroyo, the vicar of Valparaiso,
stayed with his parishioners and joined the rebellion in defense of the
Church. Fr. Arroyo criticized his fellow priests and wrote, “The
overwhelming majority of the bishops and priests, displaying a criminal
degree of conformism, wallowed in an accursed inertia, all expecting sheer
miracle from Heaven to give liberty to the Church.” They were content to
give exhortations and say a few prayers. The priests had recourse to
theology and, without further consideration, announced the illicit nature of
the violent struggle in defence of the Church.17 Msgr. Gonzalez y Valencia,
Archbishop of Durango wrote in a pastoral letter on February 11, 1927,
“We never provoked this armed movement. But now that this movements
exists, and all peaceful means have been exhausted, to our Catholic sons
who have risen in arms for the defence of their social and religious rights …
we must say: be tranquil in your consciences and receive our blessing.”18
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Because of Vatican-issued orders that bishops and priests abandon
their parishes and spiritual duties, and submit to the mandates of the
Constitution, priests rarely supported the rebellion. Fear of persecution
and death also created a barrier to clerical support, although many priests
found ways to remain with their parishioners as spiritual leaders and
conduct the sacraments covertly. The face of the Church was not
represented among the cristeros, only the presence of a few priests who felt
they could not and would not abandon their charges. If the rebellion was a
conflict between the Church and the state, the Church was missing.
The Faces of the Cristeros
In ideological, socioeconomic, and geographical terms, the cristeros
were the most diverse of all the actors in the rebellion. They were, in other
words, not engaged in a large collective action, rather the cristeros
represented numerous causes and concerns, not all of which were religious.
Jennie Purnell writes that “communities did not rebel en masse during the
cristiada unless revolutionary anticlericalism and agrarianism attacked local
resources, values, and institutions that had been successfully defended until
the revolution itself.”19 In fact, the peasants were deeply divided on the
issue of rebellion and their opinions reflected their economic interests, the
impact of agrarian reform on their villages and towns, and their feelings
toward local authorities. Although various communities and factions
shared religious beliefs, there were differing political viewpoints.20 The
rebellion acquired the name cristero because of the battle cry “¡Viva Cristo
Rey!” and not necessarily because they shared a single view.21
Some cristeros engaged in rebellion for purely political and
economic reasons. Ladislao Molina, a large landowner in Michoacan, did
not demonstrate any religious motivation, and was known to embrace
liberal ideology first, and Catholicism second.22 According to Jose Perez, a
delegate to the National League for the Defence of Religious Liberty
(LNDLR), writing to his superiors, “he is not a cristero: whilst he is a
Catholic, he is also a liberal, and does not fight for the same reasons as the
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Catholics. He has his own point of view, but it is personal.”23 In the case of
Molina, and most likely others like him, “Catholicism served as a dissident
ideology for resisting state encroachments on his sphere of influence.”24
Some of the cristeros focused their revolutionary efforts on the local
agraristas who benefited from Cardenas-era land reforms.25 Agrarian land
reform created sporadic problems throughout Mexico as villages and towns
lost territorial autonomy. However, the problem for the cristeros did not
necessarily revolve around the agraristas, it revolved around religion with
political overtones. Cristero Jose Gonzalez Romo wrote in a letter to
agrarista Jesus Morfin, “Tell the agraristas that we are not fighting them
because they are agraristas, but because they support the tyrant who is
trying to wipe out the religion of our country and hand us over to the
Protestant Gringos.”26 Government control over land distribution often
meant foreign ownership and control, the previous statement suggests that
some cristeros saw a connection between elimination of the Catholic Church,
and the introduction of liberal, state-controlled, and foreign-based
exploitation.
Despite the economic and political tones of the rebellion, defense of
religion still motivated many of the cristeros. Because of their commitment
to Church restoration, they often defied the Church’s instruction to obey
the laws and observe restraint and non-violence. In a letter to the parish
priest, the Quintanar Brigade wrote, “without their permission and without
their orders we are throwing ourselves into this blessed struggle for our
liberty, and without their permission and without their orders we will go on
until we conquer or die.”27 Many cristeros “believed they were fighting a
‘holy war’ against an anticlerical government frequently depicted as the
Anti-Christ.”28
According to Javier Villa-Flores, during periods of “accelerated
cultural, political, and economic change,” increased religious and spiritual
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participation is common.29 He suggests that the cristeros, in response to
crisis, mobilized around a religious belief that served as a source of
motivation.30 Alliances and grassroots defense of the Church solidified in
response to the rapid changes the government attempted to impose.31 In
fact, cristeros were not only found in peasant communities and rural villages,
but in urban areas as well, although their character and composition were
significantly different.
In the cities, large urban networks formed. They engaged in
clandestine operations collecting taxes for supplies, obtaining ammunition
and food to sustain the rebels, and formed elaborate communication
networks. Workers and artisans, along with professionals filled the urban
ranks of the cristeros. Women played a critical role as cristeros. They carried
messages, ammunition, obtained and delivered food, among many other
duties, at great peril.32 What united the cristeros was their need to cope
with and respond to government controls over every aspect of their lives.
Government attacks against the Church mobilized the cristeros. The
Church, in many ways, was the symbol of autonomy, of cultural identity, an
institution that sustained the people through decades of turmoil.
Conclusion
The question remains, after this short discussion of the actors of
the Cristero Rebellion, was this a conflict based on religion, or was it more
a conflict between competing factions based on economic and political
interests? We have seen that the Church as an institution played a very
minor role, if any role at all. We have also seen that economics and local
interests figured strongly in mobilizing the cristeros as in the ongoing
conflict between the agraristas and the peasants. Agrarian and land reform
provided much of the fuel for the cristiada.
Religion served as a common denominator mobilizing the lower and
middle class against the elite. Devotion to the church bound diverse antigovernment sentiments, and the government’s action against the Church
and religious freedom were springboards that propelled the cristiada. In the
Cristero Rebellion a variety of concerns converged, and the Church served
as a symbol and catalyst for anti-government expression. The desire of the
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government to inflict its control over Mexican life and create a new
national identity based on secular terms intensified the commitment of
many Catholics to practice their religion, with or without clerical guidance
or support.
Religion ultimately served as the spark that set the wheels of
rebellion in motion. But religion was not the sole motivation for the
rebellion. In the end, it appears the Cristero Rebellion was not a conflict of
the Church and the state, rather a power struggle between the autonomy of
peasants, workers, and the middle class against the elites and the
government.
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…Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and
would not blush as if I had committed a crime…However, I will not die
for the Algerian nation, because it does not exist.1
Ferhat Abbas
…Par delà la légende politique et les fictions juridiques de l’Algérie
« terre de France en Afrique », notre pays est une colonie, dont
l’originalité est d’être à la fois d’exploitation et de peuplement.2
Hocine Aït Ahmed
…Si la peur donne des ailes et fait perdre tout jugement, elle fait dire
aussi des bêtises. C’est ainsi que la période héroïque de 1936, au cours de
laquelle la conscience nationale a été éveillée par le venue de l’Étoile
Nord-Africaine en Algérie, est qualifiée de période de lutte fratricide.3
Declaration by followers of Messali Hadj, spring 1954
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In 1954, Algerian leaders of the Front de Libération National (FLN)
joyously declared independence from metropolitan France and aspired for a
unified Algeria. French colonialism, however, created deep divisions within
the FLN. These divisions were not formed spontaneously in 1954, but
through a long process and relationship with metropolitan France.
Algerian leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas, Hocine Aït Ahmed, Ben Bella, and
Ahmed Messali Hadj, experienced French colonialism differently, and
formulated their own visions of an independent Algeria. Some, like Hocine
Aït Ahmed, exposed French imperialism and conceptualized perceptions of
the “other.” For others, like Ferhat Abbas, altérité (otherness) remained a
foreign concept and demanded French citizenship status. Still, indigenous
leaders came together and formed the FLN on November 1, 1954. Political
unity remained ambiguous and Algerian leaders adopted distinct language
that worked for, but also against, independence. Algerian political leaders
were more fractured than united, partly as a result of the imperial legacy
and partly due to an assimilation of ideas, permeated through the adoption
of specific language that proved unable to solidify Algerian leadership.
This paper seeks to tease out the various perspectives held by the FLN
leaders, and in that way to present the viewpoints of the “other.”
Colonial Context: French Imperial Legacies and Nationalist
Formation
French imperial authorities entered Algiers in 1830 and promised
quiet occupation while respecting indigenous society, culture, and religion.
Algerian had, then, two distinct ethnic groups: Berbers and Arabs. Berbers,
the country’s indigenous population, constituted roughly thirty percent of
the population—Arabs seventy percent.4 After 1830, Algerians competed
with a third group: pied noirs, or colons.5 A diverse group, the pied noirs
settled Algeria under the encouragement of metropolitan French
authorities. The pied noirs were not, however, ethnically homogenous.
Spanish, Italian, Maltese, and French constituted a large portion of those
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who emigrated and settled in Algeria. The French imperial army famously
coined the term méditerranéens-et-demi (half Mediterranean) to describe the
pied noirs.6 In 1841, 37,374 pied noirs occupied Algeria.7 In only ten years,
this number grew to nearly 131,000.8 Only one European in five
constituted as ethnically “French” in 1917.9 Regardless, the French
presence in Algeria supported these colonial ventures and reinforced pied
noir supremacy over Algerian Arab and Berber populations. Pied noir
settlement coincided with French aspirations and new imperialist values
even before the scramble for Africa. Napoleonic war veteran ThomasRobert Bugeaud stated to the French National Assembly that ‘wherever
there is fresh water and fertile land [in Algeria], there one must locate
colons, without concerning oneself to whom these lands belong.’10
Thus, France proclaimed Algeria an essential component of its
empire. While Bugeaud lamented Algeria’s strategic and practical value,
French authorities immediately recognized Algeria’s value as something
uniquely “French.”
In 1848, the French government officially
departmentalized Algeria, giving it distinct “French” qualities.11 The
French colonial press antagonized this uniqueness as well. Jonathon
Gosnell noted this influence: “the printed word indeed helped to redefine
the meaning of the nation as one no longer restricted to one particular
geographic body of group of people.”12 Colonial newspapers dominated
Algeria from 1830 to 1965, and inundated “Frenchness” into Algeria. More
importantly, French rhetoric and action signified Algeria as an extension of
France itself.
Imperial authorities divided the country into three
départements, thus using distinct metropolitan terms to define Algeria.13
French assimilationist policies fomented early Algerian nationalist
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movements, but these early nationalists sought integration rather than
divorce. From 1830 to the Great War, Algerian nationalism remained
relatively quiet and undeveloped—partly the consequences of
assimilationist policy. This changed by the 1920s and 1930s. In 1938,
Rabah Zenati echoed Ferhat Abbas: “it is, in short, inadmissible that it [the
Algerian administration] should pretend to continue treating today’s
native, especially when he has been educated in the great French schools,
like his grandfather of one hundred years ago.”14 Such sentiment reflected
assimilationist legacies, which stemmed from metropolitan legislative
measures during the late nineteenth century. The French National
Congress adopted these measures en masse:
[France should] inspire French sentiments among the natives, to
favor French colonization by all possible means, to assimilate the
European foreigners […] [and adopt] a special naturalization
compatible with the maintenance of their personal statues (under
Moslem law) to those who fulfill certain conditions and offer
certain guarantees […] to become entitled after a delay of ten
years to occupy a place in the metropolitan chambers […] [and]
sufficient financial resources should be created […] [and]
accessible to the entire school-age population.15
As incipient nationalist forces digested these promises, important
discourse resulted that developed, transformed, and permeated various
nationalist conceptions of “Algeria.” While other French colonies also
experienced assimilation, Algeria represented something unique, at least for
the metropolitans.
French metropolitan rhetoric exemplified these
sentiments. Early Algerian nationalist forces recognized this uniqueness;
however, Algerian voices became increasingly emphatic after important
international crises exploded during the early twentieth century.
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With Franz Ferdinand’s assassination at the hands of protonationalist Serbs, Europe spent the next four years destroying one another.
In Algeria, French authorities drafted 173,000 indigènes into the
metropolitan army, and they fought and died as temporary French
citizens.16 In 1911, only one percent of the French immigrant population
was Algerian. By 1918, Algerian immigration numbers had risen twenty
percent, only second behind Spanish immigrants which increased by thirty
five percent.17 Others migrated and replaced metropolitan factory workers.
Exposed to the propaganda of liberté, égalité, fraternité, Algerians emerged
from war empowered, if only psychologically. Attempts were made,
however, to reform France’s imperial system. In 1915, Prime Minister
Georges Clemenceau and former Overseas Minister Georges Leygues
introduced legislation that gave “Muslims […] a second electoral college
and the right to elect half the members of the consultative assemblies.”18
The bill finally passed in 1919. Still, French colons retained majority power
in the first electoral college, and through incessant opposition gained
considerable concessions. Consequently, nationalism strengthened within
the French colon community. In 1930, centenary celebrations blossomed
throughout Algeria with grandiose and copious declarations: if Muslims
knew then, in 1830, what they know now “they would have loaded their
muskets with flowers.”19 The perfect storm brewed for those native
Algerians seeking independence. Future FLN leaders carried these burdens
for the next thirty-five years. Metropolitan politicians, unwilling to
challenge pied-noir obstinacy and confidence, ultimately antagonized and
nourished Algerian nationalism.
Nationalist movements erupted during the Interwar period.
Various groups displayed deep divisions, however, in their respective
visions for an independent Algeria. Three distinct groups formed: Ben
Badis’ religious movement, Messali Hadj’s proto-communist movement,
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and Ferhat Abbas’ liberal movement.20 Ben Badis, born in 1889, created the
influential Association des Ulema in 1931. While Badis himself never directly
or personally influenced the FLN, largely because he died in 1940, the
Ulema fomented and legitimized pan-Arabism in Algeria.21
This
puritanical Islamic force declared ‘Islam is my religion, Arabic is my
language, and Algeria is my country.’22 Many contemporary Algerian elites
ignored Ben Badis’ message, secluding it from mainstream politics.
Algerian pragmatists regarded Badis’ religious doctrine as counterintuitive
to social and political change.
Messali Hadj created the radical nationalist movement, supported
by the Étoile Nord Africaine—the first radical socialist organization in
Algeria. Born in 1898, Hadj migrated and worked in France after World
War I. He briefly studied political theory at the Sorbonne, and while there
married a French communist.23 Messali had become Algeria’s first true
revolutionary by 1933 and called for property redistribution from the pied
noirs. After failed reform under Leon Blum’s popular front government, the
ENA disbanded; however, Messali regrouped and created the Parti
Progressive Algérien (PPA), which then dissolved and became the Mouvement
pour le Triomphe de Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD).24 Many early FLN
leaders supported these organizations but often disputed the fine details.
Messali’s appeal, however, remained ambiguous because he never embraced
violence as an acceptable option. Rather, Messali urged to achieve reform
through strict legal frameworks, but he continued to emphasize popular
socialism as the preferred alternative to both French imperial structures
and the liberal nationalists’ call for further assimilation and integration. In
1947, Messali garnered little support within the MTLD convention on his
proposed non-violent reform.25 Algerian liberals countered Messali with
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their pro-assimaltionist ideology, which ultimately reinforced French
imperial policy.
The liberal nationalists’ undoubted leader, Ferhat Abbas, called for
increased negotiation between Algerian and French leaders. Abbas’
underlying belief, however, remained pro-assimilationist and aspired for
provincial status in Algeria. Educational experience provided Abbas with
opportunities most Algerians never realized. Abbas entered regional
politics after becoming a pharmacist in the 1920s; moreover, he formed the
Fédérations de Elus Musulmans d’Algérie (FEMA) in 1929—a group primarily
comprised of Algerian intellectual elites.26 Throughout the 1930s and
1940s, Abbas, along with R. Zenati, called for “the crystallization of an
Algerian national “consciousness” through popular press outlets, like the
newspaper Abbas edited: Egalité.27 Printed issues peaked from 1944-45, and
produced 30,000 print copies per day.28 Zenati, too, published and edited
La Voix Indigène from 1929 to 1942. In its inaugural issue, Zentai declared
‘L’Algérie doit devenir française.’29 In the September 12, 1929 issue, Zenati
acknowledged that “nous avons le devoir de faire remarquer la contradiction d’un
pareil système.”30
For Algeria to become France, Liberals believed
assimilation policies such as education, language reform, and intermarriage,
transformed Algerians into Frenchmen.
Such egalitarian promises
remained political rhetoric for most of the Algerian population. Critics,
often future leaders of the FLN, chastised Abbas and Zenati for their refusal
to acknowledge a preexisting Algerian identity. While Zenati died before
the FLN emerged, Abbas remained a prominent figure and voice for that
movement, and legitimized the FLN during the late stages of the Algerian
War when he joined the FLN in 1956. Abbas reflected these volatile issues
in 1962: “Ce sont malheurs de notre pays qui m’ont jeté dans l’arène politique. Si la
France avait trouvé des solutions équitables aux problèmes qui se sont posés chez
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nous, il est probable que je me serais contente de « cultiver mon jardin ».”31
Liberals never realized their goals, primarily because French authorities
never intended Algerians to assimilate into metropolitan society and
culture—Algerians into Frenchmen represented a romantic ideal, but
ultimately naïve and impractical.
We should not underestimate these variant and often divisive
visions. Nationalist movements remained inchoate. Indeed, independence
leaders never created monolithic nationalist movements. Early leaders and
their ideologies, however, remained paramount in the development of the
FLN. French imperial legacies, especially through Algeria’s unique status,
created nationalist discourse, but more importantly transformed discourse
that seemed to represent Algerian solidarity. Algerians never escaped the
perpetual altérité (otherness) that French imperial legacies ingrained into
native society; and neither did the eventual FLN leaders who adopted the
same divisive discourse that Baddis, Messali, and Abbas displayed twenty
years earlier. Exploring the complexities and dynamics of the emergent
FLN will further emphasize these points. By 1954, FLN leaders promoted
so called “Algerian” and “Muslim” unity, but remained internally and
politically fractured.
Sétif and the FLN Perspectives
The Second World War further complicated Algeria’s eventual
course to independence. France’s humiliating defeat profoundly affected the
Algerian psyche: were Algerians still “French” or did they owe their
allegiance to Germany? What about the national père de France, Marshal
Pétain? Indeed, Algeria remained officially pro-Vichy during most of the
war. Abbas seized this opportunity. In 1943, Abbas declared, ‘the French
colony only admits equality with Muslim Algeria on one level [being the]
sacrifice on the battlefields’ in the famous “Manifesto of the Algerian
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People.”32 Abbas appeared to abandon the pro-assimilationist rhetoric;
however, he still called for direct peaceful negotiation with metropolitan
France. At war’s end, Algerian nationalism escalated. On May 8, 1945,
demonstrations erupted in the town of Sétif. The day began to celebrate VE
Day, but tensions had risen over the treatment of Algerian veterans and the
imprisonment of Messali. Algerian workers took to the streets with
banners that stated ‘Vive Messali’ and ‘Long Live Free and Independent
Algeria.’33 Algerians demanded social reform and the release of Messali,
who spent numerous occasions in prison for his rancorous behavior.
Although it is not clear who fired the first shot, the incident left thousands
dead.34 No other event had such a profound impact on the development of
the FLN. French imperial authorities subsequently suppressed both Abbas
and Messali—Abbas was forced into house arrest and Messali was exiled to
the Congo.35 A small group of young Algerians, many who fought for
France in World War II, emerged as the leaders of Algeria through the
FLN. Many of these leaders participated in the Sétif incident.
Nine principle Algerian nationalists, ranging from ages 27 to 42,
founded the FLN in 1954: Ahmed Ben Bella, Ali Mahsas, Mostefa Ben
Boulaid, Belkacem Krim, Omar Ouamrane, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, Mohamed
Boudiaf, Mohamed Khider, and Hocine Aït Ahmed. These members
originated from socially diverse backgrounds. Boulaid came from Aurés
and was previously employed as a common miller.36 Hocine Aït Ahmed,
born in 1926, grew up in a small Kabyle village with few opportunities, and
where infant mortality rates remained high—Ait Ahmed attributed this to
the French colonial system.37 None of the neuf historiques supported Abbas’
liberal ideology. Rather, most gravitated towards Messali’s socialist
leaning ideas. Gilbert Meynier noted, however, that the eventual leaders of
the FLN carried different concerns and visions for an independent Algeria,
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which countered Messali’s leftist leaning ideology: “Indépendantisme et
aspiration de classe ne sont donc pas des vecteurs de sens oppose, mais des vecteurs
de même sens. Si tout ‘nationalisme’ est ‘transclassisme,’ le ‘transclassisme’ ne doit
rien a un common dénominateur social sur le long terme.”38 The FLN founders
were not, as Meynier stated, unified in ideology for Algeria’s future,
whether through Abbas’ liberalism or Messali’s socialism. Moreover, the
colonial system affected each in very personal ways, often impending on the
family structure. Thus, each carried his respective visions of revolutionary
goals, that is, what should and could be achieved through Algerian
independence.39
By the late 1940s, one figure emerged who influenced the FLN
more than any other: Ahmed Ben Bella. Bella’s immediate influence into
what would become the FLN proved most important. Born in 1918, Bella
grew up in Marnia, a small town west of Oran. His father worked in minor
commercial ventures and sustained the family with a small farm. Three of
Bella’s brothers died early, one of whom died under the French flag during
the Great War. By 1940, Bella joined the French army and received the
Croix de Guerre. After Germany’s blitzkrieg and France’s subsequent
surrender, Bella joined the French Moroccan resistance army. At war’s
end, Charles de Gaulle personally awarded Bella with the Médaille
Militaire, unaware of the young Algerian’s future. Dismayed over the Sétif
massacre, Bella went underground within Messali’s MTLD movement in
1947. With Messali exiled, Bella broke from traditional MTLD doctrines
and created the OS (Organisation Spéciale), which claimed to fight French
colonialism ‘by all means,’ violent and non-violent alike.40 Messali’s MTLD
continued to work within the system; however, Bella represented the first
clear break from the old vanguard of Messali and Abbas. Armed
confrontation became increasingly inevitable for Bella and his new
followers. Indeed, Aït Ahmed and Bella formed an important alliance in
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1949 and attacked a post office in Oran. Consequently, French authorities
issued outstanding warrants for both. Aït Ahmed evaded capture, but
French police apprehended Bella in 1950 and sentenced him to eight years
imprisonment. Bella escaped from prison, along with fellow FLN founder
Ali Mahsas, in 1952. The period from 1950 to 1954 remained largely
chaotic, and the principle nationalist groups (UDMA and MTLD)
splintered further into separate spheres. A core group of nationalists broke
from the radical side of Messali’s MTLD and called themselves
“centralists.” The most important point with this remained with Bella’s call
for a third party. By early 1954, Bella, Mahsas, Didouche and Boudiaf
secretly collaborated in Paris and outlined the FLN’s initial formation.
This third party unequivocally advocated overt violent action against
metropolitan colonial authorities.41
1954: The FLN United?
Detailed information about the inner circles of the FLN remains
problematic at best. Ben Bella and Aït Ahmed wrote extensively after
Algeria gained independence in 1962; however, both attained principle
positions of power (or opposition power) with the newly formed Algerian
government. Several other founders were either assassinated or exiled;
therefore, our understanding of events must be seen in this context. Official
FLN documents must be examined with caution, as these documents
emphasized solidarity through FLN propaganda.42 Despite Frantz Fanon’s
arguments, FLN leaders remained, as they had before and after
independence, deeply divided over political, social, and cultural issues.
Frantz Fanon argued in Wretched of the Earth that leaders unite through
“the practice of violence [which] binds them together as a whole, since each
individual forms a violent link in the great chain.”43 Fanon was heavily
invested in the FLN cause, primarily as a member himself. Terrorism
certainly played an important role, as it often does. This paper attempts,

41

Ibid., 74-77, and Besma Lahouri, “Ahmed Ben Bella (1916-),” L’Express, December 18,
2003, 1.
42
See Mohamed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962,
“Information et propagande du FLN/ALN,” 110-136.
43
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 73.

93

however, to distinguish these perspectives, and echoes William Qaundt’s
analysis that “contrary to Fanon’s prophecy […] it is simply untrue that
the Algerian revolution produced unity within the political elite.”44 Indeed,
we must deconstruct both early Algerian reactions and official FLN
documentation in order to fully tease out and distinguish divergent FLN
perspectives. In many ways, altérité (otherness) remained an important,
perhaps ingrained, concept within the FLN hierarchy. This was not only
directed at metropolitan France, but became an important distinction from
an internal point of view.
On November 1, 1954 (All Saints Day), the leaders of the FLN
officially proclaimed their sovereignty as a political and military
independence movement with the following objectives:
Our movement of regeneration presents itself under the label of:
Front de Liberation
Nationale, thus freeing itself from any possible
compromise, and offering to all Algerian
patriots of every social position
and of all parties…the possibility of joining in the national struggle.
Goal: National independence through:
1. restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and
social, within the framework of the principles of Islam;
2. preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of
race or religion.
INTERNAL OBJECTIVES
1. political house-cleaning through the destruction of the last
vestiges of corruption and
reformism, the causes of our present
decadence….
EXTERNAL OBJECTIVES
1. internationalism of the Algerian problem;
2. pursuit of North African unity in its national Arabo-Islamic
context
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3. assertion, through the United Nations Charter, of our active
sympathy towards all
nations that may support our liberating
cause.45
The “political house-cleaning” served formal acknowledgment of
divided leaders within both the FLN and other nationalist groups. It also
offered a warning to those individuals or groups not aligned with the FLN.
Only months earlier, the Messalists issued their own proclamation to the
National Algerian Congress, which echoed 1930s North African Star
ideology that “est qualifiée de période de lutte fratricide.”46 Not all
nationalist members agreed with the FLN agenda, thus creating their own
internal fratricide. Still, fratricide became an available and conceptualized
term which carried both pragmatic and psychological meaning into the
formation and fate of the FLN. This concept may be compared, in
theoretical framework, to a Norbert Elias idea that “seek[s] the conditions
for transformation in psychic economy in changes in ways to exert power
and exist in society.”47 Goals of the FLN appear to have retained much of
this thinking.
FLN leaders portrayed these goals as the only true, legitimate
cause—success depended primarily through violent military actions. For
example, early FLN propaganda utilized excessive military idioms. Leaflets
issued in November 1955, titled La Bataille de Djorf vue par Le Patriote,
galvanized the FLN’s intrepidity: “Nous chargeons avec cœur, le choc est
irrésistible.”48 Further leaflets, issued in 1955 or 1956 throughout the Oran
region, portrayed notions of FLN unity through military rhetoric: “Le
moment de l’action nous attend maintenant et nous ne pouvons obtenir des
résultats [a travers] […] les méthodes, les objectifs, l’emploi du temps et

45

Horne, 95.
Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962 (Paris:
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), 25. (…is described as the period of fratricide.)
47
Roger Chartier, On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices (London: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 108.
48
Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962 (Paris:
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), 110. (We charge with heart, the shock is irresistible.)
46

95

faisant preuve d’esprit de sacrifice, de courage et de foi.”49 However, the
FLN remained at the outset, fragmented both strategically and logistically.
Propaganda illustrated clear common objectives, motives, and ideology. It
serves important evidence that shows perceived, whether subconsciously or
deliberately, notions of unanimity with monolithic features, like war or
religion. On the contrary, it may prove more accurate to propose that FLN
leaders knowingly manipulated these ideas in order to form a broad
movement.
The FLN struggled to appeal to Algeria’s diverse populations.
The popular French news press, L’Express, echoed this statement in a 1954
article that discussed how French, Arab, Jewish, Mozabite (Berber), Italian,
and Spanish groups lived together, since colonial conception, with much
suspicion.50 Diverse ethnic groups interfered with the FLN’s “solidarity”
rhetoric. Algerian populations became increasingly fragmented and
separated. Popular support waned in the beginning, only slowly gaining
wider revolutionary participation by war’s end. Indeed, Algeria’s majority
illiterate population could not process the information, which came from
Cairo radio broadcasts and pamphlets similar to the noted examplesbroad
enthusiasm over FLN actions initially resulted in the Aurès region. Why,
then, did Algerians slowly but surely gravitate towards FLN ideas? Alf
Andrew Heggoy proposed evidence to answer such a question. Rather than
the FLN’s attempts to foster widespread violent nationalism, Heggoy
argues that native Algerians participated for numerous reasons, but
particularly through French rifle restrictions. This “legal” restriction
embodied the larger colonial system of inequality. French colonialism
assaulted pre-established Berber traditions that included the rifle. Heggoy
noted that “Kabyles gladly tell a folk story which illustrates […] a […]
man, according to this homily, owns a wife, a dog, and a gun. He can
dispense with the wife and, if need be, do without the dog. But to have no
gun is to have no honor.”51 Others, when asked why they joined the FLN,
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provided no answer.52 This suggests individuals joined for reasons other
than stated in official FLN propaganda. An often-overlooked explanation
was simply the idea of group conformity, influenced on Algerians through
word of mouth. Psychological sociality, that is the nature and tendency to
mobilize along socially similar grounds, may have been more important
than the FLN. Colonialism, in its much broader understanding, adversely
affected native culture and society. Both Heggoy and Pierre Bourdieu
noted the importance of the Algerian family structure where “the misery
and insecurity have been made even worse by the distress resulting from
the loss of the group ties on which the individual’s psychological and social
stability was based in the old communities. One can imagine how precarious
family unity must be in such a context.”53 Is it a coincidence that the term
“fratricide” is found in much of the FLN documents and personal writings
of the various national leaders? This term implies a complete breakdown of
family solidarity within the colonial structure. It seems, rather than a
unified FLN message, Algerians participated, if at all, in the independence
movement for personal reasons. The grandiose principles of FLN
propaganda recruited some individuals; however, this evidence suggests
Algerians never thought of themselves within those terms. The FLN
leaders, too, brought these different life stories and experiences into the
party. Those leaders attempted to create and legitimize its fledgling
position in 1954, despite their competing visions for an independent
Algeria. Deconstructing this evidence has shown that FLN leaders and
many Algerians were not united in 1954—just as they had not been in 1930
or 1962.
Conclusion
The Algerian War increasingly demonstrated intense violence
between both parties. For the FLN, internal division plagued its overall
efforts. By 1955, the FLN core in Aurès deposed its military general,
Bachir Chihani, and executed him. Moreover, Ben Bella remained in selfimposed exile in Cairo in attempts to form broad international coalitions.
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In 1956, the FLN leadership in Algeria issued an “ultimatum” to Bella: “If
you cannot do anything for us outside, come back and die with us.”54
Indeed, Bella found little logistical support for the Algerian cause outside of
the country. Internal quarrels increasingly divided FLN leadership.
Things became so desperate for the FLN that they welcomed Abbas into
the party by spring of 1955. Abbas continued his moderate positions—
exemplified by his numerous international trips to France and the United
Nations assembly. His clarion call for equitable solutions ultimately fell on
deaf ears.55
The war continued with numerous cases of overt terrorism, by
both sides, and widespread torture. The Battle of Algiers ensued in 1956,
leaving thousands dead and countless more homeless. By 1962, the war
ended with Charles de Gaulle’s concession and decision to “grant” Algeria’s
independence. Indeed, the war’s conclusion ultimately rested with his
decision, influenced, nonetheless, by the growing metropolitan dissent. In
Algeria, the FLN emerged victorious and transformed itself from a
revolutionary movement into a legitimate, albeit unitary, political party.56
Evidence of FLN divisions quickly formed once again in Ben
Bella’s new authoritarian government. From 1962 to 1965, Bella utilized
the army to remove and oppose the other existing founders of the FLN—
Aït Ahmed, Khider, and Boumedienne among others. Bella’s excessive
authoritarianism could not sustain itself, and he was removed in a relatively
non-violent coup in 1965. Houari Boumedienne claimed the presidency and
remained in office until his death in 1978.57 Ironically, Abbas, Aït Ahmed,
and Bella all fled to France and Switzerland in exile. Abbas retired to a
Paris suburb until his death in 1985.58 Aït Ahmed and Bella remain active
voices in Algerian politics. Thus, Algeria’s immediate post-war history
exemplified the same divisions that plagued nationalist leadership in the
1920s to 1940s and in 1954. The imperial legacy created altérité (otherness)
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in which FLN leaders never fully detached themselves, clearly evident in
the post-war struggle for stability.
Independence movements, especially in the colonial world, often
portray unanimity. This paper has shown, however, the Algerian
perspective proved much more dynamic and convoluted. We often
understand the colonial system in these terms. The Algerian story is one of
deep-rooted conflict, created and nourished by the French imperial system.
The process proved gradual, but ultimately chaotic and violent. Liberal and
moderate leadership simply could not sustain its call for assimilation.
Indeed, not just French authorities invested these ideas into Algeria, but a
core group of individuals—initially led by Zenati and Abbas—accepted the
assimilation doctrine, including the idea of fratricide. French leadership
never intended, however, for Algeria to assimilate French culture and
society. It served, rather, an important convenience to apply such rhetoric
and facilitate an efficient colonial system. French imperialism applied the
concept of altérité in order to instill pragmatic and psychological inferiority.
This came through the adoption of specific French linguistic ideas that
FLN leaders carried and employed during the independence movement.
The unintended consequences worked two fold. First, Algerian nationalism
strengthened. Secondly, Algerian nationalist leaders never agreed on a
monolithic path for Algeria. The evidence presented highlights the intense
internal conflict between the original FLN founders; however, these
disputes devolved from decades of linguistic assimilation that worked in
contradiction. While Algeria achieved its independence, it carried the
imperial burden beyond 1954 and arguably to the present. Algerian
fraternity proved too weak to sustain the imperial weight; instead, it
fractured and divided them. The symbolic power of November 1, 1954 will
always represent a better, independent Algerian future. Beneath it all,
however, FLN leaders engaged in a storm of ideas, and remained politically
fractured and incapable of shedding one hundred twenty-four years of
French imperial domination.
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When Kim Dae-jung completed his term as the Republic of Korea’a
President, the government constructed a presidential library in his honor.
The library was built at Yonsei University, a private college with a history
leading back to the dawn of western-styled education within Korea.
Interestingly, Kim Dae-jung never studied at Yonsei. So why build the
library at this private, well renowned university? Perhaps because they
represented “firsts” for their nation: Kim Dae-jung as the nation’s first
Roman Catholic President and Yonsei University as the first hospital to
provide Western medical education in Korea. By the end of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, many Western missionaries founded schools
in Korea to spread Christianity. These schools and hospitals provided new,
modern access to education for the people of Korea. Christian missionaries
played a significant role in developing Korea’s education system and
medical infrastructure from 1882 to1910. Without the works of these
individuals, a “modern” educational system would not have evolved on the
peninsula until the occupation of Korea by Japan in 1910.
Before examining the work of Christian missionaries and their
efforts to establish schools and hospitals on the Korean peninsula, we must
explore the context in which Christianity arrived and became available to
the Korean people. Takemichi Hara notes that one of the first significant
ways that Western influence reached Korea was through the annual
tributary missions to China by emissaries of the Korean Kingdom during
the eighteenth-century.1 Even though the emissaries were theoretically
forbidden to enter Peking, little stopped them from intruding into the city
to search for entertainment, shopping, or conversation. Korean emissaries
regularly visited the Nan-t’ang, or South Church, where resident Jesuit
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priests of the Manchu court provided the visiting Koreans with scientific
works or Christian writings translated into Chinese.2 When these writings
returned to Korea they found a receptive audience in the Sirhak3 crowd,
leading to academic interest and conversion among many of the intellectual
elite. This new religion was so attractive to Korean emissaries that the first
recorded baptism occurred at Peking in 1784.4
Individuals who returned from Peking and converts among the
Sirhak movement continued to spread Christianity in Korea without any
official missionaries until 1794, when Chou Wen-mo became the first
Catholic Priest in Korea. When Chou Wen-mo, a young Chinese man
entered the country he found at least four thousand converts.5 Wen-mo
became the first Catholic priest in Korea. So pervasive was this new
teaching, that it attracted followers from the late King Chŏngjo’s political
faction.
In 1801, Queen Reagent issued the Shinyu proclamation,
authorizing a large scale persecution of Christianity as an “evil teaching” in
Confucian tradition. Despite this government sponsored persecution of
Christianity, its religious base continued to grow. These trends continued
to influence the peninsula as the isolationist policies of Korea began to
crumble when Korea opened to Western powers by signing the United
States–Korea treaty. Christian persecution calmed in 1886 after Korea
signed a treaty with France containing a remarkably vague clause that
allowed missionaries to spread Christianity in Korea. The ending of official
persecution of Christians allowed for the entrance of many Protestant
missionaries into Korea who not only spread the word of God, but also
created schools and hospitals.
The brief observance of Christianity’s history in Korea is
important for two reasons. First, it exemplifies how the religion arrived on
the peninsula as a byproduct of the tributary missions between Korea and
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China. It spread among the academic population, partially through the
Sirhak movement, before being persecuted by royal mandate in 1801 by the
Shinyu proclamation. Second, the end of official persecution in 1882 opened
the door for the missionaries to come to Korea, bringing their Western
knowledge that changed the face of Korean education and medicine forever.
These two reasons prove critical to understand and contextualize the
history of Christian missionaries in Korea.
With the treaty signed in1882, the United States began their
missionary work in Korea by building hospitals and schools. Although a
pre-established form or practice of individual education existed within
Korea, especially through male dominated Confucian traditions, it remained
inaccessible to many individuals. Missionaries brought accessibility to
Korean education by creating an educational system for everyone at every
level. Prior to the establishment of missionary schools, Korean education
centered upon private primary and secondary education. State controlled
public schooling focused on college education. Sungho Lee summarizes
these ideas:
The state run institutions were mostly those of higher
learning, which opened their doors only to the selected
youths of the privileged upper class. The primary purpose
of higher learning was to acquaint the students with
Confucian philosophy and ethics through a course of
study composed of Chinese classics, which were thought
to be a guide for the bureaucracy. […] the private
institutions of education were for primary and middle
levels of education. The formal general education for
people was generally a private matter, while higher
education for the ruling class was a public one.6
In Korea, before the introduction of missionary schools, schooling
for all levels of education did not exist, either private or public.
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Complicating this problem, the state provided the only one form of higher
education. American missionaries created a system of public and higher
education outside of the Korean government’s public style. They founded
schools with the intention of upgrading them to junior colleges and to
“extend every effort to eventually create Western four-year colleges.7
In less than two years after the signing of the first United StatesKorea treaty, countless missionaries had arrived on Korea’s shores. Among
them, Dr. Horace G. Underwood, published the first Korean-English and
English-Korean dictionaries. The Reverend Underwood would later create
the Chosǒn Christian College in 1915. In addition to schools, many
missionaries came to Korea to establish hospitals that not only provided
Western medicine, but taught willing students different forms of medicine.
Dr. Horace Allen and Dr. O.R. Avison opened the first hospital to provide
and teach Western medicine in Seoul in 1885.
This hospital,
Gwanghyewon, was the forerunner to Yonsei University. With the
assistance of Ohio industrialist L.H. Severance, the college eventually
opened a medical school: the Union Medical College and Hospital and the
School of Nursing. This, too, eventually consolidated into Yonsei
University. 8 Such a prestigious university has roots in the missionary
schools of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Missionary
schools revolutionized the quality of Korean education and medicine.
Missionaries founded schools and institutions founded with two
primary differences from the Korean private and public schools systems.
These schools taught Korean Hangul and provided an educational system
for women. Sungho Lee reveals the greatest strength of these mission
schools:
[T]he Western missionaries introduced Western higher
learning in the Korean language, “Hangul.” They did
away with Chinese classics. They were first class Korean
speakers and scholars in Korean studies. They wrote the
history of Korea and studied Korea’s traditional religions.9
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Rather than teach Confucian traditions by using Chinese Confucian texts,
the missionaries broke these constraints upon higher learning in Korea by
using Hangul, making them pioneers of education within Korea. The idea
that Koreans could receive a higher education in their own language
without the use of Confucian texts was new. Its popularity trickled
downward into the primary and middle levels of education provided by the
missionaries. By establishing this new education in Korean, and not in
Chinese, the doors of opportunity were opened to all Koreans who wanted
to pursue an education.
The attention devoted to women made mission schools
indispensable to the Korean educational system. Traditionally, the
education system in Korea was exclusive to men, and those women of the
upper yangban class who did receive some education did so in the onmun
vernacular script.10 This practice would change soon after 1882 when Mrs.
Mary F. Scranton arrived in Korea. She began a women’s school, Ewha
Haktang, in 1886 with just one student. She created the school with the full
blessing of Queen Min11, a renowned and infamous monarch with a very
anti-Western background. Ewha Kaktang struggled at first. Initially, the
people of Korea believed that the missionaries intended to abduct their
daughters for service as slaves in foreign countries. Ewha Haktang,
however, began accepting orphaned girls from backgrounds of extreme
poverty some of whom, when given a chance, excelled.12 Ewha Haktang
developed quickly and Sungho Lee notes that it was a “pioneer” of progress:
[T]he girls of Ewha Haktang in 1898 asked that the
teaching of Chinese characters be included in the
curriculum. This was a reflection of the new spirit that
education for girls should not in any way be inferior to
that of boys’, knowledge of Chinese characters and
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classics being the traditional hallmark of a good education
given only to boys.13
Ewha Haktang would continue to pioneer in the area of women’s education
when it offered its first college courses in three departments—literature,
music, and home economics—in 1910 for fifteen female students. The
pioneering work of schools like Ewha Haktang brought greater educational
equality and inspired generations of women, regardless of economic
background to pursue an education.
In addition to creating an educational structure for higher
education for both genders, missionaries also worked to develop a medical
infrastructure. Missionaries founded numerous hospitals and schools for
nursing. Another hospital of note was the East Gate Women’s Hospital
founded in Seoul by Dr. Mary Cutler in 1886. In 1905, Dr. Cutler and
Margaret J. Edmunds, a nursing graduate of University Hospital in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, began the first training school for nurses. Frances Lee
Whang, former director of the Severance Hospital School, notes in an
article from The American Journal of Nursing that:
The School admitted only Christian applicants, on their
parents’ written consent, and their pastors’ or teacher’
recommendation… the school provided books, shoes,
uniforms, citizen’s clothes, bedding, food, room, light, fuel,
summer vacations and at graduation a handsome diploma
and gold school pin.14
Korean female nurses often came from poor backgrounds, much like the
girls of Ewha Haktang, and relied heavily upon the scholarship and charity
of the nursing school. The missionaries that came after the signing of the
first United States-Korea treaty strengthened the educational background
of these girls and, by extension, the nursing infrastructure of Korea. These
missionaries were the first group to establish a complete curriculum for
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Korea, from kindergarten to college, which brought a modern approach to
education by including the study of science and medicine.15 Establishing
schools, of all levels, and hospitals became the focus of many missionaries in
Korea.16
By 1910, when the Japanese annexed Korea as a colony,
Missionaries operated about one-third of all schools.17
The large
proportion of mission schools in Korea shows the demand for, and quality
of, the education that these schools provided. The establishment of nursing
schools, hospitals, and expansion of medical instruction by missionaries
vastly strengthened the medical infrastructure of the country.
By establishing these schools and hospitals, the missionaries set a
precedent for future generations of Koreans that can be seen in the
educational attainment of Christians in Korea today. In the article
“Characteristics of Religious Life in South Korea: a Sociological Survey,” a
Gallup Korea survey revealed that about one-fourth of Korean Protestants
and one-fourth of Korean Catholics surveyed had university degrees,
compared to only seven percent of the Buddhists surveyed. Thirty percent
of Korean Buddhists had only an elementary education or less, compared to
the three and eleven percent of Catholics and Protestants who had the same
educational achievement.18 This shows the impact that these missionaries
had on their converts; they took the need for an education which they found
in Korea, created a modern system of education, and established an
educational system that served generations of Koreans, even during the
Japanese occupation.19 Lillie Ora Lathrop, in a letter to the editor of The
American Journal of Nursing, provides a candid assessment of the situation
and desire for education in Korea in 1922. While discussing the celebration
of Korean Thanksgiving, the anniversary of Christianity’s arrival in Korea,
she talks about women attending night school in order to learn to write and
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read so that they may educate their children “who all, now, seem to want an
education.”20 These missionaries had changed Korean society by combining
their evangelism with a desire to provide and create a passion for education
and training. When the Japanese closed these missionary schools, claiming
they wished to purge Western influence from their new colony, they did
not expect an outcry over the loss of educational opportunities provided by
the missionaries. Christian missionaries provided the means, education, and
training, to be successful in post 1882 Korea, and many Koreans embraced
these opportunities regardless of the political climate.
The relationship between Christian missionaries and the dynamic
changes that occurred in Korea during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century, affected the policies of Meiji Japan in Korea. The
influence of Christianity continued to affect the peninsula during the
twentieth-century, even after World War II, as one-fourth of Koreans
today identify themselves as Christian. During the decades prior to the
occupation of Korea by Japan in 1910, Christianity and the mission work of
missionaries played a significant role in developing the Republic of Korea’s
education system and medical infrastructure. The history of Christianity in
Korea highlights how early converts and missionaries were the victims of
persecution until the first United States-Korea treaty in 1882 and the
Korea-France treaty in 1886. In the late nineteenth-century missionaries
founded multiple institutions to provide a beneficial education system to
Korea through the establishment of a curriculum that spanned from
kindergarten to college. This curriculum employed Hangul as the language
of instruction and provided an expansion of educational opportunities for
women, and established nursing and medical schools to provide Western
medical instruction and training to Koreans. One-third of the formal
schools within Korea adopted this educational system which illustrates the
impact of religion on educational attainment in Korea today. After the
missionary schools closed in 1911, Koreans voiced their need for this
education which was not fulfilled until the reopening of Korea in 1925.
Connecting the efforts of missionaries with Korea’s future leaders reveals
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the true impact of the mission work of Christian missionaries in Korea.
Without their work creating a complete educational system, schools, and
hospitals, the face of Korea today might look very different.
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They saw that now they lacked their full strength and great name, no one
took notice of them or spoke to them. When they saw this, they lay down on the side
of the hill at Tara, put their lips to the earth, and died.1
In the spring of 1866, less than a year after the end of the American Civil
War, veteran combatants from both sides of that conflict invaded the
British North American territory of Canada. These soldiers staged a twopronged attack: one from Buffalo, New York, and the other from St. Albans,
Vermont. They planed to use a vanquished Canada as a bargaining tool to
coerce the British Empire into releasing its grip on Ireland, creating a
sovereign Irish Republic.2 The invasion failed, however.
These soldiers were members of an Irish-American nationalist
organization known as the Fenian Brotherhood, a society dedicated to the
establishment of an independent Irish state through the violent removal of
British influence. Fenian Brotherhood adopted their name from the Fianna,
an ancient band of Celtic warriors led by the mythological folk hero Fiona
Mac Cumhaill, who earned fame throughout Gaelic culture as the defender
of Ireland. The exiled Irish nationalist, John O’ Mahoney founded The
Fenian Brotherhood in New York City in 1858. Fellow expatriate James
Stephens led The Irish counterpart, the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood.3
From a geopolitical standpoint their failure is not surprising. St.
George’s Channel separates the southeastern edge of Ireland from England
by less than one hundred miles. The proximity of the islands, however,
along with the intense disparities between their martial capacities, is only
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part of the equation. Another crucial component relates to the problem of
Irish identity itself, not only as to how the British viewed the Irish, but how
the Irish viewed themselves. The British considered the Irish as the “other”
despite their shared histories. The British portrayed the Irish as hovelling,
Catholic barbarians ill-suited for self-rule. While the British saw themselves
as “British,” the Irish defined themselves in ambiguous terms; no allencompassing “Irish” identity existed.
The Fenians failed, in part, because they struggled against near
insurmountable odds. However, the Fenians also failed, as did many Irish
nationalists before and after them, due to a lack of a coherent strategy.
They failed due to infighting and bickering and ill-defined objectives. The
Irish nationalists failed because they saw themselves as the other, much like
the British.
English antagonism towards Ireland has long historical roots. In
the 1530's, Protestant rulers, beginning with King Henry VIII, attempted
to subjugate the Catholic population. William of Orange’s victory at the
Battle of the Boyne in 1688 solidified Protestant English control of Ireland.
By this time, most of the Catholic ruling families were either dead or living
in exile on the Continent.4 Thus began a period known as the Protestant
Ascendency, when colonists, reinforced by the might of the English
government, imposed a crippling system of social, political and economic
controls against the Catholic majority. The English confiscated most of the
land and reallocated it to approximately ten-thousand Protestant families,
reducing the vast majority of the Catholic population to the level of peasant
laborers.5 The English established Penal Codes, which prohibited Catholics
from buying or inheriting land, in the late 1600s.6 Driven by the need to
raise livestock or cash crops, Catholics with larger farms exploited those of
lesser means. While the English treated Catholic tenant farmers poorly,
these farmers treated their Irish agricultural laborers in an even worse
fashion.7 Catholics could not participate in the English controlled
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parliament in Dublin.8 However, from this very Parliament the seeds of
Irish nationalism began to take root as the increasingly revolutionaryminded eighteenth-century drew to a close.
With British soldiers busy in the American colonies, Irish
Protestants decided to form themselves into companies of armed volunteers
in an effort to defend the island from the potential of opportunistic
Continental exploitation. Two parliamentary leaders, Henry Flood and
Henry Grattan, opted to use the offensive capabilities of this body, which
numbered forty-thousand by 1780, to insist on economic and political
reforms, particularly legislative independence from England. Grattan
succeeded in this venture in 1782, when the English government granted
the Dublin body partial parliamentary autonomy. However, even in
“Grattan’s Parliament,” British government patronage controlled nearly
two-thirds of the elected members.9
Within this relatively relaxed political environment, the Society of
United Irishmen formed, first in Belfast, then in Dublin, in 1791. The
Society, led by Protestant lawyer Theobald Wolfe Tone, sought to end
British rule. The success of revolutionary efforts in France increased both
the boldness of the Society and the attention of their opponents, and in
1794 the organization was declared illegal and driven underground. As a
result, the United Irishmen reorganized themselves into a secret, oathbound society whose goal was to create a nationwide, military network in
preparation for an insurrection that now seemed inevitable.10
The rebellion that began on May 26, 1798 in Wexford, failed to
meet its objective.11 Unlike the Young Ireland insurrection of 1848,
however, or any of the Fenian exercises in the 1860's, this uprising, led by
Catholic priests and acted out by thousands of pike-wielding peasants, was
particularly brutal and relatively long.12 An estimated 30,000 people were
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killed before the six-week ordeal was finally snuffed out on June 21.13 The
rebellion failed for a number of logistical reasons: poor organization on the
part of the rebels, vastly superior strength on the part of the government,
and inadequate aid on the part of the French. Ideological differences
between the combatants themselves also contributed to thefailure of the
insurrection. Whereas Protestant aristocrats revolted against British
political control, Catholic peasants fought and died in an attempt to
alleviate social grievances.14 Rather than uniting Irish patriots in a
common cause, the Wexford uprising antagonized tensions between these
factions. Even more damning, it also led to increased British control of
Ireland through the Act of Union in 1801.
William Pitt, the Prime Minister, believed that the Act of Union
would allow Westminster to govern the island more efficiently and also
alleviate at least some Catholic animosity toward the Protestant Parliament
in Dublin. Pitt succeeded in his efforts, but not without considerable effort
and loss of political capital on both islands. Many Britons, for example, saw
Ireland as a useless liability, whereas Irish Parliamentarians were
concerned by what they saw as the waning of their political clout. The
Union and the violence that preceded it soon found a place within the
ideological framework of later nationalists, men who saw the destruction of
the Act as their paramount objective, and the use of violence as a
historically justifiable means to an end.15
For the half a century 1798 uprising, there would be no more large
scale violence against the British, due, in part, to the efforts of Daniel
O’Connell. O’Connell, a Catholic born in Count Kerry in 1775, dedicated
himself to the cause of Catholic emancipation. Both a staunch royalist and
social conservative, O’Connell had no interest in the revolutionary theatrics
of the United Irishmen, instead advocating peaceful coexistence within the
larger British Empire. He created the Catholic Association in 1823,
arguing that his countrymen could be loyal subjects even to a Protestant
king if they were given representation in Parliament.16
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In 1828, O’Connell brazenly stood for election to Parliament
against a government candidate. As a Catholic, he was barred from civil
service and thus the results would only be relevant if he lost. But O’Connell
won the election. Fearing increased animosity from angry Catholic
peasants, however, Parliament relented and passed the Catholic
Emancipation Act in 1829, which allowed Catholics to enter Parliament and
hold high civil and military office. Flush with victory, O’Connell formed a
second organization, the Society for the Repeal of the Union, in 1830, again
arguing that such legislation would strengthen Irish loyalty to the British
crown. Unsuccessful in this venture, he nonetheless continued his efforts
and finally, after ten years, founded the Loyal National Repeal Association.
This organization was strengthened in 1842 by the addition of a new group
of allies who called themselves the Young Irelanders.17
Led by Thomas Davis, a Protestant barrister from Cork, the
Young Irelanders were middle class intellectuals who sought a pluralist,
non-sectarian movement to remove British influence in Ireland.18 The
Young Irelanders were also cultural and religious purists. They supported a
revival of the Gaelic language and believed in a devote adherence to strict
moral standards.19 O’Connell, in contrast, carried his Catholicism loosely,
had little interest in the promotion of the Gaelic language, and frowned
upon the revolutionary zeal which he considered to be plaguing the rest of
Europe.20 Thus, while their ultimate goals and tactics were never entirely
synchronized, these forces nonetheless saw themselves on the same side in a
larger struggle against a common opponent. These ideological differences
may have been overlooked had O’Connell’s political authority not been
seriously compromised by events which occurred in October of 1843.
O’Connell had scheduled a “monster meeting” near Dublin. These
immensely popular, open-air gatherings gave O’Connell the chance to use
his impressive speaking abilities to invigorate massive crowds of already
dissatisfied Irish. Despite his alleged loyalty to the throne, the government
became less enthusiastic about such gatherings as they grew in popularity
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and eventually decided to ban them altogether. Reluctant to risk violence,
O’Connell cancelled the meeting, a decision Young Ireland leaders saw as a
weakness. Eventually O’Connell began to move toward more conventional
parliamentary tactics in his efforts, even going so far as to forge an alliance
with the Whig party that came to power in June of 1846.21
Such tactics did not sit well with the increasingly impatient Young
Ireland leadership, who saw a permanent fracture between Irish and British
society as the only way to achieve their goals. As they declared in The
Nation, the Young Ireland journal, “To make our people politically free but
bond slaves to some debasing social system like that which crowds the
mines and factories of England with squalid victims, we would not strike a
blow.”22
The inevitable break with the O’Connellites came in 1846 when
the Repeal Association officially condemned violence as a political tool.
While no such violence was being planned, the Young Irelanders withdrew
from the organization. They shared the view with most romantic
nationalists that the forceful removal of a corrupt government was a
justifiable course of action.23
In early 1847, Young Ireland leader Smith O’Brien formed the
Irish Confederation, which sought the immediate restoration of Irish
government. O’Connell’s death that same year accelerated the development
of this more radical ideology amongst nationalists. Another such radical,
John Mitchell, left the Irish Confederation in February of 1848 to focus on
The United Irishman, a newspaper devoted to revolutionary rhetoric.24 The
relatively bloodless removal of the French monarchy that same month
convinced many Irish nationalists that such success could be duplicated on
their island.25
On March 2, British authorities arrested Mitchell, O’Brien and
others on charges of sedition, and two months later declared their
organization illegal. This declaration led to the Ballingarry insurrection,
where Young Irelanders attempted to initiate a revolution by leading a
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handful of starving Munster peasants into armed conflict with British
government officials.26 The so-called rebellion ended in diaster, and on
October 9, 1848, O’Brien was sentenced to the standard rebel fate.
However, before he was decapitated and his limbs given the standard
British tour, O’Brien, a romantic to the end, declared, “Having failed, I
know my life is forfeited […] for Ireland I shall carefully surrender life
itself.”27
Thus, it was not lack of enthusiasm that kept Irish nationalists
from success. Perhaps Thomas N. Brown offers the most
thorough analysis of the Ballingarry fiasco:
These events pointed to the difficulties nationalists faced in trying
to overthrow so resolute and confident a people as the British with
so divided a people as the Irish. The richest and most powerful
Irish—the Anglo-Irish—were committed to the British
connection. The middle classes were too few in number and too
unsure of themselves to go it alone. Peasant support was
imperative […] but hard to command […] peasant and
nationalist conceived of Ireland in different ways. The Young
Irelander wanted the peasant to act in the name of an abstraction
called the Irish nation, but his loyalties inhered in more concrete
relationships—those of the family, the parish, the village and
Whiteboy society. The peasant followed leaders, not principles
[…] and looked to the priest or the landlord or both for
leadership.28
The British, of course, disagreed with each other over multiple
issues and they represented, at the time, one of the most socially stratified
nations on Earth. However, like a moody family capable of pasting on a
smiling face while dining in public, Great Britain in the nineteenth-century
confronted the outside world behind a unified front. No such uniformity
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existed in Ireland between the Catholic peasant and the middle-class
Protestant.
Though the failures of 1848 did spell the end of Young Ireland as a
political force, blood was not spilt entirely in vain. Veterans of the uprising
moved further underground for the time being and began to plot their
revenge.29 In time the uprising, despite its lack of success, assumed an
almost mythic significance as a bridge gapping the history of revolutionary
nationalism, from those involved in the 1798 insurrection to the movement
that came next.
Before discussing the Fenian movement in depth, one must
examine the way in which intense Irish migration to North American,
along with the horrific suffering that exacerbated such an exodus, affected
these Irish-American nationalists. Descendants of Protestant colonists
owned almost all the farmland in Ireland. These landowners rented out
their plots to Irish Catholics of middling means, who in turn sublet smaller
plots to poorer and poorer farmers. By 1841, a population of eight-million
Irish were plugged into a social pyramid that consisted of an often
absentee-landlord at the top, tenant farmers that rented out smaller parcels
to cottiers in the middle, who in turn offered work to landless agricultural
laborers, peasants who barely grew enough food to survive.30
Almost half the population of Ireland depended on the potato for
existence. Nutritious and simple to grow, the success of the crop in most
years allowed for rapid population growth amongst those most dependent.
When the crop failed or succumbed to blight, the results were cruel.
Though there were actually a number of potato famines throughout the
nineteenth-century, between 1845 and 1848 the disease became especially
virulent. The death rates became so terrible that mass burials became
commonplace. Due to the Act of Union, the famine was, legally, just as
much a British problem as an Irish one. Such legislative technicalities were
not born out in practice. While the government provided some aid relief,
help was laughable at best; the British government eventual apologized for
its neglect of the dire situation.31
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The famine exacerbated migration and increased Anglophobia
among the Irish. Like pouring a can of petrol on an already angry flame,
British reaction to the famine provided more than enough evidence for
many nationalists that the Act of Union was insincere and that British
influence on the Island had to be ended. Many Irishmen and even some
members of Parliament saw in British famine policies as more than mere
neglect.32 Those Irish who did migrate to North America carried with
them a considerable amount of anti-English sentiment.
The Irish, of course, has been immigrating to the United States
well before the 1840s. As a democracy, the United States was an obvious
choice for political refugees from both the 1798 uprising and the
insurrection of 1848. By 1860, these refuges and their descendants, coupled
with famine survivors, numbered more than 1.6 million, with the
overwhelming majority of them arriving between 1847 and 1854, the
height of the famine-induced misery.33
However, these large numbers do not indicate American
hospitality. Though many politicians welcomed the Irish for their votes
and capitalists welcomed them for their labor, many Americans were
unimpressed by the arrival of people they deemed “unruly.” Harsh
treatment from families who had been living in the country for over one
generation only strengthened Irish-American nationalism.
Like all
immigrants, loneliness played a key role in the Irish-American experience,
and this loneliness led to the establishment of Irish-American social clubs
and fraternities.34 Outside of Ireland, a common “Irish” identity was
beginning to strengthen.
The leaders of both the American and Irish branches of the Fenian
movement were Young Ireland exiles. John O’Mahony journeyed to the
United States after the uprising in1848 while Stephens escaped to mainland
Europe only to return to Ireland in 1856. Correspondence between the
Fenians in the U.S. and the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in Ireland,
indicate that, while the actual rebellion would take place in Ireland, support
for the venture, both financial and military, would come from the United
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States. Stephens met with O’Mahony during a tour of America, and, before
he returned to Ireland in January. he delegated his old ally as “supreme
organizer and Director of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in
America.” American Fenianism began in New York, but O’Mahony was
charged with the laborious project of extending the movement throughout
the United States.35
“It is but natural that our progress should be slow at first,”
O’Mahony wrote in April of 1859, “particularly as our finances do not yet
warrant us in sending round agents to the different centres of the IrishAmerican population…We must calculate upon a certain amount of
opposition from some of the priests...Those who denounce us go beyond
their duty as clergymen.”36
The controversy between the Fenians as a secret, oath-bound
society and the Catholic Church had followed the nationalists to America,
much to the chagrin of the Brotherhood.37 No insurrection could succeed
without vast numbers, and, since the church was closely linked to the lives
of most Irish-Americans, these numbers would be difficult to accumulate.
Many rebels in Ireland wanted to strike immediately, and it was
not long before similar impatience spread to the United States. As a result,
O’Mahony traveled to Dublin in 1860 to examine how the funds he had
sent across the Atlantic were being spent. The two leaders sat down and
discussed specifics: The revolution needed at least 5000 disciplined men,,
complete with competent officers leading them, and the Brotherhood must
acquire at least 50,000 rifles and muskets. However, considerably more
guns than this would soon be in the hands of even more Irish-Americans
fighting in the Civil War, a dilemma that struck both men as a disaster.38
Ironically, in the long run, the American Civil War did more to
help the Fenian cause than hinder it. Despite the lament of the Boston Pilot
on May 4, 1861, “The first enemies the 69th will encounter will, in all
probability, be Irishmen...what a spectacle this is.
There they
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stand...thousands of miles from the land which it would be their common
pride to defend,” Fenian membership expanded during the Civil War.39
And, despite nativist concerns to the contrary, Irish-Americans joined the
ranks in droves. The impetus was booth financial, many enlistees were
offered bounties of 600 dollars or more, and ideological, particularly after
Great Britain lent support to the Confederacy. Army recruits focused on
this British involvement, arguing that the military training soldiers would
receive would prove invaluable in the “coming struggle” for Irish freedom.
Estimates indicate that anywhere from 150,000 to 200,000 Irish-Americans
served in the Union armies alone.40
In the mean time, however, Fenian leadership believed that
something was needed to keep the Brotherhood on the minds of IrishAmericans who might otherwise be tempted to focus on more obvious
concerns. Another veteran of 1848, Terrence McManus, played his role in
the patriotic drama by dying in San Francisco at the beginning of 1861.
McManus’s funeral procession, from California to Chicago to New York
and finally to Dublin, became a mass Fenian demonstration. How cruel a
fate, the nationalists decried, that such a man should die so far from his
ancestral home. On September 18, the well-traveled remains of Terrence
McManus were placed onto the steamship “Glasgow” and set off to Ireland.
Fate smiled again on the nationalist cause when Archbishop Colton refused
to offer mass for the rebel. Now the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood was
more than just another secret society; they were patriots whom the Church
persecuted by the Church in their valiant fight to free Ireland.41 Stephens
could not have designed a better recruitment tool.
O’Mahony took advantage of the increased Anglophobia in the
United States to continue his recruitment efforts.
Under normal
circumstances Washington would not have tolerated such behavior,
particularly during wartime.
However, with the British building
Confederate warship, Washington not only allowed but encouraged Fenian
activity. Members of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Potomac and the
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Tennessee were allowed to travel to Chicago in 1863 for the very first
Fenian convention.
The movement started to take on a more “American” tone.
Delegates drafted a constitution that created an Irish government in exile.42
Some believed that O’Mahony’s power was still too centralized, however,
and he himself was too hesitant to act, thus another convention was held in
Philadelphia two years later. At the 1865 convention, the office of the Head
Centre was abolished and replaced by an elected President answerable to a
General Congress. O’Mahony left the Philadelphia convention with much
of his autocratic influence gone, and two months later the Senate deposed
him as President, insisting he step aside. He refused.43
“Cut and hack the rotten branches around you.” Stephens wrote to
him, infuriated by the Americanization of the cause. Once again the burden
of factionalism crept into the movement.
Invoking the Chicago
constitution, O’Mahony commanded one wing of the movement while the
Senate led the other, which was now more popular with Irish-Americans
because its form of government was more American in nature.44
The Civil War ended in April of 1865, and thousands of IrishAmerican soldiers who had fought and survived the violence focusrd their
energies on a common enemy. Enthusiasm was high, as many Fenians,
soldiers and leaders, assumed that once the war ended, the United States
would naturally take Great Britain to task for its belligerent support of the
now vanquished Confederacy.45 However, this would not be the case. The
Fenians had mistaken the prevailing anti-English mood of the last halfdecade as pro-Irish sentiment, while most Americans, were not too
impressed with either group. While Americans focused their animosity
toward the English government and not necessarily its citizens, the exact
opposite was true for the Irish.46 Thus, the best the Fenians could hope for
on the part of the U.S. government was to let them exist unhindered, and,
because the Irish-American population represented such a powerful voting
block, Fenian activity was allowed to flourish.
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At this point in time, the Catholic church could no longer justify
its animosity toward the Brotherhood due to its status as a “secret-society,”
as very little about the nationalist movement was secret. A New York
Times article from September 15 of 1865 explained, “...it will be seen the
British government are becoming so alarmed at the progress of Fenianism
in Ireland that they have determined to increase the military force stationed
in that portion of the United Kingdom.”47 The January 12, 1866 edition of
the Chicago Tribune reported that the Fenian congress “has elected a
Central Council to take the place of the Senate...at the Senate headquarters,
President Roberts has sent instructions to the Brotherhood to purchase
arms for their members. The arms which the circle are to procure are
Springfield muskets […] It is reported that preparations are being made
for the purchase of large quantities of war material at seventy-five percent
less than the usual cost.”48
It is difficult now to imagine the boldness with which the Fenians
then acted. Here was an Irish-American government acting within the U.S.
government, openly making military preparations against a sovereign
world power. We can only conclude that the attack on Canada, though
certainly a bold course of action, was not as quixotic a plot as one might
assume. Many influential Americans considered the annexation of Canada
as a reasonable compensation for British behavior during the course of the
last half-decade. William R. Roberts, a wealthy American merchant and
leader in the Fenian movement, believed that an invasion of Canada might
instigate actual war between the United States and Great Britain, thus
paving the way for Irish independence.49
Evidence indicates that senior members of the American
government knew about the Fenian plot, and that a Fenian “diplomat”
broached the subject with both President Johnson and Secretary of State
Seward themselves and was told that while the U.S. government could not
officially condone such behavior, it would “acknowledge accomplished facts”
as it pertained to the potential success of such a venture.50
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As mentioned, however, the Fenian invasion of Canada failed, and
U.S. troops did, in fact, arrest the combatants once Canadian troops had
driven them back.51 The quick defeathad as much to do with the earnestness
with which the British and Canadian governments took Fenian activity in
the days leading up to the attack as it did with the audacity of the initial
plot. The British had heard rumors of an invasion as early as 1864, and had
deployed additional troops along the Canadian border.52 Here is an excerpt
from a New York Times article from March 10, 1866, mere days before the
invasion, “The government buildings and all the banks in Ottawa have been
placed under military guard at night. There has been a most enthusiastic
response throughout Canada to the call for volunteers, and ten thousand
men are already marching toward the frontier.”53 A month before, another
article from another American newspaper commented on the approaching
invasion. It merits inclusion here at length due to its discussion of Fenian
infighting:
In the Fenian addresses recently delivered, both by the O’Mahony
and Roberts leaders, it appears that the true reason of the division
between the Roberts and O’Mahony factions is that the former
proposes to invade Canada and the latter would make the
campaign direct against Ireland...General Sweeny, President
Roberts, and the Senate, confess that they have arrived at the
conclusion that the original plan of freeing Ireland by raising the
standard of revolt in that country would be insane. Probably the
O’Mahony faction perceive[s] that the plan of invading Canada is
still more insane. In Ireland the invading force might possibly be
joined by a considerable portion of the people. In Canada it would
be met by a resistance as united as it would encounter on the coast
of Cornwall or Wales. The invaders would probably by disposed
of as summarily as were the Filibusters under Lopez in Cuba. The
project of conquering Canada with 16,000 men as a base of
operations from which to attack Ireland, is worthy of that rich
Irish imagination from which it emanates. Meanwhile, it seems
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very clear that such projects are a palpable violation of our
neutrality laws.54
A final raid on Canada was attempted in 1870, but by this time the
political winds had shifted. The incoming President Grant informed his
cabinet that he would no longer offer the Fenians the privilege of the
“organization of a government within the U.S.” The Fenian Senate was
now reluctant to commit the Brotherhood to battle, fearing the erosion of
their political clout. As Brown writes: “Irish-American nationalism was
directed chiefly toward American, not Irish, ends. A free Ireland would
reflect glory on the Fenians, but of more immediate and practical value was
use of the Brotherhood as an American pressure group.” Wealthier
American-Irish became even more opposed to the violence because it kept
the Irish viewed as “a distinct nationality in the midst of the American
population.”55
The Irish transformed into the “other” for many Irish-Americans
who were becoming more and more determined to create a new life for
themselves in the United States. that Irish immigrants or their children did
not forgot about the homeland, as donations towards the burgeoning Home
Rule movement and other nationalist groups continued throughout the rest
of the century and up until 1916.56 However, the battle to purge British
influence from Irish soil would be fought on Irish soil, by Irishmen. The
zenith of Fenianism was over.
As Irish nationalism twisted its way toward the violence of 1916,
the Fenians played the part of martyred patriot-ghosts in much the same
way as did Wolfe Tone and Smith O’Brien and other dead nationalists from
1798, 1848, 1867, and beyond. The Home Rule Party in Ireland, though it
lacked the martial vigor of earlier nationalists, still looked to these figures
as inspiration for their cause.
In the end, it was not the Home Rule Party who brought Great
Britain to the bargaining table after years of violence and agitation. It was
Sinn Fein, who, after winning nearly every election in 1918 in Ireland’s
Catholic constituencies, refused to take their seats in a British Parliament.
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Uninterested in co-existing within a large British empire, Sinn Fein, like
the Fenians and Young Irelanders before them, insisted on total Irish
independence.
In December of 1921, after two years of guerilla warfare against
Great Britain, a half-century after the Fenian revolts, seventy-three years
since the debacle at Ballingarry, and a hundred twenty-three years
following the violence at Wexford, such independence was won. The
fighting was not entirely over, however, because the Irish still were not
certain as to what, exactly, such a Republic was to look like, or where,
precisely, its borders were to fall. Sinn Fein translates into “Ourselves
alone.” By 1921, Great Britain was finally ready to leave the “other” alone,
and thus, the Irish “other” became the Irish Free State.
One should not conclude that the primary reason it took Irish
nationalists so long to secure their independence was their inability to get
along with each other. The British were numerically superior, possessed
technological superiority, and used both advantages to create one of
history’s most successful war machines. One might just as easily analyze
the reasons Great Britain relented to the nationalists so soon. However,
factionalism did take its toll on Irish nationalist goals. Be it the religious
animosity between Catholic and Protestant, the class struggle between
landlord and peasant, the ideological differences between political parties,
or merely the universal disagreements among personalities, for years the
nationalists suffered for these divisions. Taking into account the modern
day borders of the island and its violent 20th century history, it is
reasonable to conclude that Ireland still suffers from this factionalism; that
even today the specter of “the other” exists, always too close for comfort.
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Eric Foner, ed., Our Lincoln: New Perspective on Lincoln and His World (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008)
Reviewed by Jason Miller
Jason Miller of Tolono, Illinois completed his Bachelor of Arts in history at the University of Illinois in
December of 2007 where he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi. Currently, he is buried in research for his
thesis project, a social history of political violence and the Copperhead movement in Illinois during the
Civil War.

Divided into four parts, Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His
World offers new insights into Abraham Lincoln’s life. Divided between
Lincoln as President, as the Great Emancipator, as Family Man, and in
Memory, these essays span from revisionist efforts to wholly new
contributions to the historiography of Lincoln and the world in which he
lived. Contributors include such household names as James McPherson and
Eric Foner as well as names recognizable to specialists of the Civil War Era
such as David Blight, Mark Neely Jr., Lincoln specialist Harold Holzer, and
up and comer Manisha Sinha. Acting in his role as editor, Foner excels
illustrating coherent themes that run through the volume while allowing
each essay to stand on their own.
The first two sections of this compilation, “The President” and
“Great Emancipator,” contained some of the most interesting, illuminating,
and convincing articles. Leading off part one is James M. McPherson’s “A.
Lincoln, Commander in Chief.” Using an interdisciplinary approach of
studying politics, strategy, and tactics to explore wartime Presidential
leadership, McPherson seeks to fill the gap left by Lincoln’s biographers—
Lincoln’s relationship with his armies. McPherson argues that Lincoln
“took a more active, hands-on part in shaping military strategy than
presidents have done in most other wars.”1 Through his well known
correspondence pushing McClellan to take the initiative in spring 1862 to
other lesser known examples of Lincolns prodding his generals, McPherson
portrays Lincoln as actively espousing his own strategic outlook. The
hesitancy of his generals troubled Lincoln, especially the commanders of
the Army of the Potomac, until he finally found his kindred spirit in U.S.
Grant in 1864. Anyone who may have heard McPherson speak over the
past year will recognize this article and recall specific passages if not entire
pages from his speaking engagements. If one were to buy this solely for
McPherson’s article they would be better advised to purchase his recently
released book length exposition on this topic: Tried by War: Abraham
Lincoln as Commander in Chief.
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Anyone interested in Lincoln and his questionable actions in
relation to the Constitution during the war would benefit from Mark Neely
Jr.’s article. Neely argues that while it is widely known that Lincoln was
attempting to expand his Presidential powers through the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, what has remained unacknowledged is that Supreme
Court Justice Taney’s Ex parte Merryman decision was also an
unconstitutional position aimed at increasing the Supreme Court’s power.
In his zeal Taney had not formulated his argument completely. His
“overeager acceptance of the jurisdictional gift of Section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789” points to the “aggressive nature” of Taney’s rulings and the
willful expansion of his powers to protect Southern rights that began to
turn reckless in his Dred Scott decision. 2 Sean Wilentz’s article portrays
Lincoln as a Whig that “had always been more egalitarian than that of
other Whigs” and had some Jacksonian tendencies. While an otherwise
well argued article, Wilentz does not seem to take into account that
Lincoln, as a western Whig, may have differed from eastern compatriots
solely due to regional interests.
Part Two begins with an James Oakes’ “Natural Rights,
Citizenship Rights, States’ Rights, and Black Rights: Another Look at
Lincoln and Race.” Historians have long struggled with the issue of
Lincoln’s racial views. As Oakes points out “The evidence for Lincoln’s
views on the equality of blacks and whites is hopelessly contradictory.
String together one set of quotations, and Lincoln comes off as a dyed-inthe-wool white supremacist. Compile a different body of evidence, and
Lincoln reads like the purest of racial egalitarians.”3 Oakes divides Lincoln’s
views into three levels: constitutional natural rights, privileges and
immunities of citizenship, and race relations at the local level. Only this
third division pertained to matters such as voting, jury duty, and marriage
that, according to Oakes, Lincoln made “every concession” to “racial
prejudice”.4 Conversely, according to Oakes, Lincoln consistently upheld
the natural rights and privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed
to all citizens in the Constitution.
In “Lincoln and Colonization,” Foner points out that most
historians believe Lincoln adhered to Colonization of freed blacks for
reasons of political pragmatism. According to this view, he did not want to
alienate the less radical antislavery members of the Republican Party’s
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antislavery coalition. He, therefore, held up the promise of exporting the
“problem” of freedmen outside of the boundaries of the United States as a
way to keep potential detractors within his ranks. For Foner, Lincoln was
a true believer in colonization. He demonstrates that the Preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation contained references to colonization and that
Lincoln’s embrace of colonization did not reconcile him to opponents of
emancipation during the elections of 1862.5 Even on New Year’s Eve 1862,
the day before Emancipation Proclamation was to go into effect, Lincoln
signed a contract with Bernard Kock to help settle freed blacks on Cow
Island in the Caribbean and, even though he never spoke publicly of
colonization after January 1 of 1863, Lincoln continued to look into
schemes of colonization.
For Foner, Lincoln’s “long embrace of
colonization suggests that recent historians may have been too quick to
claim him as a supremely clever politician who secretly but steadfastly
pursued the goal embodied in the Emancipation Proclamation or as a model
of political pragmatism in contrast with the fanatical abolitionists. For what
idea was more utopian and impractical than this fantastic scheme?” 6 As
Foner argues that, if Lincoln truly was a political pragmatist, he seriously
misjudged the Border States’ embrace of emancipation, the willingness of
blacks to leave the country of their birth, and the “intractability of northern
racism as an obstacle to ending slavery.” 7
Foner’s provocative and convincing essay is followed by Manisha
Sinha’s equally provocative but less convincing “Allies for Emancipation?:
Lincoln and Black Abolitionists.” Like many historians, Sinha upholds the
view that Lincoln’s time in the Oval Office changed his perception of his
role and the conflict’s role in American history. Moving from a war of
reunification to a war of emancipation, Lincoln came to see the conflict as
part of a millennialist divine plan for the nation and the ending of slavery.
Yet, from this basis she overstates the influence that black abolitionists,
including Douglass, had upon the president. It is likely that black
intellectual leaders of the abolitionist movement influenced Lincoln, but her
argument does not show a causal link between their influence and Lincoln’s
views. In fact, if one was to accept the view of James Oakes’s essay,
Douglass and other black abolitionists were preaching to the choir. Her
essay, like her book The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in
Antebellum South Carolina, seems to garner its main force from the
restatement of her thesis throughout the work. That, however, does not
make it convincing.
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Part Three of the compilation investigates Lincoln “The Man.”
This section begins with Andrew Delbanco’s exploration of what meanings
may have been lost and wrongly attached to Lincoln’s words over past 140
years. It is an intriguing read for anyone concerned with the meaning of
Lincoln’s words in Lincoln’s world. For this reader, most impressive within
this section is Richard Carwardine’s “Lincoln’s Religion” which traces
Lincoln’s religious beliefs from his days as an “‘infidel’ politician of the
1830s” to an evangelical Protestant during his stint in the White House in
which he looked for signs from God.8 In his early political days in Illinois,
Lincoln was well aware that religion played a significant role in people’s
lives as well as their political motivations—different sects usually voted
certain ways. Though Lincoln was an inconsistent attendee at Church, he
garnered a reputation as an ethically earnest person that followed him from
his early days and into the White House. Over the next four years, Lincoln
would transform from that infidel of the 1830s into an intensely religious
man and, finally, following his assassination, a Christian martyr.
Closing out Part III is Catherine Clinton’s “Abraham Lincoln: The
Family That Made Him, the Family He Made.” As Clinton establishes that
we still know very little about his family and those who shaped him,
especially his mother. Her intervention, however, has very little to do with
exploring and speculation on these unknowns. Instead, she offers the use of
current scholarship on family honor in southern households to explore
Lincoln’s “complex personal character.”9 Her exploration holds promise,
but relies heavily on theories of cause and effect especially in regards to
Lincoln’s relationship with his mother and his treatment of women
throughout his life.10
The book closes with an article in the vein of recent scholarship
exploring the memory of the war and its appropriation. David Blight’s “The
Theft of Lincoln in Scholarship, Politics, and Public Memory” should serve
as the beginnings of new facets directed towards understanding the
memory of the war and its leaders in modern society. For Blight the
Lincoln myth is just as tenacious as that of the Lost Cause, but maybe a bit
more malleable. As he points out, the Republican National Committee
recently has been reminding the electorate that it “is” the “Party of
Lincoln.” Such claims, Blight points, misrepresent Lincoln’s character and
the Republican Party’s beliefs of the time period that serve to create a
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direct, albeit fictitious, tie with the Republican Party of today.11 Other
examples abound, Blight’s work is an important reminder that it was not
just the losers of the Civil War that created myths.
The strength of this compilation is its holistic approach towards
Lincoln. While there are no direct disagreements between scholars within
the volume, one can draw distinctions between the different approaches,
interpretations, and uses of sources in the volume. Despite some
shortcomings, this volume is a worthy edition to any Civil War scholar’s
library and has the potential to reopen some old and create some new
debates.
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John D’Emilio, Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 2003).
Reviewed By Derek Shidler
Derek Shidler, who earned a B.A. in History from Southern Illinois University, is now a graduate
student at Eastern and a member of Phi Alpha Theta, where he is researching the Vietnam War.

Bayard Rustin’s long and tumultuous life was shrouded in successes and
setbacks. John D’Emilio’s book, Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard
Rustin, explores these two issues. D’Emilio explains how leading activists
such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X overshadowed Rustin, making
him a lost prophet. Rustin’s successes seemed small, but the combination of
his remarkable gifts and talents, along with the brave supporters of
America’s radical movements, enabled him to leave his mark on the
American pacifist tradition, campaigns for economic justice and
international peace, and the Civil Rights Movement. However, Rustin’s
homosexuality and paradoxical silence on the Vietnam War tarnished his
career.
Rustin’s successes stemmed from his early childhood as a Quaker
with a mother who instilled peace and equality in the community. When
Rustin became an active member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR)
and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), he quickly became renowned
as a remarkable orator. Dave McReynolds, a UCLA student, attended one
of Rustin’s lectures in the late 1940s and said, “You would see people with
tears coming out of their eyes. He could respond to a group or get in touch
with them because he was a likeable creative person.”1 His ability to
influence and accumulate admirers was inspiring. Nevertheless, Rustin’s
ideas, modeled after those of Gandhi, and his superb speaking skills
followed him to prison from 1944 to 1946. However, unwilling to fight,
Rustin and many other nonviolent activists refused to serve their country
in World War II. Those who declined the draft were sentenced to prison.
While Rustin’s imprisonment initially seemed to have been a setback, it
proved to be a stepping stone to his success. His pacifist ideas helped push
for desegregation in Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary. Rustin acquired a
number of followers within Lewisburg, and some of these supporters would
provide assistance for future protests. During these two years, correctional
officers kept an attentive eye on Rustin. He began to lead strikes where
black inmates refused to leave their cells for work assignment, recreation,
and meals. Most of Rustin’s protests within the jail received recognition
from people within and outside the walls of the penitentiary.
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Several years before the Montgomery Bus Boycott and a few years
after Rustin’s release from prison, he and George Houser devised a plan to
abolish the racial segregation on the public transit system. The Journey of
Reconciliation, Rustin and Houser called it, included an array of groups like
CORE, FOR, NAACP, WRL, and veteran COs. After twelve arrests, due
to the Journey of Reconciliation, thousands of black and white Southerners
engaged in discussion about the Jim Crow laws. Rustin and Houser’s
attempt to bring desegregation to the public sphere worked. The Baltimore
Afro-American newspaper reported, their movement “knocked several props
from beneath the already tottering Jim Crow structure.”2 Also, the Journey
of Reconciliation achieved a high profile in black press, seeping the model of
nonviolent action further into the consciousness of African Americans.
However, seventy-five years of setbacks seemed to outweigh
Rustin’s successes. During a time in American history when segregation
and inequality towards blacks was prevalent, Rustin also endured criticisms
for being a homosexual. D’Emilio explains that Rustin’s first problem with
his sexuality was in Lewisburg Penitentiary. One officer observed Rustin
with another inmate, saying, “sitting with different other inmates, his arms
around them, rubbing their legs and other parts of their bodies, while
rubbing his cheek against theirs.”3 Another officer observed Rustin
“walking around the yard with his arms around several different inmates, in
a very loving and personal manner.”4 On August 18, 1945 two inmates
described to Captain Huntington an incident in which Rustin was caught
performing oral sex on another inmate behind a curtain on the stage of the
prison auditorium. Rustin’s denial and eventual confession of the ordeal
created conflict within his prison movements. The once admired pacifist
was now shrouded in suspicion and disgust. After learning about Rustin’s
betrayal, Abraham Muste, leader of the FOR, sent him a harsh letter,
saying, “You have been guilty of gross misconduct, specially reprehensible
in a person making claims to leadership.”5 After his release in June 1946,
Rustin found himself in trouble again because of his sexuality. Davis Platt,
his lover for several years, kicked Rustin out of the house because of his
sexual escapades became unbearable. A few years later, in January of 1953,
after a lecture at the American Association of University Women at the
Pasadena Athletic Club, police caught Rustin performing oral sex on two
young men in a parked car. Yet again, Rustin was imprisoned and his
creditability was severely damaged. Near the end of Rustin’s life he “lost”
his voice precisely when the most potent anti-war movement in modem
American history crested. Rustin’s conspicuous record as a pacifist puzzled
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activists since he did not play a major role in the Vietnam-era antiwar
movement.
At the outset of his book, D’Emilio stresses that Rustin’s ideas and
movements were relative obscure in the popular memory of the Civil Rights
Movement. Yet, Rustin paved the way for the Civil Rights Movement in
the 1960s. His pacifist ideas may have been radical to the public eye, but
the combination of Rustin’s remarkable gifts and talents crept into future
civil rights activists. Rustin left a profound mark on the Civil Rights
Movement with his lectures, penitentiary movements, bus boycotts, and
assistance in the development of Martin Luther King’s movement.
E’Dmilio agrees, noting that “Rustin was as responsible as anyone else for
the insinuation of nonviolence into the very heart of what became the most
powerful social movement in twentieth-century America.”6 Rustin’s career
of pacifism and conservatism helped define the Civil Rights Movement.
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Sandra Ott. War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderland, 1914-1945
(Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2008).
Reviewed by Chad R. Cussen
Chad R. Cussen is a graduate student from Roann, Indiana. He graduated with a B.A. in History and
International Studies from Indiana University in 2008 and studied at the University of Strasbourg’s
affiliate Institute of Human Rights in France. Chad’s research interests include the cultural and
political history of nineteenth and twentieth-century France.

Historians incorporate interdisciplinary approaches to history with various
degrees of intensity and effectiveness. Is the historical discipline a social
science or is it confined solely within the humanities? Historians find
numerous answers to this question. Perhaps hesitant to admit, historians
rely on interdisciplinary approaches regardless of their methodological
biases. Sandra Ott’s War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderlands
offers another work to bring together various approaches into what can be
defined as broad historical research in a specific regional locale. Ott’s book
is a regional study that effectively integrates larger national trends. While
combining heavy doses of anthropology, social history, and cultural history,
Ott examines a minute Basque community nestled in Southern France
within the Western Pyrenees: Xiberoa (Soule in French).7 Ott argues that
Xiberoans carried defined terms of social and cultural legitimacy through
judicial and behavioral judgments in wartime experiences, including
occupation and resistance among others. Ott defines these social and
cultural dynamics as a moral community: “distinctions between insiders and
outsiders defined the boundaries of the moral community in spatial and
linguistic terms, in social and symbolic acts, in customary law, in transPyrenean treaties, and in popular culture. Membership in a moral
community entailed a shared habitus, compliance with certain moral codes
and behavioral norms, and validation by public opinion.”8 Thus, Ott
employs these techniques within Xiberoan experiences during wartime
(both World Wars) and how these experiences shaped their identity in the
years after, including memory.
Divided into thirteen chapters, Ott produces a solid organizational
structure to the book. Chapters one and two trace relational developments
Xiberoa’s diverse social makeup. Xiberoa’s inhabitants shared “longstanding traditions of trans-Pyrenean migration, immigration, and human
displacement […] although Xiberoa was relatively isolated geographically,
even its most secluded inhabitants had contacts with the world around
them.”9 Moreover, it is here that Ott establishes the moral community,
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formulated, in part, from anthropological structures developed by Pierre
Bourdieu. Despite the traditions of contact between diverse social groups,
Ott argues that Xiberoans formulated their communities around “house”
inhabitants and strangers, or simply those who emigrated from abroad.10 ,
Ott shows that Xiberoans carried a strong regional identity into the Great
War, the Second World War, and beyond.
Ott supports these conclusions about local identity within the
context of war. Echoing much of Eugen Weber’s ground-breaking work
Peasants Into Frenchmen, Ott explores Xiberoan obstinacy, reluctance, and
difficulty in defining themselves as “Frenchmen” during the Great War.11
Wartime desertion or conscription evasion proved a common feature within
Xiberoan communities. For those who did serve on the Western front,
language difficulty proved an immense problem for Xiberoans. French
military leaders used this to their advantage by promoting regional identity
within the military. For example, military leaders created competitions
between Bretons and Xiberoans—either group would attempt to prove
their physical superiority on the battlefield.12 During the Interwar period,
class conflict over returned veterans, commune workers, and factory
owners dominated Xiberoan communities. Ott shows that Xiberoan
communities proved dynamic and abrasive, which resulted, at least in part,
by the combination of regional and newly conceived notions of national
identity.
The central chapters emphasize Xiberoan’s experience under
Vichy rule and German occupation. Xiberoan authorities, coupled with
public sentiment, generally supported Pétain’s Vichy in the early stages of
the Second World War. However, Ott shows that Xiberoans became
discontent with the status quo. Although many Xiberoans displayed
conservative tendencies, Ott argues that Xiberoans displayed sentiments
more closely aligned with xenophobic tendencies, although Ott never
employs the term. Perhaps a more appropriate observation shows that
Ott’s analysis relies heavily on ideology. Xiberoan communities, from the
outset of Spanish Civil War refugees, were characterized as largely hostile
towards communist affiliates. Authorities in Béarn, the province bordering
Xiberoa to the east, constructed the important Gurs concentration camp in
the late 1930s, which held nearly nineteen-thousand prisoners at its height
including communists and Jews. Anti-Semitism, however, proved a
relatively quiet issue, at least presented by Ott. Again, ideology takes
precedence in this analysis.13 Important for Ott is the way the moral
community challenged Xiberoan communities through complaisance,
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resistance, and denunciation, especially the latter two. The moral
community, through human communication, rumor, and imagination,
proved highly malleable in these situations.
Ott finishes the book with an exploration of divided memories.
Commemoration, through ritual and communication, played an important
role in understanding the Xiberoan experience. Such issues surfaced as late
as 2004 with the sixtieth anniversary of Xiberoan resistance. As Ott shows,
such commemorations proved highly contentious for current inhabitants
and remaining survivors. Family members and supporters of distinct
resistance groups—Secret Army, CFP, FTP, International Brigade, and
Guérilleros—all vied for adequate representation in public
commemorations.14 Moreover, each group, or rather its representatives,
asserted their long-established traditions and values within the structure of
the moral community. Divisions within the moral community remained
well intact into the twenty-first century.
Ott concludes that Xiberoa’s moral community remained divided
through its experiences before, during, and after wartime. Even though
resistance groups coalesced during German occupation, Xiberoans were
torn over how each represented themselves and conducted their resistance.
In other words, conceptions of the moral community were never fully
integrated and unified.15 Ott’s analysis proves intriguing and important for
our understanding of regional and national identity. Ott suggest that
regional identities operate over national identity, at least in this case.
Divisions apparent before the world wars remained within Xiberoa’s moral
community. Expanding from past works, like Weber’s Peasants and
Gildea’s Marianne in Chains, Ott expands our understanding of
regional/national dynamics and argues that these go well beyond the
nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. Ott integrates archival research,
memoirs, and a strong emphasis on local enthographic fieldwork into a
well-balanced and nuanced study. At times, Ott fails to adequately address
how these sources mesh and support one another. Oral testimony in 2004
can be quite contentious for events that originate at the turn of the
nineteenth-century. It is difficult to see how one can make such
connections without an adequate explanation which is lacking in this study.
Critics of anthropological studies may latch on to this fact. Regardless, Ott
should be commended for making broader connections between the past
and present and between the region and nation.
Expanding our
understanding of such social and cultural complexities proves an asset for
historians attempting to bridge memory with the past.
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Kathryn A. Bard, An Introduction to the Archaeology of Ancient Egypt (Malden,
Ma: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).
Reviewed by Jeff Cutright
Jeff ‘s interests include the relationships between the Roman and Parthian Empires and the interactions
between an assortment of ancient and early medieval cultures along frontier regions. After completing
the M.A. here at EIU, he will attend Louisiana State University to begin work on a Ph.D. in ancient
history.

In her preface, Kathryn Bard states the impetus for writing this book was
that there was “no one text that covered everything … in a comprehensive
survey.”1 Attempting to incorporate everything she ever “wanted to know
about ancient Egypt” when first beginning her study, Bard’s first three
chapters include the background necessary to understand the survey of
Egyptian archaeology and history.2 These initial chapters focus on the
ecology, geography, and natural resources available in Egypt. The
following seven chapters offer a detailed analysis of Egyptian archaeology
on a chronological foundation beginning with the Paleolithic, around
500,000 years ago, and extending through the Greco-Roman Period.
While textbooks on Egyptian history discuss the archaeology to
supplement the history, Bard explicates the history based in, and extracted
from, the archaeology of Egypt, not the other way around. Throughout the
book, Bard narrates a thoroughly detailed and thoughtful history of Egypt.
Bard devotes the final chapter to a summary of the current applications and
potential implications of ancient Egyptian archaeology. In keeping with
her stated goal of writing a textbook designed for classroom, Bard includes
a set of chapter summaries and review questions in the back. Finally, Bard
provides a glossary of terms as well as an extensive “suggested readings”
list.
Bard discusses Egyptian history from an archaeological point of
view, and utilizes an assortment of tools to aid the reader. She presents the
panorama of Egyptian historical periods, which are derived from cultural
and political considerations based on the important remains dating from
that period. In the section on the pyramid of King Khufu at Giza, Bard
provides a detailed map of the Giza Pyramid Complex.3 The map includes
the three largest pyramids built by Khufu, Khafre and Menkaure, and the
excavated subsidiary buildings such as mortuary temples, workers’ quarters
and the boat pits. Bard gives illuminating descriptions of the buildings and
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artifacts. She goes into ever-increasing detail on the excavations at Giza
and finally explores the statues discovered at the various parts of the site.4
One of the most impressive works of art in the ancient world
originates from the Giza Pyramid Complex. The life-size statue of King
Menkaura and his wife Khamerernebty II is shown in Plate 6.5. Bard notes
that the statue bears traces of the original paint, so what we see today is a
dull reflection of the original. Bard notes that fifteen statuettes of the king
existed at various stages of completion. Indeed, the pyramid itself was not
completed. This king was the last to build at Giza and his pyramid is tiny
compared to his father’s and grandfather’s.5 She further comments that the
incomplete pyramid, royal statuettes, and the relatively small size of
Menkaura’s pyramid point to possible economic difficulties, changes in the
religious practices of the time, or space on the Giza plateau. While
discussions of the current debates in Egyptian archaeology are outside the
primary purpose of her book, Bard believes the value of including such
material, if only in passing. This analysis of the implications for Egyptian
cultural, social and political history is founded on the examination of the
excavated objects. The archaeological discoveries spotlight the content of
the book.
To the student of ancient Egypt, justification for its study seems
superfluous. Nonetheless, in chapter eleven Bard spends some time and
effort illustrating the applications of Egyptology to other questions and
problems which lie outside the scope of ancient Egyptian studies. For
example, ancient Egypt provides both material remains and textual
evidence for the “earliest large territorial state” which “unlike most early
states…was a stable one, in existence for over 800 years, from Dynasty 0 to
the end of the Old Kingdom.”6 One such link is the study of the unification
of Egypt which illuminates the study of primary state formation.
Another example of the applications of archaeology is that it yields
information on environmental problems pertinent to the present day. Bard
notes that over its long history, Egypt became increasingly arid. The way
the Egyptian government and people reacted to, or failed to react to, these
environmental changes remains of great interest to modern researchers.
Comparing this textbook to others in the field would be useful.
However, as John Baines states on the back cover, no other scholarly
introduction to Egyptian archaeology exits that was also intended for
classroom use. One might compare Bard’s text with Nicholas Grimal’s A
History of Ancient Egypt, which presents Egyptian history as a coherent
narrative but does not generally link the history with archaeology in such a
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Ibid, 143.
Kings Khafre and Khufu, respectively.
6
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5
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direct way.7 While Bard’s text emphasizes the archaeology, she makes a
clear connection with the history. Bard has filled the need for a single text
integrating Egyptian archaeology and history into a pedagogically useful
textbook while maintaining a scholarly approach to the subject matter.
Bard’s discussion of the influence of Ancient Egypt on modern day
fiction and cinema represents a potential point of contestation regarding the
relevance of present-day pop-culture and archaeology. Her rationale was
that Egyptian archaeology and archaeologists exert an important influence
on society as a whole today. It has the beneficial effect of encouraging the
general public’s interest in ancient Egypt. Movies such as The Mummy
series, though obviously intended to entertain and not inform, opened the
door to more accurate portrayals of Ancient Egyptian society. Indeed, a
Hollywood rendition of Cleopatra stirred the first interest in Egyptian
history and archaeology in the author of this review.
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